US embassy cable - 05ANKARA5236

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PGOV, EU, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKS PREPARED TO ACCEPT EXISTING FRAMEWORK 
LANGUAGE, BUT NO MORE 
 
REF: ANKARA 5183 
 
Classified By: A/DCM James R. Moore, E.O. 12958, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 1. (C)  Summary:  In separate September 7 meetings with MFA 
Deputy U/S Bozkir and U/S Tuygan, Charge learned that the 
Turks are prepared to stomach some fairly tough language in 
the Negotiating Framework, especially if they can get 
slightly modified language in the Counter-Declaration, 
linking Cyprus recognition to a comprehensive UN settlement. 
They remain hopeful that October 3 will happen, are grateful 
to the British for their statesmanship and professionalism in 
moving the process forward, and hope they will have both 
documents in their hands prior to October 3.  It remains, 
however, a tough slog, and the GOT is concerned with possible 
opposition backlash and flagging public opinion.  End summary. 
 
Cyprus Recognition Language Remains a Problem 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  During Charge's September 7 introductory call on 
Turkish Deputy U/S Volkan Bozkir, who has overall 
responsibility for EU within the MFA, Bozkir offered a 
hands-on review of where the Turks stand on the two documents 
on which the EU is currently working - the 
counter-declaration and the Negotiating Framework.  Per 
Bozkir, the biggest stumbling blocks in the current version 
of the counter-declaration remain: 
 
--the requirement of "de jure normalization" with all EU 
member states, stated separately from the references to a 
comprehensive settlement on Cyprus, and 
 
--the inclusion of a 2006 review. 
 
These are both serious issues for Turkey.  With respect to 
the first point, Bozkir stated, if normalization and overall 
settlement are not explicitly tied to one another in a single 
paragraph, some could interpret it as a call for recognition 
of the Republic of Cyprus, prior to recognition within the 
framework of a comprehensive, UN-sponsored Cyprus settlement. 
 This would simply not be possible for Turkey.  As to the 
inclusion of a date one year hence for a review, this would 
again raise the public profile of what should at that point 
be routine negotiations.  The GOT's goal, having gotten the 
December 17 commitment to start negotiations, and then, they 
hope, the actual start of negotiations on October 3, is to 
remove this from the public eye.  It should become routine. 
Moreover, the EU has built-in mechanisms for regular review 
in the form of progress reports; an explicit additional date 
is not needed; it would be merely gratuitous.  The Turks have 
asked that it be deleted. 
 
3. (C)  As it stands, the draft language on Cyprus is 
difficult domestically for the GOT.  It could, Bozkir 
related, cause an opposition coalition that developed after 
December 17, and which consists of a mix of leftists, 
nationalists, social democrats, Islamists and even some in 
the military, to once again be highly critical of the 
government.  Other MFA officials have told us that PM Erdogan 
is concerned about defections among his own AK party members 
of parliament when the Additional Protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement comes up for ratification.  Public support for 
Turkey's EU accession, while still substantial at around 65%, 
has dropped from a high of 80%. 
 
4. (C)  Bozkir's expectation is that, however close CoReper 
were to come to agreement on the counter-declaration, they 
will leave it to Foreign Ministers to finalize - especially 
the difficult point on Cyprus recognition - at a meeting the 
British will convene o/a September 26.  EU FonMins will take 
up the nearly-finished Negotiating Framework at the same 
time, he asserted, bringing that to closure as well.  Bozkir 
described this as "not good" for Turkey, but perhaps a 
political necessity for the EU.  He expressed great 
appreciation for the UK's extraordinary and professional 
efforts on Turkey's behalf. 
 
Turks Willing to Live with Framework "As Is" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  The negotiating framework (the Framework) has 
remained essentially unchanged for some time.  The problem in 
the GOT's view lies in Section 4, which goes further than the 
spirit of December 17, turning elements into actual 
requirements that must be met to continue negotiations. 
These include references to Turkish-Greek relations, certain 
political and economic criteria, and the improvement of 
relations with the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
6. (C) In addition, the Framework contains a separate clause 
on the EU's absorption capacity.  In Bozkir's view, this is a 
clause of a different nature altogether, since it would 
require the Commission to look into the capacity of the EU 
during the course of the negotiations.  The result could be 
that, if the Commission determines the EU has insufficient 
absorption capacity, the negotiations could be stopped dead 
in their tracks through no fault on Turkey's part.  However, 
Bozkir concluded, the Turks have made it known that, in the 
spirit of compromise, they are prepared to live with these 
requirements as long as no new ones are added.  The GOT could 
not, he stressed, stomach any more. 
 
7. (C) Bozkir's read is that, based on the College of 
Commissioners, 20 of 25 members are prepared to leave it as 
is.  The five hold outs are France, Austria, Greece, Cyprus 
and the Czech Republic.  Of those, aside from the French, 
only the Austrian FM has expressed herself, and would have 
remained isolated, but for support from Prague.  His sense 
from his French counterparts is that they are pushing for 
France to return to a more reasonable stance, but are faced 
with the new political reality.  The result is that they 
continue to press in order to save face, but will, Bozkir 
believes, likely stop with the counter-declaration.  Still, 
he remains wary of what the French may do. 
 
They Need Both Documents Before October 3 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C)  The GOT continues to be appreciative of British 
efforts to bring both documents to closure prior to October 
3, in particular because if FM Gul is to travel to Brussels 
on October 3, he needs to be able to have the Framework in 
hand.  Otherwise, the Turkish Ambassador will represent 
Turkey at the official opening.  Bozkir assured Charge that 
the GOT would be ready with its negotiating team when the 
time came.  Its structure as a secretariat would change with 
the new parliament, as would its name and many of its faces, 
and it would gain clout.  Staffing, he stressed, would not be 
a problem.  The Turks would use appropriate ministries to 
assist a smaller secretariat with various chapters.  Bozkir 
assured Charge that the Additional Protocol would not/not be 
brought before parliament prior to October 3.  At this point, 
he concluded, they just need to get past the October 3 
starting gate. 
 
9. (C)  In a separate meeting with MFA U/S Ali Tuygan the 
same day, Tuygan admitted that the road to October 3 appeared 
to be a harder slog than he had expected.  In his 
consultations in EU capitals, however, he had stressed the 
need for the EU to agree on a Negotiating Framework and 
counter-declaration in good time, to allow the GOT to be 
prepared for October 3.  FM Gul, he reiterated, could not fly 
without such a mandate.  However, a number of states had 
pledged to Tuygan that they would be supportive and not 
remain on the sidelines.  "Every time," he lamented, "the joy 
is taken out of it."  After October 3, which Tuygan believes 
will happen, there will be a new political reality on the 
ground. 
 
10 (C)  Comment:  We continue to make the point to the Turks 
that they should keep their cool and continue to let the 
British navigate these difficult waters.  The Turks 
appreciate the ongoing UK effort, as well as ongoing USG 
behind-the-scenes support.  The GOT is keeping a watchful eye 
on the various EU players, though, and is not taking anything 
for granted.  End Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY