US embassy cable - 05PARIS6076

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EUR A/S FRIED DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS AND OPINION LEADERS

Identifier: 05PARIS6076
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS6076 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-09-08 08:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL XF SY LE KMPI KDEM IS KPAL KPAO FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, XF, SY, LE, KMPI, KDEM, IS, KPAL, KPAO, FR 
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH 
SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS AND OPINION LEADERS 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and comment: EUR A/S Fried discussed U.S. 
BMENA strategy, Syria/Lebanon, and Israeli-Palestinian issues 
with senior French MFA and Presidency officials September 
1-2.  MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Thibault concurred that both the 
November Forum for the Future and Barcelona Summit need to be 
successful, but stressed French attachment to the Barcelona 
Process.  Fried explained initiatives to launch a Foundation 
and Fund for the Future in November, with French officials 
offering few substantive comments, beyond questioning the 
advisability of involving Lebanon in the Foundation. 
Thibault opined that UNSCR 1595 was producing unexpected, 
accelerated results in Lebanon, and stressed the GoF desire 
to consult on the planned Core Group ministerial in New York. 
 On possible sanctions on Syria, Thibault stressed the need 
to wait for the Mehlis report.  Thibault also suggested GoF 
reticence on a possible arms embargo targeting Hizballah, 
warning that we are entering a dangerous phase in Lebanon and 
stressing the need to preserve international consensus, 
especially Arab support.  President Chirac will raise with 
President Putin the unhelpful Russian role in recent UNSC 
consultations on the Mehlis report.  French officials agreed 
with Fried on the need to make Gaza withdrawal a success.  In 
a series of successful public diplomacy events, including a 
friendly public debate with former FM Hubert Vedrine, A/S 
Fried made the case for a common agenda to promote freedom in 
the Broader Middle East, to receptive audiences of Arab 
ambassadors, academics, journalists and French opinion 
leaders.  End summary and comment. 
 
2. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried met with French A/S-equivalent 
for North Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault September 
2 and discussed U.S. strategy on BMENA, Syria/Lebanon and 
Israeli-Palestinian issues.  (Fried also discussed these 
issues in lesser detail September 1 with Presidential 
Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne and MFA 
Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye; their comments on 
non-Middle East related issues are reported septel.)  Fried 
was accompanied during the Thibault meeting by NEA DAS Scott 
Carpenter, Acting POL M/C, and poloff (notetaker). 
 
BMENA: FORUM, FOUNDATION AND FUND INITIATIVES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) A/S Fried briefed Thibault, Gourdault-Montagne, and 
Laboulaye on U.S. strategy for BMENA in coming months, 
stressing that we wanted both the November Forum for the 
Future and the Barcelona Process summit to be successful. 
BMENA and Barcelona were not in competition, nor was the U.S. 
seeking to take over EU efforts; both initiatives should be 
viewed as working towards similar objectives.  In this 
context, the U.S. was seeking to work with a core group of 
interested European governments to help BMENA stand on its 
own and give a chance for all interested European government 
to participate, particularly with the Russian G-8 presidency 
approaching.  Both Spain and Denmark appeared interested in a 
greater role in the Forum.  Fried observed that it was France 
that had sought originally to make the Forum for the Future 
the centerpiece of the BMENA, which was precisely what was 
taking place. 
 
4. (C) Thibault conceded that there was no contradiction 
between Barcelona and BMENA, which had many shared values. 
Nevertheless, the GoF remained focused on the 
"Euro-Mediterranean dimension" of the Barcelona process, 
which remained a strategic element of French foreign policy. 
The Barcelona Process, though it contained democracy and 
development aspects, was essentially broader in scope than 
BMENA.  Thibault also cited the sizable funds expended under 
Barcelona and stressed that the GoF would always make sure 
that the Barcelona Process was supported.  In separate 
comments to Fried, Laboulaye assessed that Barcelona had not 
met the goals it set out in 1995, but blamed the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the lack of progress. 
Laboulaye worried that BMENA could get similarly sidetracked 
by the Israeli-Palestinian issue, or by Iraq or generalized 
"hatred of the West."  On the latter point, Laboulaye mused 
that many Arab youth who professed hatred for the U.S. shared 
a fascination with America and wanted to be as successful as 
Arab-Americans, which gave some cause for hope. 
 
5. (C) Fried briefed his French interlocutors on proposals to 
launch a Foundation and Fund for the Future at the November 
Forum for the Future, recalling recent briefings to the 
French and other EU embassies in Washington.  He stressed 
that the proposed Foundation would be independent and not 
U.S.-led, with private U.S., European, and regional 
participation.  The U.S. had begun quiet consultations with 
Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Lebanon, with initial positive 
reactions.  Thibault responded by asking pointedly why and 
when the U.S. had approached Lebanon on the issue.  Thibault 
conceded that that there was a rationale for including 
Lebanon in the foundation, given its need for political and 
economic reform; he questioned, however, whether it was the 
right moment to put Lebanon at the forefront of Middle East 
reform, given the delicacy of its current political 
situation. 
 
6. (C) On the proposed Fund for the Future, Fried noted that 
we were close to concluding MOU's with Egypt and Morocco, and 
Jordan wanted in as well.  Fried summed up that senior U.S. 
officials would visit Rome, Madrid and Brussels the following 
week to explain these initiatives, and that Paris was being 
consulted first.  He stressed that we wanted French views, 
and ideally were seeking a roll-out of the Foundation and 
Fund boards by the November 11-12 Forum for the Future in 
Bahrain.  Thibault offered minimal response, beyond noting 
that the G-8 at Gleneagles had not endorsed the foundation 
initiative, cautioning against creating too many new 
institutions, and seeking details on the positions of Egypt 
and other key Arab countries.  He added that France was 
interested in the Forum for the Future process and had sent 
its Education Minister to the recent ministerial in Jordan, 
in addition to sending then-FM Barnier to the inaugural Forum 
last December in Rabat. 
 
CAUTION ON SYRIA/LEBANON 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Thibault observed that political developments in 
Lebanon were moving at an accelerated pace and constantly 
defying expectations, as seen in the recent arrests and 
charges issued against the former security chiefs and 
Presidential Guard Chief Mustafa Hamdan.  The GOL decision to 
respond to Mehlis' requests was important and showed 
unexpected courage on the its part.  The GoF wanted to 
continue consulting with the U.S. on what might happen in the 
UNSC and on planning for the expected Core Group ministerial 
on the margins of UNGA in New York.  At the same time, 
Thibault stressed, it was too early to draw conclusions prior 
to issuance of Mehlis' final report in October, and we needed 
to proceed with discretion. 
 
8.  (C) Fried observed that Lebanon developments were a 
vindication of Chirac's leadership and strategy in initiating 
UNSCR 1559: by concentrating on Lebanon first, we would have 
direct impact on Syria.  While Thibault concurred, he 
remained circumspect when asked how we should handle Syria, 
given the accelerating developments in Lebanon.  Although the 
GoF was willing to consider possible sanctions on Syria, 
everything depended on the Mehlis report and to what degree 
it fingered Lebanese or Syrian officials.  As for a possible 
arms embargo limiting arms transfers to the GOL only, 
Thibault was more reticent, noting that such a UNSCR had more 
to do with UNSCR 1559 that UNSCR 1595, and could undermine 
international consensus on Lebanon.  In the French view, 
Lebanon was entering a "very dangerous period;" whereas up to 
now progress had been relatively easy, now we were 
approaching the core of the problem, including Syria, Iran, 
and Hizballah. 
 
9. (C) A/S Fried observed that, in the context of our 
bilateral cooperation on Lebanon, every time we had taken the 
initiative we had succeeded, so we should keep pushing 
forward.  Thibault stressed the importance of UNSC consensus 
and having a realistic assessment of what we can achieve in 
the Council, while keeping Egypt and Saudi Arabia on board. 
A/S Fried stressed the need for Russia in particular to hear 
a reinforcing message from France on Lebanon.  In a separate 
discussion with A/S Fried, Diplomatic Advisor 
Gourdault-Montagne confirmed that President Chirac would soon 
speak with President Putin to raise Russia's unhelpful 
actions during recent UNSC consultations on the interim 
Mehlis report, in addition to the Iran nuclear issue. 
 
AGREEMENT ON NEED TO MAKE GAZA WITHDRAWAL A SUCCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
10. (C) Thibault commended Israel's handling of Gaza 
withdrawal and noted FM Douste-Blazy's planned visit to 
Israel and the Occupied Territories September 7-8.  Thibault 
agreed with Fried on the need to make Gaza withdrawal a 
success, and reiterated French support for the mission of 
Quartet Special Envoy Wolfensohn, who met with Douste-Blazy 
and Chirac in Paris on September 1.  Fried cautioned that we 
had to be careful as the situation was fragile on both sides; 
President Chirac's praise for PM Sharon had been helpful in 
this context.  Thibault observed that Sharon's July visit to 
France had been highly successful and restored confidence 
between the two governments. 
 
FRIED SPEECH, OUTREACH EVENTS 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) A/S Fried delivered a well-received speech on 
building a common agenda to promote freedom in the broader 
Middle East to a packed audience of Arab ambassadors, senior 
MFA officials (including Political Director Laboulaye), 
prominent academics, think tankers, and journalists September 
1 at the Embassy,s Hotel Talleyrand.  Following A/S Fried,s 
remarks, former Foreign Minster Hubert Vedrine presented a 
polite, but skeptical commentary, in which he laid out the 
myriad reasons for caution regarding democratization in the 
Middle East, which he cautioned was not like making 
"Nescafe."  The audience was very receptive to the open 
exchange of views between Vedrine and Fried, who corrected 
misperceptions that the U.S. was seeking to "impose its will" 
on the region.  Fried also underlined that we were well aware 
of the challenges ahead, and were not seeking to make instant 
coffee.  (The only hostile questions were posed by an Irish 
journalist, who asked why the U.S. hadn't imposed a solution 
for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.)  A later dinner hosted 
by the Ambassador with key Arab League ambassadors underlined 
U.S. interest in soliciting Arab views on our shared forward 
strategy for freedom.  Meanwhile, Arab journalists, during a 
spirited, September 2 on-the-record roundtable with A/S 
Fried, questioned whether the U.S. was fully committed to 
pushing Middle East regimes to accept democratic reform. 
Specifically, they asked if the U.S. would take a more 
hardline stance on Egyptian elections and Syrian interference 
in Lebanon. 
 
12. (SBU) The DCM hosted an off-the-record lunch for A/S 
Fried, NEA DAS Carpenter, and a group of French opinion 
leaders September 2, stressing that the timing of the Fried 
visit early in the political season signaled the importance 
of the Franco-American relationship.  The group of 
journalists, authors, editors, and intellectuals agreed that, 
whereas in recent years the problems in the transatlantic 
relationship had been the issue of discussion, the situation 
had improved so that today the debate had shifted to how to 
address the common problems before us.  Picking up from the 
previous evening's speech, the lunch discussion touched on 
Middle East democratization and reforms currently taking 
place in the region, and the need to sustain international 
efforts to support the democratic shift.  Responding to a 
question on reform in Eastern Europe, A/S Fried discussed the 
democratic growing pains that now face Ukraine and the 
challenges posed by an increasingly troublesome Belarus. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (SBU) A/S Fried,s outreach to French decisionmakers, 
opinion leaders and a broader audience of Arab diplomats and 
journalists successfully reinforced the image of the 
Administration's interest in dialogue and coordinated action 
on promoting freedom in the Broader Middle East. 
Interlocutors at all events commented on the positive efforts 
of this outreach and open dialogue, particularly the 
September 1 speech/debate with former FM Vedrine.  Although 
Vedrine was not on board with all our ideas, the format of 
having a public dialogue was very effective and will be a 
useful model for future visitors.  End comment. 
 
14. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Fried. 
STAPLETON 

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