US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI6974

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006974 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS S, P, SA, NEA, NP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: KNNP, PREL, MNUC, IR, IN, India_Iran 
SUBJECT: INDIA NOTES US IRAN VIEWS; TRYING TO CLARIFY ITS 
POSITION 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  Our efforts here and Congress' reaction in 
Washington seem to be encouraging the Indians to review their 
public postures on Iran.  According to a senior MEA contact, 
they are mulling ways to restate their position in an 
unambiguous and helpful way.  Our MEA contacts cite Indian 
engagement with the EU3, Singapore, South Africa, and others 
in the IAEA in Vienna as evidence of their desire to be 
helpful on Iran.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WE GOT THEIR ATTENTION 
---------------------- 
 
2. (S) A/DCM met MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) Dr. 
Jaishankar on September 9 to review Iran (other topics 
covered septel).  Referring to the prominent Indian news 
coverage highlighting Rep. Lantos and others' views on 
India's Iran policy during  U/S Burns' and Joseph's hearing 
on September 8, A/DCM handed Jaishankar the testimony 
transcripts and asked what India planned to do to address its 
critics.  Jaishankar said India appreciated Burns' statement 
that FM Natwar Singh's remarks were only partially known and 
that the USG would seek further clarification of media 
reports. Natwar Singh had complained privately that he had 
been misquoted by the Iranian News Agency. 
 
WHAT IS YOUR POLICY, THEN? 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (S) Jaishankar explained that India's positions and those 
of America were not as far apart as the hearing made it 
appear to be.  "Nobody here says Iran is an exception to 
nonproliferation goals," clarified Jaishankar, It would be 
damaging to India, he insisted, if Iran were to become a 
nuclear weapons state.  Moreover, Jaishankar stressed that, 
since Iran is an NPT signatory, it must abide by its 
obligations or accept the consequences.  Jaishankar 
complained that India, as the "man in the middle" in the 
Iran-US confrontation, was facing criticism from both sides. 
He conceded that Iranian pressure was not as public as that 
of Congress, but it was nonetheless a factor.  Given India's 
ties with Iran, India could not just rebut Lantos by 
explaining its helpful stance behind closed doors at the IAEA 
in Vienna, lamented Jaishankar.  In any case, he admitted, 
India could not duck the issue; it would work in the IAEA 
with us, the EU3, South Africa, Singapore, and  just as it 
had in the past.  Jaishankar reported that FM Singh had 
consulted prior to visiting Tehran with his German and 
British counterparts (and was about to meet Germany's Iran 
point-person Fischer as we left the meeting). 
 
SO WHAT TO DO? 
-------------- 
 
4. (S) A/DCM pressed Jaishankar to explain how India would 
address concern in Washington over its Iran policy and 
perceptions of ambiguity created by Natwar Singh's public 
remarks.  Jaishankar suggested that India might be able to 
issue a nonpaper reiterating its views or might use a Foreign 
Ministry press briefing to re-articulate them.  In any case, 
he said, Iran should figure in Singh's conversation later 
September 9 with the Secretary and in Foreign Secretary 
Saran's conversation the same day with U/S Burns.  Much, he 
speculated, would be cleared-up that way.  A/DCM also pressed 
for public clarification of India's opposition to Iran's WMD 
effort, a suggestion Jaishankar agreed to pursue.  Later, he 
told A/DCM India would convey a nonpaper on Iran to us on 
Saturday, September 10.  Hopefully, he said, the nonpaper 
would clarify any misunderstandings.  A/DCM explained that in 
the past former NSA Mishra had regularly briefed the 
Secretary on India's official interaction with Iran when she 
 
SIPDIS 
was his counterpart.  Such consultations lent transparency to 
what India was doing and helped the US understand fully the 
situation.  Jaishankar took the point. 
 
SMELLING THE COFFEE 
------------------- 
 
5. (S) COMMENT: The September 8 HIRC statements on Iran by 
members of Congress served as a wake-up call to India that 
its Iran stance would directly impact its desire for 
legislative fixes that would implement the July 18 POTUS-PM 
Singh agreements, especially on civil nuclear technology. 
India is sufficiently concerned to restate its position on 
Iran's nuclear weapons.  We have an opportunity as a result. 
The Indians believe they have been helpful in the IAEA on 
Iran, but we should press for more.  END COMMENT. 
MULFORD