US embassy cable - 05PARIS6109

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EB/TRA/OTP, S/CT AND EUR/WE 
DHS FOR TSA, ICE/CBP, AND ICE/FOREIGN OPS 
FBIHQ FOR OIO SC MICHAEL WELCH 
CTD/TSOU FOR SSA MICHAEL CAPUTO 
TSC FOR DONNA BUCELLA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: AIR FRANCE ADDRESSES LETTER TO AMBASSADOR ON JULY 
FLIGHT DIVERSION 
 
REFS:  A) Paris 4921 
 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In an August 29 letter to Ambassador, Air 
France CEO Jean-Cyril Spinetta raised a number of concerns 
about the July 8 diversion of AF flight 50 to Chicago due to 
the presence of a passenger on the "no-fly" list (reftel). 
He argues that Air France followed TSA procedures in this 
case, yet has born substantial costs to its treasury and 
reputation.  A summary of the letter follows in paragraphs 2 
and 3, with the text included in paragraph 4.  Post intends 
to respond to the letter based on the points suggested in 
paragraph 5.  End Summary 
 
2. (SBU) Spinetta points out that passenger Abed Khalifeh 
had a valid US passport, was not on the no-fly list used by 
AF to screen passengers for this flight, and could not have 
been matched to selectee list because the entry birthdate 
did not match.  He also notes that Khalifeh was able to 
return to the U.S. the following day without a problem. 
Moreover, his reservation had been made over a month before; 
in spite of the cost to AF, Spinetta believes that U.S. 
authorities had access to PNR data for over a month yet 
apparently made no use of information that should have 
pointed to a problem.  All of this indicates the probability 
of "a mistake by TSA."  AF cannot accept repetition of such 
mistakes, which have occurred several times in the past two 
years without AF being at fault.  He is "particularly 
surprised" at the disproportionate number of such incidents 
that have affected AF. They are costly (in this case 368,734 
Euros) and are hurting its reputation. 
 
3.  (SBU) In addition, Spinetta requests information about 
how the USG proposes to compensate AF for the "prejudice" it 
has suffered.  He also complains about a TSA press release 
indicating that AF had boarded a "positive hit," and says AF 
would like the right to correct the record. He closes by 
evoking AF's desire to pursue "positive and efficient" 
cooperation with TSA and CBP; and suggests that a 
"constructive dialogue" leading to better understanding is 
necessary.  He proposes that contacts both in Washington and 
Paris be intensified in order to achieve "precise and 
efficient operational processes" that can avoid such 
incidents in the future. 
 
4.  (SBU) Unofficial translation of Air France Chairman 
Spinetta's letter: 
 
Mr. Ambassador: 
 
As you have just taken up your functions, I regret bringing 
up, in my first letter to you, a very disturbing matter for 
Air France.  I nevertheless take the liberty to do so in the 
hope that you will understand. 
 
On July 8, 2005, AF flight 050 bound for Chicago was refused 
entry into U.S. airspace in mid-flight.  Air France 
management ordered the flight Captain to return to CDG 
airport because one of the passengers on board was on the 
"no fly list," which is regularly furnished to us by U.S. 
authorities. 
 
This case leads me to provide you with additional 
information on the way the incident unfolded and on the 
costs borne by Air France on this occasion. 
 
The passenger in question, Mr. Abed Khalifeh, born on 
January 1, 1960, was in possession of a passport valid under 
existing U.S. regulations.  He had made the reservations for 
himself and his family over a month before the flight. 
 
According to existing procedures, the list of passengers of 
AF flight 050 had been checked against the "no fly list", 
and no anomaly was or could have been detected since the 
family name, first name and date of birth of our passenger 
were completely different from those of the people on the 
list. 
 
Furthermore, and contrary to allegations by the TSA, 
published in the American press as early as July 8, we 
proceeded in the same manner with the "selectee list," and 
were unable to identify him as a "selectee" for the same 
reasons outlined previously (different date of birth, i.e. 
1980 instead of 1960). 
 
It is worth noting that Mr. Abed Khalifeh and his family 
finally flew to Chicago the following day, on our July 9 AF 
flight 050, without any problem this time. 
 
I will add that Mr. Abed Khalifeh had made reservations on 
June 3, 2005 on flight AF 050 of July 8, and that no 
modification in his travel record had taken place between 
reservation and check-in procedures. 
 
I would further like to point out that as of March 5, 2003, 
both the CBP and the TSA have access to all the records of 
Air France passengers traveling from and to the United 
States. 
While the U.S. authorities performed over 2 million 
transactions on passenger name record (PNR) data concerning 
Air France passengers during the month of June at a cost to 
Air France of some 26,000 Euros, and while these same 
authorities had more than a month to trace the passenger 
under suspicion, Air France was neither alerted nor informed 
about him.  This obviously raises serious questions about 
the interest of making our PNR data available, when it is 
evidently of no particular use, as illustrated in this 
particular case. 
 
General efforts by Air France to meet U.S. regulatory 
requirements, and permanent efforts by our staff to improve 
our responsiveness in cooperation with U.S. authorities, 
should have prevented such an incident, which would appear 
to originate in an error by the TSA. 
 
Air France cannot possibly accept that such errors be 
repeated, since for almost two years many of our flights to 
the U.S. have been similarly disrupted, without any known 
error on our part.  I would further like to note that it is 
particularly surprising that Air France flights represent 
such an important part -- almost half -- of all commercial 
flights to the U.S., either cancelled, re-routed or banned. 
 
Finally, the impact of this case, in terms of financial 
costs and bad publicity, cannot be ignored. 
 
As you may know, turning a commercial aircraft around 
produces additional costs, related to the replacement of the 
crew in accordance with the French Civil Aviation Code, 
aircraft assistance, fees, compensation to passengers, 
financial losses, flight delays affecting subsequent 
flights.  The decision to turn around this flight has cost 
us 368,734 Euros.  We would greatly appreciate knowing what 
U.S. authorities intend to do to compensate Air France for 
the financial prejudice incurred. 
 
Furthermore, the cost of such an operation on Air France's 
image is considerable.  Although it is normally accepted 
that no comment related to this type of event should ever be 
relayed to the media, the TSA published a press release 
asserting that "a passenger of the federal no fly list had 
been authorized to board the Air France flight to Chicago, 
that this time it was a positive hit," which greatly altered 
the image of the company. 
 
Even though part of the press in the U.S. reported the TSA's 
mistake, Air France believes it should enjoy a right to 
correct the record, in order to polish its tarnished image 
in the U.S. 
 
You are familiar with the difficulties encountered by all 
carriers over the past few years to meet growing operating 
costs, resulting from the oil price hike, as well as safety 
and security-related expenses.  While we remain convinced of 
the need to continue together our fight against the scourge 
of the 21st century we know as terrorism with the utmost 
energy, we cannot allow the commercial activities of Air 
France to be periodically disturbed by decisions that do not 
appear to be fully justified.  The frequent and repetitive 
nature of these incidents is extremely detrimental to us in 
most of our markets. 
 
At Air France, we have always endeavored to make our 
cooperation with the CBP and the TSA as positive and 
efficient as possible.  It has however become more and more 
evident that a constructive dialogue aimed at a greater 
mutual understanding needs to be established. 
 
My colleagues have met many times with U.S. officials in 
Washington as well as in Paris.  These meetings were 
designed to convey as clearly as possible the daily problems 
we encountered.  I would like to propose a rapid increase in 
the number of these working sessions to achieve the 
establishment of precise and efficient operational 
procedures, which will in turn prevent any further such 
incident from occurring. 
 
Supervised by competent French authorities for almost four 
years now, Air France has made efforts to follow all the 
successive requests of the U.S. Administration relating to 
security, as swiftly and efficiently as possible.  We 
respected the spirit and the letter, in a climate of trust 
backed-up by substantial investment.  I do not want to see 
these efforts compromised by inadequate and costly 
decisions. 
 
Complimentary closing. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Proposed points for use in reply: 
 
--We understand the concerns expressed in your letter.  Air 
France is a valued business partner of the United States and 
an important participant in the fight against terrorism. 
 
--We have never sought to place blame on Air France for this 
incident.  It is inevitable that at times last-minute 
information leads to airlines not possessing the latest 
version of the list, which is updated several times daily. 
The passenger in question was added to the No-Fly list late 
on July 6 based on information developed in the days 
immediately preceding the flight.  After subsequent 
evaluation of all the information pertaining to him, he was 
downgraded to a selectee the following day and permitted to 
fly home. 
 
--We recognize the particular burden that has fallen on Air 
France due to repeated flight diversions, and want to do 
everything we can to avoid them in the future.  In a few 
cases these were the product of unfortunate circumstances 
that placed suspicion on travelers that later proved to be 
unnecessary.  In other cases however we would point out that 
lack of notification by Air France led to flights being 
diverted.  For that reason, we are concerned that Air 
France's inability to implement the Selectee Emergency 
Amendment (EA) without French Government approval may 
increase the risk of future diversions.  We would like to 
work with you to ensure that full application of TSA 
security procedures, including particularly Selectee and 
Master Crew Lists, helps minimize the risk of flight 
diversions in the future. 
 
--We share your desire for closer cooperation in order to 
improve security procedures and diminish the risk of future 
flight diversions.  TSA has provided additional support to 
assist Air France with this, and we encourage you to contact 
Embassy representatives whenever you have questions about 
required procedures or need to resolve ambiguities about 
whether passengers names are on our watch lists.  This will 
permit us to better understand Air France's operating 
procedures and particular concerns, and we are hopeful that 
it will help us to develop solutions that meet the needs of 
all concerned.