US embassy cable - 05HARARE1271

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI INVIGORATING BASE TO CAPITALIZE ON GOZ 
WEAKNESS 
 
REF: PRETORIA 003284 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
1. (C) Summary.  In a September 8 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) President 
Morgan Tsvangirai said that ZANU-PF's hold on power was 
fragile and that he envisioned a more confrontational MDC 
as a means to boost the public's confidence in the 
opposition and to exploit the opening created by GOZ 
mis-steps over the last three months.  There may be a need 
for MDC leaders to be arrested, he said, in order to 
demonstrate the party's courage and leadership.  Noting 
that the MDC had been conducting a permanent parliamentary 
campaign for the past five years, Tsvangirai admitted that 
the party needed to retool and invest in training the party' 
s lower-rung cadre and in its communication network, 
especially in the rural areas.  The Ambassador reiterated 
US willingness to support Zimbabwe's democratic forces in 
appropriate ways.  Tsvangirai noted that continued debate 
over whether to participate in Senate elections and 
differing views over the agenda for the MDC's party 
congress to be held early next year may, however, divert 
the party's attention from these institution building 
moves.  End Summary. 
 
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ZANU-PF Down, But MDC in Need of Courage 
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2.  (C) Tsvangirai told the Ambassador that ZANU-PF was 
treading on fragile ground and that some ruling party 
members were beginning to question whether the end was 
near.  He pointed to the international community's 
condemnation of Operation Restore Order and divisions 
amongst Mugabe's traditional African backers as evidence 
that the regime was increasingly isolated.  Tsvangirai said 
it was, however, na e to think that President Mugabe would 
become a democrat and step down.  Instead, he said Mugabe 
is prepared to die in office.  Meanwhile, some ZANU-PF 
members, including parliamentary whip Joram Gumbo, had been 
reaching out to the MDC citing "irreconcilable differences" 
within the regime.  Tsvangirai said that these talks might 
produce a union that could work together in parliament or 
contest the next election. 
 
3.  (C) Tsvangirai said that during his on-going travel 
around Zimbabwe he sensed that the GOZ's "burn the house 
down" mentality - as evidenced by Operation Restore Order - 
has left the Zimbabwean people increasingly demanding a 
change.  Rather than being squashed by the GOZ's brutality, 
the people were incensed and "challenged."  The MDC has to 
capitalize on this sentiment, he said, by demonstrating 
courage and proving - both domestically and internationally 
- that the democratic fight is still alive and relevant. 
He said that the opposition should not be a "debating club" 
and asserted that MDC leaders might have to be arrested at 
demonstrations to give the public confidence in their 
leadership. 
 
4.  (C) The MDC has been in election campaign mode for five 
years, but now was the time to focus on the party's 
institutions, according to Tsvangirai.  Noting the need 
both to renew the party and to confront the regime, he said 
that his top priorities now were to train the party's 
lower-level cadres and build a "rapid-response" 
communication network.  The lack of investment in training 
beyond the party's top leadership has left the majority of 
its personnel with "wishy-washy" campaign skills. 
Meanwhile, the party was losing the propaganda war. 
Tsvangirai agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion to tap 
 
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into Zimbabwe's "bush network," saying that the urbanites 
displaced by Operation Restore Order might give the party a 
useful beachhead into the rural areas.  Rather than destroy 
the MDC's urban base, Tsvangirai agreed with the Ambassador 
that "the virus" of the urban opposition was now being 
spread into the rural communities. 
 
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Distractions Ahead 
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5.  (C) Tsvangirai noted that his plans to strengthen the 
party's ranks and media connections might be undermined by 
ongoing debate regarding participation in the Senate and 
the MDC's party congress scheduled for February or March of 
next year.  Alluding to these hurdles, Tsvangirai said it 
would be a struggle to ensure that the party does not turn 
on itself.  He said he was opposed to the MDC's 
participation in the Senate, but noted that some MDC 
members may be inclined to participate in the upcoming 
election and that the party's posture on the Senate may 
prove to be divisive.  He called the Senate an unnecessary 
diversion from the real national issues and questioned how 
winning a few seats in the largely powerless Senate would 
help the MDC advance its fight against the regime.  Perhaps 
a bigger distraction will be the MDC's party congress next 
year.  Tsvangirai said that preparation for the congress 
was likely to divert the party's attention away from 
national issues and institution-building plans. 
 
6.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question regarding 
the political fortunes of the "third force" alternative to 
both ZANU-PF and the MDC, Tsvangirai doubted the movement's 
prospects, saying that its proponents lack popular 
support.  Suggesting that the third force was 
personality-driven, Tsvangirai said there was a need for 
unity against Mugabe's regime.  Even Jonathan Moyo - the 
third force's leading mouth - could only go so far in his 
criticism of the government, Tsvangirai said.  Tsvangirai 
suggested the GOZ tolerated Moyo, for now, but was prepared 
to crack down should he air too much of its dirty laundry, 
or present a genuine threat. 
 
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Role of the International Community 
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7.  (C) When asked by the Ambassador for ways the 
international community could help the opposition, 
Tsvangirai said other countries needed to condemn Operation 
 
SIPDIS 
Restore Order and follow through on the UN 
recommendations.  UN Special Envoy Tibaijuka's report, 
Tsvangirai cautioned, must not remain as simply debating 
 
SIPDIS 
points.  He even suggested that the EU bring a case before 
the International Criminal Court to prosecute the regime 
for launching Restore Order.  Once again saying that South 
African President Mbeki had failed to encourage dialogue in 
Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai said the international community 
needed to find some face-saving means to push forward on 
prospects for interparty talks, folding Mbeki into a 
larger, constructive process and thereby extricate him from 
his own failed role. 
 
8.  (C) Tsvangirai reiterated a proposal made earlier to 
Ambassador Frazer (reftel) that the prospects of lifting US 
financial and travel sanctions could be dangled to entice 
regime leaders to defect.  The Ambassador replied that the 
proposal was premature; in order for it to work, ZANU-PF 
leaders had to calculate that the end of Mugabe's reign was 
near and before we could think about an approach like this 
we would probably want to increase the pressure and sense 
of isolation these individuals felt they were under. 
 
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Comment 
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9. (C) Tsvangirai's analysis and recommendation for the MDC' 
s renewal appear to be right on.  Operation Restore Order 
and the UN's subsequent report have ignited criticism 
domestically, in the west, and within other African 
capitals that are increasingly seeing Mugabe as a 
liability.  Equally spot on, political and campaign savvy 
is limited to the MDC's upper rung and the opposition is 
falling behind in the propaganda war, highlighting the need 
for increased training and focus on communications, 
especially in rural areas. 
 
10.  (C) Despite the probity of his analysis, Tsvangirai 
fell flat on specific action steps for his party.  Echoing 
professed party priorities he has propounded continuously 
since the disappointing "final push" effort of 2003, his 
commitment to party rebuilding and more effective 
confrontation ring somewhat hollow.  Indeed, his goal of 
looking inward to rebuild to some extent conflicts with his 
stated need to demonstrate the party's relevance by 
directly and publicly confronting the regime.  This 
juggling act will be further complicated by the impending 
divide over the Senate - MDC middle-weights may be eagerly 
eying Senatorial paychecks - and the upcoming party 
congress. 
 
11.  (C) The MDC is battered and bruised after five years 
of fighting losing electoral campaigns and producing few 
results.  Emerging talk of the third force hints to the 
public's frustration with the MDC.  Tsvangirai seems seized 
with the imperative to demonstrate domestically and 
internationally that the MDC remains a credible force in 
Zimbabwean politics.  At the same time, continued inaction 
seems certain to accelerate a perception that the MDC is 
drifting toward further irrelevance.  To reverse this, it 
needs to be more effective at tapping into what Tsvangirai 
claims to be mounting public anger, strengthening its own 
structures and finding ways to chip away at ZANU's cohesion 
and unity. 
DELL