US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3694

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. A 958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: ENRG, MOPS, MARR, PINR, PGOV, PTER, EPET, MOPS, MARR, PINR, PGOV, PTER, IZ, Energy Sector, Parliament 
SUBJECT: CHALABI EMANDS MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK FROM SIBS 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i., DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASON 
S 1.4 (b) AND (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: At the September 4 meeting of the National 
Energy Council (NEC), Deputy Pri- Minister Ahmad Chalabi 
castigated Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Abadi for the poor 
performance of the Strategic Infrastructure BattQUions 
(SIBs) in protecting vital power and pipelines.  C0Jlabi 
stressed the GOI's urgent need for intelligence support and 
urged better screening of SIB members during Phase II SIB 
training to ensure these units' loyalty. Chalabi expressed 
interest in learning more about hardening pipelines against 
insurgent attacks.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi chaired a 
September 4 session of the National Energy Council (NEC). 
Present at the meeting were Minister of Oil (MO) Ibrahim 
Bahr al-'Ulum, Minister of Finance (MoF) 'Ali 'Allawi, 
Minister of Electricity (ME) Dr. Muhsin Shalash, Deputy JHQ 
Commander LTG Abadi, ME Security Advisor MG Sa'ad Hashim, 
and Infrastructure Coordination Cell Director BG Kamal. 
Also attending were Deputy Commander MNF-I LTG Brims, IRMO 
Deputy Director for Operations MG Robert Heine, IRMO 
advisors and Embassy Econoff (notetaker). 
 
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Chalabi on the Offensive 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) DPM Ahmad Chalabi and MO al-'Ulum castigated Deputy 
JHQ Commander LTG Abadi for the poor performance to date of 
the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions.  Referring to the 
recent blackout, which, combined with additional 
interdictions on the pipelines has resulted in a loss of 
oil export revenue, Chalabi claimed "the terrorists have 
defeated electricity over the summer."  Al-'Ulum noted that 
one of most recent attacks on the 30/32" crude oil line 
near al-Fatah had cut off the Bayji refinery from crude oil 
supply.  Chalabi predicted worse attacks to come, and said 
that the goal of the insurgents is to cut off the supply of 
benzene (gasoline) to Baghdad.  Al-'Ulum complained that he 
had repeatedly requested action from the Iraqi Army, but 
"nothing has been done" and that workers are still being 
killed around Bayji.  Chalabi said that the GOI had "done 
everything" recommended by MNF-I, spending $35 million to 
create the first SIB battalions. 
 
4. (C) Deputy Commander MNF-I LTG Brims defended the SIB 
program, emphasizing that the SIBs' positive effect is 
cumulative and will only increase over time.  Chalabi 
maintained that Abadi "had the wrong priorities," 
stationing SIBs in areas where attacks are no longer a 
problem.  The troops should be moved to the vital Bayji to 
Baghdad corridor immediately.  If the Iraqi Army (IA) is 
unable to handle the problem, Chalabi said, Kurdish 
brigades could be brought in to supplement their efforts. 
He also requested U.S. Predator overflights to protect 
infrastructure, expressing surprise that this is not 
already being done. 
 
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Urgent Need for Intelligence 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Chalabi said that, while they appreciate MNF-I 
support, what the ITG really needs is intelligence.  When 
Chalabi questioned the loyalty of the SIBs, Deputy 
Commander MNF-I LTG Brims recognized that the initial 
vetting process during SIB formation had not been as 
thorough as required.  Chalabi stressed that he expected 
better screening in the Phase II SIB training plan; LTG 
Brims said that the training and development of the SIBs is 
under constant review.  Chalabi said that it is more 
effective to weed out undesirable SIB members than to scrap 
the program. 
 
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Deployment and Action Update 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (C) MNF-I liaison briefed the NEC on the current status 
of Coalition, IA and SIB troop deployments.  A combination 
of permanent IA forces and MNF-I assets are currently 
guarding all 10 nodes and structures deemed to be Tier I - 
of critical importance.  Among these are the Bayji-Baghdad 
 #1 and #2 400KV power lines, the al-Fatah river crossing, 
the Bayji power plant and Bayji refinery.  SIBs are 
guarding the somewhat less critical Tier II (one of which 
is the Bayji-Baghdad crude oil line) and Tier III sites. 
Coalition forces are flying Seeker missions in the north, 
providing critical intelligence on insurgent movements, as 
are the CompAir flights monitoring the Bayji-Kirkuk 
pipeline route.  The Deputy Commander MNF-I stressed, 
however, that these flights - though useful - canQt be 
everywhere at once. 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: ENRG, EPET, MOPS, MARR, PINR, PGOV, PTER, IZ 
SUBJECT: CHALABI DEMANDS MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK FROM SIBS 
 
7. (C) MNF-I liaison reported that a composite IA 
battalion had been deployed to guard the Bayji-Baghdad 
400KV power lines in the Samarra corridor to address the 
immediate security emergency in the aftermath of the August 
22 blackout.  As of September 1, this battalion is being 
replaced by the 3rd Battalion, 1st IA Brigade, 5th 
Division, who will oversee security in this vital corridor 
through the end of the year.  Plans are underway to reduce 
the area that individual SIBs are responsible for 
patrolling, with MNC-I conducting an assessment to 
determine the best way to redeploy these units. 
 
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Electricity 
----------- 
 
8. (C) Minister of Electricity (ME) Dr. Muhsin Shalash 
agreed with MNF-I's assessment that the 80 meter electrical 
towers are critical, as they are difficult to put up once 
they have been knocked down in an attack.  MNF-I has 
identified them as "most vulnerable" and made them a 
priority for protection.  The speed with which ME repair 
crews have repaired the 60 and 80 meter towers was 
acknowledged.  ME Shalash said, however, that the 
electricity situation was far from stable and that they are 
barely "hanging on." The transmission network has averaged 
two attacks per day since July, and one of the two main 
Bayji-Baghdad lines are down more than they are up.  Iraq 
is producing record amounts of electricity, DPM Chalabi 
said, but "we can't deliver it."  The IRMO Senior Advisor 
for Electricity noted that PCO is considering the purchase 
of 20-30 additional Lindsay towers to assist ME with making 
urgent repairs (Note: The Lindsay towers are a temporary 
fix.  While they allow the ME to get lines up sooner, 
permanent tower repair is still necessary.  End Note). 
 
9. (C) MO al-'Ulum and DPM Chalabi expressed satisfaction 
with these moves and the immediacy with which they were 
carried out, but MO al-'Ulum stressed that what he really 
wanted to do was start pumping oil.  He said he understands 
that even the most aggressive deployment strategy is not 
going to prevent every attack: "I am willing to tolerate 
intermittent stoppage, just not permanent stoppage." 
 
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Physical Infrastructure Protection Upgrades 
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10. (C) MNF-I liaison suggested that hardening pipelines 
and electrical towers could be a cost-effective way to 
counter insurgent attacks.  For example, surrounding each 
of the 954 towers along the Bayji-Baghdad #1 and #2 
electrical lines  with an alarmed fence at a cost of $3500 
per tower, would cost approximately $3.5 million.  For oil 
there are a number of options, the most expensive of which 
would line both sides of the Bayji-Baghdad pipeline with 
earthen berms, a ditch, and one alarmed and one electrical 
fence for a cost of approximately $40 million.  Less 
expensive options are also available. 
Satterfield