US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA2691

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

CANADA SHARES CONCERNS ON UNITED NATIONS SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT

Identifier: 05OTTAWA2691
Wikileaks: View 05OTTAWA2691 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ottawa
Created: 2005-09-07 21:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL CA UNGA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

072133Z Sep 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 002691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2010 
TAGS: PREL, CA, UNGA 
SUBJECT: CANADA SHARES CONCERNS ON UNITED NATIONS SUMMIT 
OUTCOME DOCUMENT 
 
REF: A) SECSTATE 163224 B) OTTAWA 2649 
 
Classified By: POLMINCOUNS BRIAN FLORA, REASONS 1.4 (B) (D) 
 
1. (C) Poloff presented reftel demarche points to 
Marie-Isabelle Massip, Director of the United Nations and 
Commonwealth Affairs Division of Foreign Affairs Canada. 
Massip said that Canada agrees with the U.S. on the 
importance of arriving at a strong outcome document and has 
instructed its delegation (which she described as 
&exasperated8) to work flexibly to arrive at a successful 
outcome.  She said she would reiterate this with them. 
Massip asked how strongly the U.S. really feels about the 
document, however, and said that while she accepts our 
contention that we seek a successful conclusion, is not sure 
this is well-known.  Massip suggested that our technique of 
sometimes entering into U.N. negotiations without a firm 
desire for an outcome could lead some to question whether 
this is a time when we would be just as happy if no outcome 
document was produced.  She believes we need to clarify this 
with the UN community. 
 
2. (C) Massip shares our concern with the direction the 
negotiations are going; the development segment, already the 
longest, has grown in the last few days.  She believes it is 
breaking down to the G-77 on one side and the U.S. and a few 
others on the other.  Canada would like to see the Monterey 
consensus reflected in the development document, with no 
blanket lifting of duties, and changes to the .7 percent of 
GDP language.  Massip said that the GOC has agreed to use our 
text as the negotiating text. 
 
3. (C) Massip is concerned with the way in which outcome 
document is being negotiated by clusters, which she admitted 
is the only way to move the document forward, but which could 
also lead to paralysis because people do not see the big 
picture.  In the end, she concludes that the document will go 
down to the wire and Foreign Ministers will have to get 
involved in final negotiations.  She also assumes that this 
will take place when the shorter documents the various 
parties have &in their pockets8 (especially the U.S., are 
taken out and considered. 
 
4. (C) Massip said the GOC is disappointed in how many G-77 
nations have dismissed the need for U.N. reform, and does not 
see that the Volker Report will necessarily change that.  She 
expressed that Canada is willing to be flexible, and it hopes 
that the U.S. too will be willing to sacrifice some of its 
pet projects in order to move the larger reform agenda 
forward.  She hopes that we collectively will not have to 
forego too much to obtain the support of the G-77. 
 
5. (C) Finally, Massip suggested that it would be helpful for 
friends such as Canada to know what our red lines are in 
terms of the outcome document, so that Canada can be as 
supportive as possible in the negotiations, and not 
accidentally cross them.  The only way to negotiate with the 
G-77 is through blocs. 
 
6. (C) In an earlier conversation with Acting Deputy Minister 
Michael Small on development issues in the UN, (ref b), 
Poloff was told that the GOC would like to emphasize the 
importance it places on the issue of the responsibility to 
protect, which is Canada,s number one issue in the UNGA.  He 
said the public comments by U.S. officials on the issue was 
reassuring to them.  Canada understands the U.S. is looking 
to be supportive and sees the issues, as Canada does, as one 
of moral not legal obligation.  If we collectively manage to 
get the responsibility to protect into the outcome document, 
it would be very positively received in Canada.  Again, Small 
said, the GOC is very appreciative of the support the U.S. 
and particularly Ambassador Bolton has offered Canada in this 
key area. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  Small,s comments were made on the margins 
of a meeting on development issues, but tie in with the later 
meeting with Massip.  Canada would look favorably at any 
support we can offer on the responsibility to protect and 
that overt help with this key issue for Canada would likely 
result in political support for our agenda. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04