US embassy cable - 05DHAKA4440

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 004440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, BG, BG Terrorism 
SUBJECT: PRESSING THE BDG ON THE AUGUST 17 INVESTIGATION 
 
Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, Reason(s): 1.4 (b) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  We are pressing the BDG hard to step up its 
investigation of the August 17 blasts and to show it 
recognizes the blasts are a turning point in the development 
of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh.  With seven alleged 
bombers saying they belong to Jamaat ul-Mujahdin Bangladesh, 
there is a link now between a campaign of national terror and 
cohorts in sister groups who demand total sharia law, reject 
the Bangladesh constitution, attack NGO's working to help 
poor rural women, persecute religious minorities, exact 
vigilante justice on religious and political grounds, and 
encourage terrorism against the U.S.  While the Bangladeshi 
investigation appears disorganized if earnest, there is a 
conspicuous lack of political leadership to drive the case 
forward.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Two weeks after the 500 bomb blasts that rattled 
Bangladesh, the BDG's investigation was widely seen as 
disorganized and potentially stalled.  The military DGFI 
appears to be heavily involved in an inter-agency effort that 
includes major efforts by the police and the Rapid Action 
Battalion (RAB).  In our contacts with these and other BDG 
elements, it became clear that information and strategy were 
highly compartmentalized.  There was also confusion about 
what assistance the BDG wanted from the USG, though the 
final, official version was experts to assist on 
interrogation techniques and on analyzing financial 
documents.  There was conflicting information about the 
progress of the investigation. 
 
3. (C) On September 7-8, Charge met with DGFI DG Rumy, 
Foreign Minister Khan, and Home Minister of State Babar to 
underscore USG concerns and requests for information.  She 
has meetings with NSI DG Haider and PMO Principal Secretary 
Siddiqui scheduled for September 11, and has requested a 
meeting with PM Zia before she departs for UNGA on September 
12.  Charge's key points were: 
 
-- In response to the BDG's request for US technical 
assistance, we need a detailed notional schedule to ensure 
that US experts would be appropriately engaged upon arrival 
and not obliged to cool their heels as on previous occasions. 
 
 
-- We need an authoritative point of contact on the 
investigation who can cut across the different agencies 
involved in the investigation. 
 
-- Are there transcripts and/or videotapes of interrogations? 
If so, can we see them, along with phone logs and bank 
records? 
 
-- Is media reporting accurate that investigators believe the 
Kuwait-based NGO Revival of Islamic Heritage Society financed 
the blasts? 
 
-- Has the BDG requested Interpol "red notices" for Bangla 
Bhai and Abdur Rahman?  (Note: According to the FBI liaison 
at Interpol, Bangladesh has not submitted a "red notice" 
since the year 2000.)  When was the last credible sighting of 
Bangla Bhai? 
 
4. (C) Charge stressed the importance for Bangladesh and of 
Bangladesh's international credibility that it identify and 
punish the perpetrators and sponsors of the blasts.  She 
noted that some foreign governments are citing the blasts as 
proof that extremism has sunk deep roots in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, since the BDG says alleged bombers in its custody 
have confessed to being members of the banned Jamaat 
ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB), which is organizationally 
related to Professor Ghalib's Ahle Hadith Movement and Bangla 
Bhai's JMJB, there is now a clear linkage between a campaign 
of national terror and those extremists who demand the total 
imposition of sharia law, reject the Bangladesh constitution, 
attack NGO's working to help poor rural women, persecute 
religious minorities, exact vigilante justice on religious 
and political grounds, and encourage terrorism against the 
U.S.  Thus, it is no longer tenable to say that extremism is 
isolated or absent in Bangladesh. 
 
5. (C) DGFI's General Rumy said that Additional IG Faruk 
heads the inter-agency investigative committee comprised of 
police, RAB, Special Branch, NSI, and DGFI.  (Note: We have 
not previously heard of IG Faruk.)  He expressed surprise 
that Interpol might be helpful in tracking down Bangla Bhai 
and Abdur Rahman (Note: For months, the BDG has suggested 
they fled to India.)  Regarding financing, Rumy stated that 
the Kuwaiti and Saudi embassies had ignored his requests for 
information on NGO's funneling funds for mosque construction 
in Bangladesh. 
 
6. (C) Foreign Minister Khan undertook to pursue our requests 
with ministerial colleagues.  Bangladesh, he said, has no 
intention of hiding anything, there is a first time for 
everything, and "the August 17th bombing were a first time 
for us." 
 
7. (C) Home Minister of State Babar stated there have been 
227 arrests in the case, but only 60 appear to have serious 
involvement with the blasts.  Seven suspects have confessed 
before a magistrate, and 154 cases have been filed.  He 
promised Charge that we would have a notional schedule for 
the US expert by COB September 8, and assured us that the BDG 
has seized many bank documents that need to be analyzed. 
Regarding interrogations, he stated that the BDG wants 
someone who can sit with the 20 BDG interrogators working the 
case to provide suggestions on how to improve their 
questioning. (Note: We received a very general notional 
schedule that will need refinement.  RLA will be in touch 
with FBI to coordinate travel dates.) 
 
8. (C) On September 8, A/RSO met with Inspector General of 
Police Muhammad Abdul Quayyum to seek information on the 
August 17 investigation. Quayyum agreed to provide a complete 
list of detainees and those released.  He stated that a 
police and RAB force had raided an apartment in Dhaka on 
September 7, arresting four men and one woman, and finding 
bomb making material and a laptop. 
 
9. (C) Comment: Based on private and public statements by key 
officials, the BDG's emerging position is that the bomb 
blasts were executed by JMB members organized and duped by a 
"foreign power" (i.e., India).  Domestically, the opposition 
Awami League and others seem to have moved on from the blasts 
to new issues like fuel price hikes.  The disorganized and at 
times keystone cops nature of the BDG investigation can 
easily be attributed to incompetence, but at this point it 
appears that the BDG is unable or unwilling to see August 17 
as a turning point for Bangladesh and its relationship with 
various Islamist groups.  PMO leadership -- in the form of 
special events or addresses to the nation -- to bring the 
bombers to justice is conspicuously absent.  When it wants 
to, the PMO can act quickly and effectively.  Last week, for 
example, an outraged PM Zia mobilized the bureaucracy, 
police, and judiciary to secure in a matter of hours a stay 
on a court judgment declaring that the martial law government 
of her husband was unconstitutional.  Bangladesh remains a 
country where the past overshadows the future. 
CHAMMAS