US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2872

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NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES COUNTERNARCOTICS, THE ICC AND COTE D'IVOIRE WITH NSA MOHAMMED

Identifier: 02ABUJA2872
Wikileaks: View 02ABUJA2872 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2002-10-18 12:11:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL SNAR PGOV MOPS MASS IV NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002872 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2007 
TAGS: PREL, SNAR, PGOV, MOPS, MASS, IV, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES COUNTERNARCOTICS, 
THE ICC AND COTE D'IVOIRE WITH NSA MOHAMMED 
 
 
REF: STATE 192375 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASON 1.5 (B) AND 
(D). 
 
 
1.  (C) Counternarcotics: During a brief October 10 meeting 
with NSA Aliyu Mohammed, Ambassador Jeter underscored our 
concern regarding the modest funding the GON had provided its 
NDLEA this year.  The Ambassador noted that last year, NDLEA 
funding was supplemented toward the end of the year, there 
were no signs of a similar infusion now.  Ambassador Jeter 
told Mohammed the NDLEA funding levels would be a factor in 
the upcoming USG narcotic certification process. 
 
 
2.  (C) Saying that he understood our position, NSA Mohammed 
attributed the NDLEA/Presidency problem to the current 
political bickering between the President and the National 
Assembly.  The Executive-Legislative impasse had choked the 
flow of funds for many Ministries and agencies, he asserted. 
The NSA stated that he would raise the issue with President 
Obasanjo and the Justice Minister at their next meeting. 
(Note: Ambassador gave this same demarche to Attorney General 
Agabi.  End note.) 
 
 
3.  (C) ICC-Article 98: Ambassador Jeter made reftel 
demarche, underscoring that Nigeria's interests dovetailed 
with ours, given the country's active role in African and 
international peacekeeping missions.  Unlike Foreign Minister 
Lamido who had registered strong opposition when we broached 
the subject on an Article 98 agreement with him, Mohammed 
took on board our arguments and seemed interested in 
exploring possibilities.  He suggested that we send the draft 
agreement to him so that he can confer with the Minister of 
Justice and Minister of Defense.  The NSA also suggested that 
the Ambassador also demarche these senior officials.  He did 
not include the name of FM Lamido among those he would 
consult.  (Note: The draft agreement has been sent to the 
NSA.  End note.) 
 
 
4.  (C) Cote d'Ivoire: Mohammed stated Nigeria supported the 
Gbagbo government but stressed the only solution was to 
negotiate.  Nigeria shared our concern that the attempt at a 
military solution could further destabilize Cote d'Ivoire and 
drag its immediate neighbors into the fray.  Already Charles 
Taylor was offering the use of his territory to counterattack 
the rebels.  Mohammed stated President Obasanjo remained 
engaged and recently held telephone conversations with 
Chirac, Annan and Kufuor. 
 
 
5.  (C) When asked whether Obasanjo's offer to provide 
"safehaven" to the rebels still stood, Mohammed explained the 
offer was not to extract all the rebels, only the leadership. 
 Nigeria did not know how many rebels there were, so it would 
not make an open-ended commitment to take them all, he said. 
Inviting several hundred rebellious Ivorians to Nigeria would 
only turn Abidjan's headache into Abuja's, the NSA concluded. 
JETER 

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