US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1455

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, EU, CG 
SUBJECT: EU SECURITY MISSION REFORM REPORT 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1447 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1.(U) The European Union Security Mission (EUSec) chief, 
General Joana, provided further details on the EUSec security 
sector reform report recently presented to the GDRC, as 
reported reftel.  Joana briefed the 16 Ambassadors/Charges of 
the International Committee to Accompany the Transition 
(CIAT) during the CIAT,s regular weekly meeting September 8. 
 
The Problem 
------------ 
 
2.(C) Joana outlined EUSec findings regarding the current 
administrative disarray of the FARDC.  Highlights of the 
Mission,s findings include the following: 
 
a) There is no accurate inventory of the total number of 
FARDC personnel, much less their deployments and movements. 
This applies to the "ex-government" forces as well as former 
"rebel" (i.e., MLC and RCD) units.  Clearly no pay or support 
system can be effective without an established base line. 
The current South African-led military census project will 
take a major first step toward establishing this base, but 
the ID cards being issued under this process lack biometric 
indicators.  Already, cases have been recorded of multiple 
registrations.  Since the census is being conducted over 
several months, personnel transfers between units already 
inventoried and those not yet covered will likely introduce 
further errors into the recorded numbers. 
 
b)  There is in essence no remaining administrative cadre 
left within the FARDC.  With administrative training and 
expertise neglected for years by Mobutu,s military, the 
problem has grown worse with the 1990,s cut-off of 
international training and support.  At this point, there has 
been a gap of about 10 years without any administrative 
specialist training, and there is nobody left with 
administrative expertise. 
 
c) The FARDC continues to make payments to disabled and de 
facto retired soldiers as well as to survivors (widows and 
children), because there are no viable systems in place to 
pick up defined state obligations to these individuals. 
 
d) The pay/support system is basically an inheritance of the 
dysfunctional Mobutu-era system, with weaknesses magnified by 
years of war and instability.  There is no legal statutory 
code defining pay, benefits, and responsibilities.  Pay is 
handled by an ad hoc system, with individual units defining 
the next month,s cash needs.  This information moves up the 
command chain, with cash eventually disbursed through the 
same chain. Inflated claims and corrupt skimming, and 
eventual near-total loss of control, are predictable results 
of such a system. 
 
e) Procurement for food rations is similarly dysfunctional, 
with a supposedly centralized procurement system unable to 
provide sufficient supplies, and costs magnified by the need 
for expensive transport to widely dispersed military units. 
Corruption arising within the rather loosely controlled 
cash-based systems clearly creates further problems. 
Approximately $2 million/month is now spent for food, but 
supplies are lacking throughout the country. 
 
f) Pay levels are completely inadequate.  The base enlisted 
pay of $10/month is clearly insufficient to support a 
soldier, much less the soldier,s family.  The lack of 
personnel control multiplies the problem.  A transferred 
soldier, for example, may end up for months not appearing on 
anyone,s claimed payroll.  Given the disarray in the system, 
this usually means no compensation for the lost time.  Health 
and education services to which the uniformed military are in 
theory entitled, have eroded to such a point over the years 
that they essentially now do not exist. 
 
g) Lodging is also nearly nonexistent or inadequate 
throughout the force, with large numbers of soldiers and 
families essentially without shelter. 
 
3.(C) To begin to address these issues, EUSec has made 
numerous recommendations, the main elements of which are 
summarized below.  Most will require international community 
support. 
 
a) Create the statutes and regulations necessary to define 
military service pay, benefits, and related conditions. 
 
b) Institute a follow-on ID exercise to the South African 
census project once completed, including biometric indicators 
to facilitate an accurate personnel data base and tracking 
system.  EUSec noted the system being utilized by CONADER, 
the agency in charge of DDR programs, as appropriate and 
suitable for adaptation.  This system includes iris scans, 
with information transferred to a central computerized data 
base.  If not practical, other technologies, including 
fingerprint scans, could of course be considered. 
 
c) Most critically, separate command and 
administrative/financial control functions.  Pay requirements 
and disbursement responsibility should be taken away from 
line commanders and vested with separate administrative 
controllers.  Pending training of skilled FARDC 
administrators, two international advisors should be assigned 
to each integrated brigade to assist with implementation of a 
reformed pay system. 
 
d) International community-supported training should be 
provided on an urgent basis to develop administrative skills 
and expertise within the FARDC. 
 
e) Payments to retired or disabled soldiers, as well as to 
widows and children survivors of deceased soldiers, should be 
taken off the Defense active-duty roster and transferred 
elsewhere.  (Disabled or retired soldiers, for example, can 
be handled through the CONADER-managed DDR process.) 
 
f) Develop systems to provide health and education services 
to military personnel and their dependents. 
 
g) Provide for basic lodging and shelter for soldiers and 
their families. 
 
h) Greatly step up international training efforts to increase 
the general professional military level of FARDC officers and 
troops.  There has been essentially no international training 
for at least five years until very recently, and the negative 
effects of this suspension are clear. 
 
i) Restore the FARDC,s own military schools. 
 
4.(C) Neither Joana nor CIAT members harbor any illusions 
about the magnitude of these tasks.  Clearly some are more 
urgently needed than others; i.e, ensuring basic adequate 
pay, food, and other support systems.  The EU in particular 
is already devoting substantial resources to DRC military 
training, integration, and reform in general, and the general 
sense is that the EU commitment will continue as long as 
progress is being recorded. 
 
5.(C) The EUSec report was presented to the GDRC Superior 
Defense Council the afternoon of September 7.  The session 
apparently was long, extending into the evening, and we do 
not yet have a read-out of the results. 
MEECE