US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA8409

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 008409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR H - PLEASE PASS TO CODEL DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, SNAR, ASEC, PTER, CO, CODEL 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DAVIS 
 
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Summary 
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1. (SBU) Post warmly welcomes the September 9-11 visit of 
CODEL Davis to Colombia.  With USG assistance, Colombian 
President Alvaro Uribe has made great strides in fighting 
drug trafficking and terrorism.  Drug eradication and 
interdiction are at record levels.  A nation-wide, 
multi-phased offensive by the security forces has re-taken 
key territory from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC).  The peace process with the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC) has already resulted in the 
demobilization of almost 9,000 paramilitaries with several 
thousand more expected.  Colombia's human rights record, 
although imperfect, is improving.  Executive-legislative 
relations have been tense, but Uribe managed to push through 
some important legislation, including a bill to allow 
presidential re-election.  The economy continues to improve 
and FTA talks have concluded the eleventh round.  Three U.S. 
citizens have been held hostage by the FARC for two and a 
half years now; their safe recovery continues to be one of 
our top priorities.  Uribe is a strong proponent of 
extradition.  End Summary. 
 
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U.S. Assistance Key to Security Improvements 
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2. (SBU) USG Assistance to Colombia (Plan Colombia) is 
premised on combating the interrelated issues of drug 
trafficking and terrorism and includes training, material 
aid, and guidance to the security forces and other 
institutions.  President Uribe and Colombian Minister of 
Defense (MOD) Camilo Ospina have characterized U.S. 
assistance as key to the GOC's "Democratic Security Policy" 
and acknowledged the United States as Colombia's most 
important ally.  Since taking office, President Uribe has 
focused on establishing a state presence throughout national 
territory. 
 
-- Plan Patriota: The military's multi-phased campaign plan 
to re-take areas dominated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) is entering its third year.  The first 
phase, which focused on securing Cundinamarca Department, 
which surrounds Bogota, pushed the FARC presence out of reach 
of the capital and resulted in the deaths of at least five 
mid-level FARC commanders.  The second, much more complex 
phase has reached the eighteen month mark and is focused on 
the FARC's traditional stronghold in southeastern Colombia. 
Infectious diseases - especially leishmaniasis, a parasitic 
skin and intestinal infection - and landmines are the leading 
causes of military casualties. 
 
-- FARC Attacks: FARC violence in the first half of 2005, 
although tactically aggressive, remained more a political 
tool than military tactic. 
 
-- Center for Coordinated Integral Action: With support from 
the U.S. MILGRP, the GOC formed an interagency center to 
facilitate social services in seven areas that have 
traditionally suffered from little state presence and 
pressure from illegal armed groups.  The Center focuses on 
providing immediate social services, including documentation 
and medical clinics, and establishing longer term projects, 
such as economic reactivation.  Approximately 40,000 
individuals have been enrolled in state health care, judges, 
investigators, and public defenders have been placed in all 
16 municipalities of the Plan Patriota area, and a public 
library was recently opened in the town of San Vicente del 
Caguan, which had long been dominated by the FARC. 
 
-- Plan Colombia II: The GOC has provided us with a draft 
proposal of Plan Colombia II.  Most of the program areas 
outlined are a continuation of the same goals the U.S. has 
supported since Plan Colombia's inception in 2000.  Congress 
will be asked to consider one new program area, which 
includes peace negotiations, demobilization, and 
reintegration of illegal armed groups. 
 
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Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Eradication and interdiction are at record levels. 
As of August 2005, over 110,000 hectares of coca and 1,500 
hectares of opium poppy had been sprayed since the beginning 
of 2005, and 15,500 hectares of coca and poppy were manually 
eradicated.  Ground fire against spray planes is well below 
2003's record levels but remains problematic. 
 
4.  (SBU) Interdiction operations are on target to match or 
exceed last year's record seizures.  Through July 2005, the 
Colombian National Police (CNP) had seized more than 65 
metric tons of cocaine and coca base and the Colombian navy 
had seized more than 75 tons of metric tons of cocaine.  In 
CY2004, GOC forces seized 178 metric tons of cocaine and coca 
base.  CNP interdiction units are also concentrating on 
capturing high value leadership targets of the FARC, ELN, and 
AUC, and have had several successes in seizing secondary 
leaders. 
 
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U.S Assistance to Development and Democracy-Building 
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5.  (U) The USAID Mission in Colombia funds programs to 
improve transparency of the justice system, assist farmers in 
growing alternative legal crops and livestock production, and 
supports more than 1.4 million Colombians displaced from the 
internal violence.  USAID is also strengthening a center to 
support children who had been forced to serve as child 
combatants.  These programs help reinforce Colombian 
society's democratic and social institutions. 
 
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Military Justice 
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6. (U) The Colombian military justice system has been 
criticized for inefficiency and weakness.  We have emphasized 
the importance of creating a system that delivers credible 
findings to ensure expeditious justice for both the innocent 
and the guilty.  In April, the Military Penal Justice 
Director submitted a "shock" reform package to Congress as 
the first step towards institutional streamlining.  A second 
reform package, slated for Congressional review in the next 
few weeks, would improve the long-term functioning of the 
institution. 
 
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Extradition 
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7. (SBU) President Uribe is a strong supporter of the 
U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship, and since taking 
office has approved more than 250 extraditions to the U.S. 
President Uribe, the prosecutor general and other senior GOC 
officials have expressed concern about the impact of 
amendments to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill 
dealing with extradition. 
 
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Peace Process 
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8. (SBU) The GOC has been holding negotiations with the 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) since 2002. 
Almost 9,000 paramilitaries have demobilized thus far.  The 
GOC has said up to 10,000 more paramilitaries could 
demobilize by the end of Uribe's term in August 2006.  The 
GOC has repeatedly stated that the peace process will not 
damage the excellent U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship. 
 
-- Aid to Demobilizations: Almost 9,000 paramilitaries have 
demobilized since Uribe took office, and he plans to 
demobilize the rest of the paramilitaries by year's end. 
Colombia has requested U.S. aid for the demobilization and 
reinsertion process, including police aid to prevent FARC 
inroads in areas formerly under paramilitary domination. 
 
-- Deserters: Since Uribe took office, almost 8,000 illegal 
armed group members have deserted and entered the 
government's reinsertion program.  The program has limited 
funding and logistical problems, but is slowly improving. 
 
9. (SBU) The Mexican government was facilitating peace talks 
between the GOC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), but 
the ELN has refused to suspend kidnapping.  The ELN 
unilaterally ended the facilitation process on April 18.  The 
FARC has shown no willingness to have peace talks or hold a 
"humanitarian exchange" to swap prisoners, but the GOC 
continues to attempt talks.  For example, President Uribe 
accepted the Catholic Church's offer to broker a 
"pre-dialogue" with the ELN and the FARC on August 23, but 
Archbishop Castro said on September 1 that the short-term 
prospects for success remained dim because the FARC had shown 
no flexibility. 
 
10. (U) President Uribe approved the Justice and Peace Law in 
July and established mechanisms to hold demobilized 
terrorists accountable for their crimes.  The law offers 
demobilized terrorists a five to eight year sentence followed 
by a 2.5 to four year parole period only if they fully 
demobilize, turn over all illicit assets, release all 
hostages and child soldiers, and give reparations to victims. 
 Individuals or groups organized for drug trafficking or 
illicit enrichment would not be eligible for reduced 
sentence.  Only crimes committed during membership in, and in 
the service of, the illegal armed group would be eligible. 
The law has been criticized since the debate phase about 
being too soft on criminals, but implementation will be the 
key to ensure that both the goals of peace and justice are 
realized. 
 
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Human Rights Record Improving 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress 
on human rights.  Homicides fell by 16 percent, kidnappings 
by 42 percent, and forced displacements by 37 percent in 
2004, building on 2003's trends.  The GOC increased its 
dialogue with NGOs, the UN, and foreign governments, hosting 
meetings with local and international human rights 
organizations that included over 40 hours of discussions on 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' 27 
human rights recommendations for Colombia.  Human rights 
training is mandatory for all members of the military and 
police.  Less than two percent of human rights violations are 
attributable to government security forces, according to GOC 
statistics.  Recent credible allegations of violations by 
members of the armed forces demonstrate the need for further 
improvement. 
 
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Internal Politics 
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12. (SBU) Executive-legislative relations have been tense 
over the last two years.  A major issue has been Uribe's 
break with traditional pork barrel projects and patronage for 
members of Congress, and many have exacted payback on the GOC 
as a result.  Uribe's presidential reelection reform 
initiative, however, was passed by Congress in December.  The 
Constitutional Court is currently reviewing the reform, and 
it remains to be seen if it will strike the measure down. 
Uribe's popularity is over 70 percent and he is expected to 
win an additional four year term if the Constitutional Court 
upholds the reelection law.  Other major issues before 
Congress include pension and tax reform, both controversial 
proposals that face tough sledding. 
 
13. (SBU) Elections for Congress and President will be held 
in March and May 2006, respectively.  The current 
Congressional session began on July 20 and will likely center 
around campaigning and the upcoming Congressional elections 
in March 2006. 
 
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Positive Economic Outlook 
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14. (U) Tremendous gains in security have helped the 
Colombian economy.  In 2004, Colombia's gross domestic 
product (GDP) increased by 4.1 percent to nearly USD 90.8 
billion. Colombian exports grew 26 percent in 2004 to USD 16 
billion.  Exports to the U.S. grew by USD 1 billion.  The 
Colombian Congress recently passed a pension reform package 
that will improve the long-term sustainability of the 
country's retirement system.  Although the International 
Monetary Fund has recommended that Colombia revamp its tax 
system, fiscal reform was not addressed during this session 
of Congress.  Unemployment remains high, near 12 percent, but 
the rate has been declining since the beginning of the Uribe 
administration. 
 
15. (U) The eleventh round of negotiations toward a free 
trade agreement with Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru took place 
in Miami last month.  The talks are progressing slowly, with 
agricultural issues representing the biggest stumbling block. 
 As the Colombian political season approaches, negotiators 
are concerned that significant delays in completing the 
agreement this year could put the FTA on hold until late 
2006, at the earliest. 
 
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U.S. Hostages 
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16. (SBU) In February 2003, a DOD plane carrying four USG 
contractors and a Colombian military representative crashed 
in FARC-controlled territory in southern Colombia.  The three 
surviving hostages' safe release continues to be one of our 
top priorities. 
WOOD