US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1447

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, KPKO, CG 
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: MOVING - WITH DIFFICULTY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Several meetings in the past week have 
featured significant discussions at senior levels regarding 
critically important Security Sector Reform programs.  The 
Ambassador and President Kabila reviewed the subject 
September 2, a long September 6 CIAT/Espace Presidential 
underscored the need for further progress, and a Joint 
Security Commission meeting September 7 included detailed 
discussion of all major sector areas.  Five  integrated FARDC 
brigades have now been formed, but support is still a 
problem.  Delays have been encountered in starting the next 
training cycle.  The EU Security Mission has prepared an 
extensive plan to ensure salary payments and other support to 
integrated brigades; Kabila has given orders for expedited 
review and, hopefully, approval and implementation.  South 
African-led military census efforts are advancing, and 
predictably showing greatly reduced number of actual soldiers 
from earlier estimates.  The U.K. has promised to finance 
completion of the exercise, which ideally can be finished by 
the end of November.  Large-scale DDR programs finally seem 
to be moving forward in something approaching the original 
plan, although major challenges remain.  Disarmament and 
repatriation of foreign combatants remains a major concern. 
End summary. 
 
Security Sector on Numerous Agendas 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) The security sector and elections are the center 
points of the Congolese transition.  This cables summarizes 
discussions of key security sector issues that were discussed 
in several meetings over the past week, including a 
one-on-one Ambassador/President Kabila meeting September 2, a 
four and a half hour September 6 meeting involving the 
sixteen Ambassadors/Charges of the International Committee to 
Accompany the Transition (CIAT) and the Espace Presidentiel 
(President Kabila and the four GDRC Vice Presidents), and a 
GDRC/international community Joint Security Sector Commission 
meeting September 7.   The major areas covered in these 
discussions included the effort underway to form integrated 
brigades and a national army; the associated disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program; Congolese 
Armed Forces (FARDC) pay and support issues, including 
substantial European Security Mission findings and proposals; 
military census programs; and military deployment problems 
and constraints. 
 
3. (C) The weakness of FARDC capacity and the central 
importance to the DRC transition process of effective reform 
are universally recognized in Kinshasa.  More difficult is 
finding timely and effective solutions.  The Ambassador 
discussed the problem with President Kabila in their 
September 2 meeting.  The Ambassador emphasized that FARDC 
Chief of Staff General Kisempia shows no signs of interest in 
addressing serious support issues, but rather throws up a 
screen of excuses why progress has not been recorded.  Kabila 
took note, commenting that the problems have been  entrenched 
in the Zaire/Congo army for years and that a "new breed" of 
officers has to be developed to change the overall mindset. 
Separately, EmbOffs have been told by Presidency staff that 
Kabila has been ready for some time to get rid of Kisempia, 
but is not happy about the logical successor, current Air 
Force Commander John Numbi.  In recent days, Presidency staff 
have contacted the U.S. and other embassies seeking evidence 
of Kisempia,s direct involvement in salary skimming or other 
corrupt practices, and have also indicated that Kabila is 
looking at options that are politically viable to appoint a 
better prospect as FARDC Chief of Staff.  (Comment: Kabila,s 
reservations about Numbi are well-founded.  Numbi has been 
busy trying to build his own rival power base, and his name 
has been suggested by the U.K. for inclusion in a potential 
arms-trafficking sanctions list, although we are not aware of 
any evidence at this point of Numbi,s active involvement in 
arms trafficking.  Given the unsteady nature of the GDRC 
Transition Government, changing the FARDC Chief of Staff can 
provoke major tensions and possibly disruption within the 
GDRC.  That said, while Kisempia,s removal would not 
automatically translate into a solution of FARDC corruption 
problems, it would represent a positive step.  End comment.) 
 
Creating an Integrated Army 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The military integration process is at the heart of 
security sector reforms, and it deservedly received 
substantial discussion in recent meetings.  Five FARDC 
integrated brigades have now been formally trained and put in 
place, working toward a goal of 18 integrated brigades to be 
formed and deployed before 2006 elections.  (Note: This does 
not include the 2,500 FARDC troops that de facto have been 
trained by the MONUC Pakistani brigade in South Kivu province 
and are not part of any integrated FARDC brigades.  End 
note.)  The integrated brigades are urgently needed in Ituri 
District and North and South Kivu to conduct operations, but 
significant - and familiar - deployment and support problems 
have been encountered.  The Fourth Brigade, recently 
completing training at the Mushaki integration center, for 
example, was struck with a cholera epidemic while being 
deployed to Ituri District.  Compounding the problem, troops 
and dependents not hospitalized in Beni (North Kivu) were 
taken to a site near Bunia (Ituri District, Orientale 
Province) and placed there in quarantine, but without food, 
shelter or other essentials.  At the September 6 CIAT/Espace 
Presidentiel meeting, Vice President Z,Ahidi Ngoma charged 
that up to 1,000 ex-RCD troops had deserted this brigade, a 
charge vehemently denied by Vice President Ruberwa and 
Defense Minister Onusumba.  Defense Minister Onusumba was 
also put on the spot in the September 7 Joint Commission 
meeting, seeking to explain measures being taken to 
investigate what went wrong with this deployment and the 
steps underway to address the problems.  MONUC has been 
attempting to help to the degree it can in the interim, at 
least with food. 
 
5. (C) The Angolan-trained Third Brigade from the Kitona 
center has still not been deployed to its designated station 
in South Kivu.  Security officials asserted at the September 
7 meeting that the problem continues to be a lack of air 
transport for the troops and equipment, a problem also 
affecting the Belgium/South Africa-trained Second Brigade 
trained in Kamina, destined for North Kivu.  (Note: Given the 
distances involved and lack of roads, surface movements for 
these deployments are not feasible.)  The Kamina brigade is 
also still lacking some equipment which is being supplied and 
is en route from Belgium.  Both brigades are urgently needed, 
as neither North nor South Kivu as of yet have any FARDC 
integrated brigades in place.  In both the September 6 and 7 
meetings, the need to find rapid answers to the deployment 
problems was strongly reiterated. 
 
6. (C) Vice President Ruberwa also initiated discussion at 
the Joint Commission regarding roadblocks to getting 
combatants into place to start the next cycle of integration 
training.  Only a relative handful of the combatants 
designated to report are yet in the training centers. 
Problems identified as delaying progress include delays in 
assigning personnel (primarily EU and MONUC) to oversee the 
collection and processing of weapons, although all teams are 
as of this week reportedly now in place.  There also appears 
to be confusion in some areas as to who is to report and how. 
 Some units not designated for this cycle are reportedly 
waiting to be processed, while soldiers in other units which 
are designated do not seem to have all needed information. 
Ruberwa directed, and Defense Minister Onusumba and the FARDC 
Military Integration Service (SMI) commander undertook, to 
resolve the problem quickly.  Previous problems of how to 
ensure the transport of soldiers to processing centers for 
sorting into those being demobilized and those being 
integrated have now also been solved, in an agreement struck 
with the World Bank which is heavily involved in the 
demobilization effort. 
 
7. (SBU) On a more positive note, the SMI Commander reported 
that all integration centers have now been provisioned with 
food and other supplies, a major improvement over the 
previously existing situation.  The organization in charge of 
DDR, CONADER, also reported that its corresponding DDR sites 
are ready to proceed.  SMI also reported that a Dutch General 
(being financed by Holland) has also just arrived on detail 
to SMI to assist with organization and operations. 
 
DDR - Starting to Get On Track 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) CONADER indicates that it has at this point in excess 
of 20,000 people involved in DDR activities, plus another 
roughly 6,000 former child soldiers involved in community 
reintegration.  The bulk of this figure, however, comes from 
former Ituri militia members who submitted to DDR programs as 
a result of MONUC/FARDC First Integrated Brigade operations 
in recent months.  CONADER reported that it has largely 
solved payment issues and is now able to supply at least most 
promised payments to those being demobilized, except in Ituri 
District.   Ruberwa pointedly noted that Ituri arguably 
represents the most urgent location where payments are needed 
to ensure the former militiamen do not revert to armed 
activity.  CONADER noted that agreements are nearing 
completion with the World Bank and implementing partners that 
will enable Ituri programs to go forward.  The Ambassador 
noted in the September 7 meeting that USAID is strongly 
engaged in this effort, with a substantial commitment of USD 
2 million to supplement a World Bank USD 4 million to 
implement effective Ituri reintegration activities as quickly 
as possible. 
 
9. (SBU) CONADER also reported that it is now ready to begin 
receiving soldiers who are designated for demobilization from 
the integration "orientation centers", in accordance with the 
original integration/DDR model.  That model had been severely 
distorted in recent months by multiple "emergency plans" 
largely put in place following Rwanda,s threats in late 2004 
to stage cross-border unilateral military action.  The South 
Africans reported at the September 7 meeting that their 
military census activity has already indentified 25,693 
soldiers in active duty ranks in seven military districts as 
preferring, or being selected for, disarmament. 
 
Salaries and Support - EU Report 
--------------------------------- 
 
10. (U) The familiar topic of salary payments and needed 
support for FARDC troops was discussed in all three meetings. 
 There has been little to no improvement to-date in this 
area; troops, including those in integrated brigades, are not 
receiving regular salary payments, nor ongoing essential 
support (e.g., food, supplies, etc).  All key players 
recognize this as a major problem for FARDC effectiveness, 
and indeed a threat to Transition progress. 
 
11. (C) Minister of Defense Onusumba in the CIAT/Espace 
Presidentiel meeting reported that the EU Security Mission in 
the DRC has completed a report on support questions, with 
extensive recommendations.  Apparently equipped with a copy 
which was several inches thick, the Minister indicated that 
he intended to bring the report to the Government as soon as 
possible.  President Kabila asked Onusumba to skip the usual 
step of discussing it in the Political Committee, and to save 
time instead by bringing it directly to the High Defense 
Council, which met the afternoon of September 7. 
 
12. (C) Onusumuba and EUSec head General Joanna briefed the 
Joint Security Commission September 7 on key elements of the 
report.  In particular, they noted that pay reform proposals 
are keyed to separating FARDC line command functions from 
"chain of expenditure" responsibilities.  In other words, 
control of salary and other payments is to be vested with 
individuals specifically charged with, and presumably trained 
for, ensuring disbursements are made as intended, taking 
control of the funds away from line commanders.  This would, 
of course, preclude the traditional practice of 
Zairian/Congolese commanders skimming funds from the payroll, 
leaving little or no money to actually pay the troops.  EUSec 
also has personnel to detail to the FARDC to help train and 
oversee implementation of its recommendations.  Joanna noted 
that there are specific recommendations as to how funds 
should flow directly to brigades or affected units, as well 
as other aspects of financial controls to ensure support is 
provided. 
 
13. (C) Both the Minister and EUSec chief emphasized that 
implementation of the pay and other changes should start with 
the integrated brigades.  There is already a firm base line 
of how many soldiers are in these brigades and where they are 
deployed.  In addition, there is a clear advantage to 
underscoring the advantage to soldiers of participation in an 
integrated FARDC brigade vice the former belligerent 
factional units. 
 
Military Census - South African Progress 
----------------------------------------- 
 
14. (U) At the September 7 meeting, a South African officer 
delivered a summary report of progress and findings to-date 
of the South African-supported military census program.  This 
effort was launched to determine for the first time a firm 
base-line figure of the number of active duty combatants, as 
opposed to the inflated claimed figures that have long 
existed in all Congolese forces. 
 
15. (C) The census has largely been completed in seven 
military districts, with four left to cover.  A total of 
95,052 soldiers have been identified to-date and equipped 
with I.D. badges.  Of these, as noted in para 9, over 25,000 
have been designated for the disarmament program, with 
roughly 69,350 tentatively scheduled for integration (Note: 
All soldiers will still be subject to processing through the 
orientation centers for a determination of selection for 
integration or demobilization).  The South Africans did not 
report how many soldiers had been claimed in the units 
reviewed.  Other reports, however, suggest that typically, 
between 30% and 50% of the claimed forces cannot be found. 
In the September 7 meeting, Vice President Ruberwa noted that 
even relatively high estimates for the remaining four 
military districts would bring the total number of soldiers 
to fewer than 150,000, with a significant portion of these to 
be demobilized.  Other commentary during the discussion noted 
that the Presidential Guard (GSSP) is not included in the 
inventory figures to-date.  GSSP numbers are estimated to 
total between 12,000 - 15,000 soldiers, but these are not 
attached to specific military districts.  Ruberwa expressed 
concern about the wide variance in the GSSP estimates. 
 
16. (C) Defense Minister Onusumba also reported that an 
in-house FARDC inventory was coming up with significantly 
higher numbers of soldiers, likely totaling well in excess of 
200,000.  He noted that the Defense budget is continuing to 
bear the burden of payments to widows and children out of 
what amounts to active-duty pay allocations.  Vice President 
Ruberwa suggested that the South African numbers are likely 
to be more accurate than the in-house numbers.   He also 
noted that survivor payments should be transferred to other 
ministries. 
 
17. (SBU) The outcome of the census will have a major impact 
on GDRC military pay allocations and systems.  In theory, the 
greatly reduced number of supposed soldiers can permit a 
general increase in pay levels without raising the overall 
defense budget.  Currently, enlisted soldiers are only 
scheduled to receive $10/month, an amount that is clearly 
insufficient for a soldier and family.  President Kabila told 
the Ambassador that the IMF has already been saying it wants 
the Defense budget reduced to correspond to the lower number 
of soldiers.  The Ambassador told Kabila that he, and other 
colleagues in the CIAT, favor using the ostensible "savings" 
to increase soldiers, pay to more acceptable levels. 
 
18. (C) Responding to a question, the South African officer 
reported that he hopes that the inventory exercise can be 
completed by the end of November.  The UK Ambassador reported 
that the British government, responding to concerns about 
inadequate funds, is ready to finance completion of the South 
Africa-supported exercise. 
 
USG Activities 
------------------ 
 
19. (SBU) The Ambassador briefed President Kabila regarding 
planned USG military cooperation efforts.  Notably this 
includes training for between 100 and 300 battalion and 
brigade staff officers (Note: using Mobutu-era leftover FMF 
funds) hopefully to be implemented no later than January 
2005.  Kabila welcomed the planned training, and indeed 
anything more the U.S. could  provide.  In addition, the U.S. 
is planning a Defense Institute for Legal Studies (DIILS) 
counterterrorism seminar September 19-23 which will involve 
security and law enforcement personnel, as well as civil 
society representatives, to be financed by available 
counterterrorism funds the DATT identified.  Some HIV/AIDS 
activities targeting the military are also in the pipeline. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
20. (SBU) Security sector reform in the DRC is an immense 
undertaking.  The various components including training, DDR, 
census, pay and support reform, and redeployments all 
represent moving parts that must work to some degree in 
tandem to avoid the general machinery grinding to a halt. 
With very major investments from the Europeans, Angolans, and 
South Africans, the process is moving forward, albeit 
haltingly, and some measurable progress is being recorded. 
It is of critical importance to accelerate the reform 
activities, however, to ensure domestic security and 
operational effectiveness against various Congolese and 
foreign armed groups in eastern Congo, and  to preclude a 
return to armed conflict by any party who might decide that 
the transition process and elections no longer serves his 
purpose. 
 
MEECE