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| Identifier: | 05PARIS6076 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05PARIS6076 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Paris |
| Created: | 2005-09-08 08:01:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL XF SY LE KMPI KDEM IS KPAL KPAO FR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006076 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015 TAGS: PREL, XF, SY, LE, KMPI, KDEM, IS, KPAL, KPAO, FR SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS AND OPINION LEADERS Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). 1. (C) Summary and comment: EUR A/S Fried discussed U.S. BMENA strategy, Syria/Lebanon, and Israeli-Palestinian issues with senior French MFA and Presidency officials September 1-2. MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Thibault concurred that both the November Forum for the Future and Barcelona Summit need to be successful, but stressed French attachment to the Barcelona Process. Fried explained initiatives to launch a Foundation and Fund for the Future in November, with French officials offering few substantive comments, beyond questioning the advisability of involving Lebanon in the Foundation. Thibault opined that UNSCR 1595 was producing unexpected, accelerated results in Lebanon, and stressed the GoF desire to consult on the planned Core Group ministerial in New York. On possible sanctions on Syria, Thibault stressed the need to wait for the Mehlis report. Thibault also suggested GoF reticence on a possible arms embargo targeting Hizballah, warning that we are entering a dangerous phase in Lebanon and stressing the need to preserve international consensus, especially Arab support. President Chirac will raise with President Putin the unhelpful Russian role in recent UNSC consultations on the Mehlis report. French officials agreed with Fried on the need to make Gaza withdrawal a success. In a series of successful public diplomacy events, including a friendly public debate with former FM Hubert Vedrine, A/S Fried made the case for a common agenda to promote freedom in the Broader Middle East, to receptive audiences of Arab ambassadors, academics, journalists and French opinion leaders. End summary and comment. 2. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried met with French A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault September 2 and discussed U.S. strategy on BMENA, Syria/Lebanon and Israeli-Palestinian issues. (Fried also discussed these issues in lesser detail September 1 with Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne and MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye; their comments on non-Middle East related issues are reported septel.) Fried was accompanied during the Thibault meeting by NEA DAS Scott Carpenter, Acting POL M/C, and poloff (notetaker). BMENA: FORUM, FOUNDATION AND FUND INITIATIVES --------------------------------------------- 3. (C) A/S Fried briefed Thibault, Gourdault-Montagne, and Laboulaye on U.S. strategy for BMENA in coming months, stressing that we wanted both the November Forum for the Future and the Barcelona Process summit to be successful. BMENA and Barcelona were not in competition, nor was the U.S. seeking to take over EU efforts; both initiatives should be viewed as working towards similar objectives. In this context, the U.S. was seeking to work with a core group of interested European governments to help BMENA stand on its own and give a chance for all interested European government to participate, particularly with the Russian G-8 presidency approaching. Both Spain and Denmark appeared interested in a greater role in the Forum. Fried observed that it was France that had sought originally to make the Forum for the Future the centerpiece of the BMENA, which was precisely what was taking place. 4. (C) Thibault conceded that there was no contradiction between Barcelona and BMENA, which had many shared values. Nevertheless, the GoF remained focused on the "Euro-Mediterranean dimension" of the Barcelona process, which remained a strategic element of French foreign policy. The Barcelona Process, though it contained democracy and development aspects, was essentially broader in scope than BMENA. Thibault also cited the sizable funds expended under Barcelona and stressed that the GoF would always make sure that the Barcelona Process was supported. In separate comments to Fried, Laboulaye assessed that Barcelona had not met the goals it set out in 1995, but blamed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the lack of progress. Laboulaye worried that BMENA could get similarly sidetracked by the Israeli-Palestinian issue, or by Iraq or generalized "hatred of the West." On the latter point, Laboulaye mused that many Arab youth who professed hatred for the U.S. shared a fascination with America and wanted to be as successful as Arab-Americans, which gave some cause for hope. 5. (C) Fried briefed his French interlocutors on proposals to launch a Foundation and Fund for the Future at the November Forum for the Future, recalling recent briefings to the French and other EU embassies in Washington. He stressed that the proposed Foundation would be independent and not U.S.-led, with private U.S., European, and regional participation. The U.S. had begun quiet consultations with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Lebanon, with initial positive reactions. Thibault responded by asking pointedly why and when the U.S. had approached Lebanon on the issue. Thibault conceded that that there was a rationale for including Lebanon in the foundation, given its need for political and economic reform; he questioned, however, whether it was the right moment to put Lebanon at the forefront of Middle East reform, given the delicacy of its current political situation. 6. (C) On the proposed Fund for the Future, Fried noted that we were close to concluding MOU's with Egypt and Morocco, and Jordan wanted in as well. Fried summed up that senior U.S. officials would visit Rome, Madrid and Brussels the following week to explain these initiatives, and that Paris was being consulted first. He stressed that we wanted French views, and ideally were seeking a roll-out of the Foundation and Fund boards by the November 11-12 Forum for the Future in Bahrain. Thibault offered minimal response, beyond noting that the G-8 at Gleneagles had not endorsed the foundation initiative, cautioning against creating too many new institutions, and seeking details on the positions of Egypt and other key Arab countries. He added that France was interested in the Forum for the Future process and had sent its Education Minister to the recent ministerial in Jordan, in addition to sending then-FM Barnier to the inaugural Forum last December in Rabat. CAUTION ON SYRIA/LEBANON ------------------------ 7. (C) Thibault observed that political developments in Lebanon were moving at an accelerated pace and constantly defying expectations, as seen in the recent arrests and charges issued against the former security chiefs and Presidential Guard Chief Mustafa Hamdan. The GOL decision to respond to Mehlis' requests was important and showed unexpected courage on the its part. The GoF wanted to continue consulting with the U.S. on what might happen in the UNSC and on planning for the expected Core Group ministerial on the margins of UNGA in New York. At the same time, Thibault stressed, it was too early to draw conclusions prior to issuance of Mehlis' final report in October, and we needed to proceed with discretion. 8. (C) Fried observed that Lebanon developments were a vindication of Chirac's leadership and strategy in initiating UNSCR 1559: by concentrating on Lebanon first, we would have direct impact on Syria. While Thibault concurred, he remained circumspect when asked how we should handle Syria, given the accelerating developments in Lebanon. Although the GoF was willing to consider possible sanctions on Syria, everything depended on the Mehlis report and to what degree it fingered Lebanese or Syrian officials. As for a possible arms embargo limiting arms transfers to the GOL only, Thibault was more reticent, noting that such a UNSCR had more to do with UNSCR 1559 that UNSCR 1595, and could undermine international consensus on Lebanon. In the French view, Lebanon was entering a "very dangerous period;" whereas up to now progress had been relatively easy, now we were approaching the core of the problem, including Syria, Iran, and Hizballah. 9. (C) A/S Fried observed that, in the context of our bilateral cooperation on Lebanon, every time we had taken the initiative we had succeeded, so we should keep pushing forward. Thibault stressed the importance of UNSC consensus and having a realistic assessment of what we can achieve in the Council, while keeping Egypt and Saudi Arabia on board. A/S Fried stressed the need for Russia in particular to hear a reinforcing message from France on Lebanon. In a separate discussion with A/S Fried, Diplomatic Advisor Gourdault-Montagne confirmed that President Chirac would soon speak with President Putin to raise Russia's unhelpful actions during recent UNSC consultations on the interim Mehlis report, in addition to the Iran nuclear issue. AGREEMENT ON NEED TO MAKE GAZA WITHDRAWAL A SUCCESS --------------------------------------------- ------ 10. (C) Thibault commended Israel's handling of Gaza withdrawal and noted FM Douste-Blazy's planned visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories September 7-8. Thibault agreed with Fried on the need to make Gaza withdrawal a success, and reiterated French support for the mission of Quartet Special Envoy Wolfensohn, who met with Douste-Blazy and Chirac in Paris on September 1. Fried cautioned that we had to be careful as the situation was fragile on both sides; President Chirac's praise for PM Sharon had been helpful in this context. Thibault observed that Sharon's July visit to France had been highly successful and restored confidence between the two governments. FRIED SPEECH, OUTREACH EVENTS ----------------------------- 11. (SBU) A/S Fried delivered a well-received speech on building a common agenda to promote freedom in the broader Middle East to a packed audience of Arab ambassadors, senior MFA officials (including Political Director Laboulaye), prominent academics, think tankers, and journalists September 1 at the Embassy,s Hotel Talleyrand. Following A/S Fried,s remarks, former Foreign Minster Hubert Vedrine presented a polite, but skeptical commentary, in which he laid out the myriad reasons for caution regarding democratization in the Middle East, which he cautioned was not like making "Nescafe." The audience was very receptive to the open exchange of views between Vedrine and Fried, who corrected misperceptions that the U.S. was seeking to "impose its will" on the region. Fried also underlined that we were well aware of the challenges ahead, and were not seeking to make instant coffee. (The only hostile questions were posed by an Irish journalist, who asked why the U.S. hadn't imposed a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.) A later dinner hosted by the Ambassador with key Arab League ambassadors underlined U.S. interest in soliciting Arab views on our shared forward strategy for freedom. Meanwhile, Arab journalists, during a spirited, September 2 on-the-record roundtable with A/S Fried, questioned whether the U.S. was fully committed to pushing Middle East regimes to accept democratic reform. Specifically, they asked if the U.S. would take a more hardline stance on Egyptian elections and Syrian interference in Lebanon. 12. (SBU) The DCM hosted an off-the-record lunch for A/S Fried, NEA DAS Carpenter, and a group of French opinion leaders September 2, stressing that the timing of the Fried visit early in the political season signaled the importance of the Franco-American relationship. The group of journalists, authors, editors, and intellectuals agreed that, whereas in recent years the problems in the transatlantic relationship had been the issue of discussion, the situation had improved so that today the debate had shifted to how to address the common problems before us. Picking up from the previous evening's speech, the lunch discussion touched on Middle East democratization and reforms currently taking place in the region, and the need to sustain international efforts to support the democratic shift. Responding to a question on reform in Eastern Europe, A/S Fried discussed the democratic growing pains that now face Ukraine and the challenges posed by an increasingly troublesome Belarus. COMMENT ------- 13. (SBU) A/S Fried,s outreach to French decisionmakers, opinion leaders and a broader audience of Arab diplomats and journalists successfully reinforced the image of the Administration's interest in dialogue and coordinated action on promoting freedom in the Broader Middle East. Interlocutors at all events commented on the positive efforts of this outreach and open dialogue, particularly the September 1 speech/debate with former FM Vedrine. Although Vedrine was not on board with all our ideas, the format of having a public dialogue was very effective and will be a useful model for future visitors. End comment. 14. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Fried. STAPLETON
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