US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK5791

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 005791 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS 
NSC FOR MORROW 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA (POWERS) 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, OVIP, TH 
SUBJECT: PM THAKSIN'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON 
 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Alex Arvizu, Charge d,Affaires, a.i.  Rea 
son 1.4 (a and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: PM Thaksin Shinawatra's September 19 meeting 
with the President presents an opportunity to underscore our 
deep and warm relations with Thailand and to build upon that 
relationship to strengthen our links to the rest of 
Southeast Asia.  Thaksin is the strongest Prime Minister in 
Thai history and retains a firm grip on power.  That being 
said, Thaksin,s political opponents have seized on recent 
vulnerabilities, including government missteps in dealing 
with separatist violence in Thailand,s restive southern 
provinces, as well as a distinct economic downturn.  Thaksin 
has promised the Thai public that he will deliver an "Action 
Plan" with the United States designed to enhance bilateral 
relations and Thailand,s stature in the region.  As for what 
we want to achieve, the Prime Minister's personal involvement 
is vital to push forward a number of key bilateral issues, 
including an Open Skies agreement, Thai endorsement of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, and a bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement.  We also encourage the President to speak candidly 
about our concerns regarding the situation in southern 
Thailand and the deplorable lack of political progress in 
Burma.  End Summary. 
 
THE STRONGEST PRIME MINISTER IN THAI HISTORY 
 
2. (C) Prime Minister Thaksin dominates politics in a way 
never before seen in Thailand.  His Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love 
Thais) political party holds 377 of the 500 elected seats in 
Parliament.  His Cabinet Ministers are beholden to him for 
their positions and tend not to make major decisions -- or 
often even minor ones -- without Thaksin's express approval. 
A successful businessman, Thaksin turned his family's 
company, Shinawatra Corporation, into the largest 
telecommunications concern in Southeast Asia, making himself 
a billionaire in the process.  His grasp of modern public 
relations was evident in both of his national election 
campaigns where he presented a polished, telegenic image to 
the electorate and ran on a platform that promised a 
twenty-first century economy coupled with a social welfare 
program that included virtually free health care and 
development grants to the nation's villages.  (The majority 
of the Thai population still resides in rural areas.) 
Thaksin,s power base, as a result, includes the captains of 
Thai industry, many business owners, and poor rural voters. 
Opposition Democratic Party leaders are in disarray, working 
to rebuild from their crushing defeat at the polls in 
February their support areas are now pretty much relegated to 
the party's traditional strongholds in the south and among 
the intelligentsia in the capital.  Thaksin displayed an iron 
hand in imposing discipline within his party in June when he 
beat back an attempt by the Democrats to censure the former 
Transport Minister for corruption and, in so doing, made 
clear that he would crush any Thai Rak Thai member or faction 
that supported the censure motion. 
 
THAKSIN,S AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES 
 
3. (C) With justification, critics accuse Thaksin of having 
little tolerance for dissenting views.  Critics also point 
out that Thaksin has curbed press freedom and filled key 
government positions (including in the military) with family 
members, Armed Forces Academy Prep School classmates and 
other confidants, often seemingly regardless of 
qualifications.  Supremely self-confident, he frequently 
makes snap decisions and rarely second-guesses himself.  In 
July, he pushed through the Cabinet an Emergency Decree in 
response to the ongoing violence in southern Thailand.  The 
sweeping measure has been roundly criticized by activists and 
scholars as giving security forces a virtual "license to 
kill" in the Muslim south (although the edict seems to be 
popular with the Thai public outside of the south and has yet 
to be enforced, in any case). 
 
THAKSIN'S VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT, AND 
HIMSELF 
 
4. (C) A graduate of the Thai National Police Academy, 
Thaksin also holds a master's degree in Criminal Justice from 
Eastern Kentucky University and a Ph.D. in Criminology from 
Sam Houston State.  With American visitors, he jokingly 
refers to himself as an "honorary Texan."  Speaking 
colloquial if heavily accented English, he is comfortable in 
the presence of Americans.  The Prime Minister is grateful 
for American assistance after the December 26 tsunami; it's 
worth recalling that he rapidly approved our request to use a 
Thai naval air base as the hub for U.S.-led international 
relief efforts to Indonesia and Sri Lanka.  Thaksin quickly 
grasped the opportunities created by U.S.-Thai cooperation in 
the tsunami aftermath and endorses our working  together to 
enhance security links with other countries in the region. 
 
5. (C) Thaksin also views himself as the man most qualified 
to lead ASEAN in the coming years.  He believes he has become 
a more important player on the global stage and, like other 
national leaders, responds favorably to  suggestions or 
proposals pitched personally by prominent leaders such as 
Vladimir Putin or Hu Jintao.  Drawing on his business 
experience, in recent  months Thaksin has kicked off a number 
of "Action Plans" with other countries designed to strengthen 
bilateral relations with China and others.  In practice, 
these plans seem to be virtually anything the two countries 
want them to be.  After meeting with Secretary Rice in Phuket 
in July, Thaksin unveiled in a subsequent weekly radio 
address his Action Plan with the United States; our upcoming 
Strategic Dialogue with Thailand (see para. 7) should be 
viewed as part of that plan.  He has been preparing for his 
meeting with the President for weeks and will probably 
respond favorably to any suggestions the President offers to 
strengthen the U.S.-Thai relationship that he can later pitch 
to the Thai public as fulfilling his launch of an "Action 
Plan with America." 
 
THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 
 
6. (C) Nothing better illustrates the strength of our 
security relationship than our bilateral cooperation in 
response to the December 26 tsunami.  Thanks to years of 
working with the Thai military, the United States was able to 
quickly deploy over one thousand American soldiers, marines, 
sailors and airmen to Utapao Naval Air Base and set up a hub 
to provide relief to tsunami victims in Thailand, Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka.  Thaksin and his senior military staff 
recognize that the good will emanating from the tsunami 
response affords both countries an opportunity to enhance the 
military relationship and to work jointly with other 
militaries in the region.  For years, Thailand has hosted the 
Cobra Gold annual exercise, our largest multilateral exercise 
in Asia.  Over time, that exercise has transformed from a 
bilateral event designed to thwart a Vietnamese invasion of 
Thailand to a multilateral exercise to train for peace 
keeping and disaster relief operations.  Recent exercises 
have allowed American and Thai troops to train with 
militaries from Singapore, Japan, the Philippines and others. 
 We are now planning for Cobra Gold 2006 which will include 
participation by Indonesia in addition to Singapore and 
Japan.  We are convinced that we and the Thai can work with 
other militaries to support key U.S. objectives in Asia such 
as improving responses to terrorism, enhancing peace keeping, 
promoting interoperability with U.S. forces, and improving 
maritime security -- while continuing to provide us a vital 
platform in the region from which to respond to future 
contingencies. 
 
7. (C) To enhance more strategic thinking among Thai military 
and civilian leaders, and as a way to shape Thaksin's Action 
Plan concept, we have agreed to send key officials from the 
Departments of State and Defense, the National Security 
Council, and the U.S. Pacific Command to hold a Strategic 
Dialogue in Bangkok in November.  This mechanism will also 
allow us to explore other tangible means to demonstrate 
America's commitment to the region.  We suggest the following 
points be made in the President's meeting: 
 
-- Our combined response to the December 26 tsunami 
illustrates the importance of our strategic relationship.  It 
also demonstrates opportunities to reach  out jointly to 
other countries in the region through exercises like Cobra 
Gold. 
 
-- We see the upcoming Strategic Dialogue as an integral part 
of a U.S.-Thai Action Plan to explore ways to further enhance 
our relationship. 
 
THE SOUTH AND TERRORISM 
 
8. (C) Thaksin's preeminent policy concern is how to respond 
to the unrest in southern Thailand.  The current violence is 
caused by separatist activity mixed with unfocused violence 
by disaffected Muslims and criminal activity.  All of this, 
together with an often heavy-handed response by security 
forces, has led to approximately 800 deaths since early 2004. 
 The ongoing violence has historic roots going back a century 
and is aimed at driving Thai Buddhists out of the region. 
While we are not aware of direct evidence of links between 
Thai separatists and outside terrorist groups, we are 
concerned that trans-national terrorist groups might attempt 
to take advantage of the situation.  Thaksin's  policy 
missteps over time clearly have exacerbated the violence. 
Although his recent Emergency Decree is controversial, there 
are some positive signs.  Earlier this year, Thaksin 
appointed a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) led by 
respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to make 
policy recommendations.  The NCR's work to date has received 
generally good marks from most objective Thai observers. 
Partially in response to NRC recommendations, Thaksin has 
committed to implementing much needed education and economic 
reforms to benefit southerners.  No one in Thailand, 
including Thaksin, seeks  a U.S. military presence in the 
south, and we must constantly deal with nefarious rumors that 
the U.S. is somehow behind the violence.  Nonetheless, there 
are areas where we can help.  We have stepped up human rights 
training of Thai troops rotating into the south to improve 
their ability to control crowds and  conduct other operations 
in ways consistent with international norms.  We are also 
working with the Thais to improve their intelligence sharing 
and gathering  capabilities. 
 
9. (C) The Prime Minister told the Ambassador that he is 
eager to discuss his southern policy with the President and 
address concerns that his policies are counterproductive.  We 
suggest the President consider making the following points: 
 
-- We recognize the situation in the south is an internal 
Thai affair.  We stand prepared to help to the extent we can 
by sharing intelligence, improving human rights training and 
assisting with educational reform, if Thailand so desires. 
 
-- We appreciate Thailand's assurances that the Emergency 
Decree will not be used to justify human rights abuses in the 
south. 
 
-- We are encouraged by the work of the National 
Reconciliation Commission. This distinguished group seems to 
have come up with some good recommendations.   We hope that 
your government will be able to work with them on 
implementation. 
 
BURMA 
 
10. (C) Under Thaksin, Thailand has maintained a strategy of 
engagement with Burma.  Pointing to the 1,400 mile long 
border the two countries share, Thaksin tells Americans that 
he has little choice but to engage the regime in Rangoon in 
order to address narcotics trafficking, refugees, and 
trafficking in  Persons.  He maintains that Thailand does 
press Burma behind-the-scenes.  Thaksin often likens 
Thailand's problem with illegal Burmese immigrants to 
America's concern with illegal workers from Mexico. 
Recently, we have detected some positive movement from 
Thaksin on Burma.  He told Secretary Rice in July that if the 
regime did not take some positive steps soon, he would be 
willing to call more openly for political progress.  We 
suggest that the President call him on this pledge: 
 
-- We both recognize that the regime in Rangoon is abhorrent. 
 You indicated to Secretary Rice in July that you would 
consider calling more openly for reform in Burma. 
 
-- We suggest that now is the time for you to join us in 
publicly calling on  Rangoon to release all political 
prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue with the democratic opposition. 
 
OPEN SKIES 
 
11. (C) The United States and Thailand have been discussing a 
passenger Open Skies arrangement since 2003.  Until recently, 
impediments laid by the Thai Ministry of Transport in support 
of Thai Airlines, which has long feared that an agreement 
would hurt its business, effectively blocked any chance for a 
deal.  But Thaksin personally endorsed an Open Skies 
agreement following Secretary Mineta,s visit earlier this 
year.  Thaksin dispatched an experienced government 
delegation to Washington for negotiations September 7-8 with 
an eye toward concluding an agreement.  If agreement is 
reached prior to the September 19 White House meeting, we 
suggest the President make the following point: 
 
-- Thank you for your personal attention to achieving an Open 
Skies agreement.  Successful implementation can help make 
Thailand a regional aviation hub and help boost tourism. 
 
If a deal is not reached, we suggest the President make the 
following point: 
 
-- Your personal attention is important in order for our 
sides to conclude a successful Open Skies agreement. 
 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
 
12. (C) Under Thaksin, Thailand has been supportive of our 
efforts to combat proliferation.  Despite our efforts since 
2003, however, Thaksin has not yet formally endorsed PSI.  He 
recently told Ambassador Boyce of his concern that endorsing 
PSI now risks aggravating Muslim separatist sentiment in the 
south.  Singapore is the only ASEAN nation that has endorsed 
PSI to date; Thaksin has told us private that if another 
ASEAN country were to endorse PSI (the Philippines is one 
possibility), that would give him sufficient political cover 
to bring Thailand on board.  We suggest the President make 
the following point: 
 
-- We appreciate Thailand's commitment to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
precursors.  PSI is a meaningful way for the international 
community to show unity in combating this threat. 
 
-- Thailand can demonstrate regional leadership by offering 
your endorsement of the PSI Statement of Principles. 
 
-- We will keep you appraised of our efforts to enlist 
support for PSI from within ASEAN and elsewhere. 
 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) 
 
13. (C) Our FTA talks with Thailand languish in part because 
few senior leaders in Thailand other than Thaksin himself 
fully endorse an agreement.  Recently, Thailand concluded an 
FTA with Japan only after Thaksin himself intervened at a key 
moment.  It will probably take the same personal touch from 
Thaksin to make progress in our talks.  Thaksin will likely 
tell the President that he fully endorses an FTA and that he 
does not envision any serious problems in eventually reaching 
a deal.  We suggest that the following points be made: 
 
-- An FTA is one of the most tangible ways to show the world 
how seriously we both are about enhancing our relationship. 
 
-- Your leadership is vital.  You are the greatest proponent 
of an FTA within your government.  We hope that you will 
instruct your key ministers that we need to begin making 
concrete progress soon. 
 
-- Ours must be a comprehensive agreement, covering all 
economic sectors, although we are willing to discuss phase-in 
periods. 
 
--Time is of the essence, if we are going to conclude an FTA, 
we have to reach agreement in the next few months. 
 
F-16 
 
14. (C) Thailand has been considering a purchase of 18 
fighter aircraft to replace aging F-5s in its fleet.  Up 
until several months ago, it appeared that Russian SU-30s or 
Swedish Saab Gripens would win the contract.  Since that 
time, we have worked closely with Lockheed Martin to ensure 
that F-16 receives serious consideration.  The Thai Air Force 
already has 59 F-16s and, by purchasing new F-16s, or 
upgrading its existing aircraft, Thailand would maintain 
interoperability with the U.S. military and enhance the 
likelihood that the Thai Air Force could buy the Joint Strike 
Fighter in the future.  Secretary Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld 
have both raised this issue with Thaksin.  Thaksin recently 
indicated to Ambassador Boyce that he may be willing to spend 
 400 million dollars on Lockheed Martin upgrades to existing 
F-16s, but in part due to the personal intervention of 
President Putin, he might be compelled to also buy new 
Russian SU-30s.  Thaksin seemed open to the idea, however, of 
forgoing buying any new aircraft and instead using his budget 
to upgrade existing F-16s.  This alternative would also 
benefit our security relationship and Lockheed Martin.  We 
suggest the President make the following points: 
 
-- If Thailand decides to purchase new fighter aircraft, F-16 
is the best option available.  It will be cheaper to 
maintain, more capable and interoperable with the United 
States -- your treaty ally. 
 
-- However, a less expensive way to improve your fleet would 
be mid-life upgrades of your fleet of F-16s -- thereby making 
them airworthy for years to come. 
 
CHINA 
 
15. (C) Thaksin maintains excellent relations with China.  He 
went to Beijing in July and will meet PRC Vice Premier Wu Yi 
in September upon his return from Washington.  Thai 
government and economic leaders subscribe to the maxim that 
"a rich China will lead to a prosperous Asia" and encourage 
further expansion of trade links between the two countries 
building on a limited FTA  covering some agricultural goods. 
Thaksin is dismissive of suggestions that Taiwan and the 
Mainland might someday come to blows, citing the PRC's 
paramount desire not to disturb economic growth.  PRC 
state-run media and cultural centers saturate the Thai 
market, reaching not only the 15 percent of Thai who are 
ethnic Chinese, but a growing number of the population in 
general.  Although the Thai military tends to have far more 
links with Americans than with Chinese, PLA ties with the 
Thai military are on the upswing through bargain-priced  arms 
sales, officer exchange programs, and offers to hold joint 
exercises.  Some Thai analysts are concerned that their 
leaders are too nonchalant about possible friction points 
Bangkok might have with Beijing in the future and call for 
greater discussions about China between Thai and U.S. 
representatives.  In the White House meeting, we suggest the 
President make the following point: 
 
-- We share a desire to see China become an engaged, mature 
member of the international community.  China's growing 
influence would be a good topic for discussion during our 
upcoming Strategic Dialogue. 
 
IN CLOSING AND HURRICANE KATRINA 
 
16. (C) Thaksin is eager to make a good impression in 
Washington and wants to show his constituencies that he is 
close to the President.  He has been personally involved in 
Thailand,s offers of assistance to those affected by 
Hurricane Katrina.  Thaksin,s personal involvement is 
essential to advance a number of key U.S. objectives and 
address our concerns, including terrorism, the violence in 
southern Thailand, Burma, PSI, an FTA, an Open Skies 
Agreement, and F-16s. 
ARVIZU