US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA8406

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 008406 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PREL, CO, CODEL 
SUBJECT: CODEL COLEMAN MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE 
 
REF: BOGOTA 8292 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary.  Senators Coleman and Martinez and 
Congressman Miller met with President Uribe on August 23 
during a brief visit to Bogota.  The CODEL told Uribe they 
had come to thank him personally for his leadership in the 
fight against drugs and terrorism, and for the vital 
U.S.-Colombian partnership.  Uribe expressed gratitude for 
ongoing U.S. support.  He also thanked the U.S. for 
supporting Ambassador Moreno's election to head the IDB.  He 
proposed that the U.S. work with the IDB to set a new agenda 
for Latin America.  Citing the resonance of Chavez's message 
and impact of his checkbook, growing anti-Americanism, and 
many upcoming elections in the region, Uribe said the time 
was right for a new approach.  His formula was that: (1) 
Latin American countries pledge to comply with UN Millennium 
goals; (2) the IDB help countries comply; and (3) the U.S. 
strongly support the initiative.  The economic and social 
components of the goals could effectively counter Chavez's 
populism.  The CODEL agreed that a new effort was needed with 
more immediate results felt by the average person.  The CODEL 
asked Uribe for his views on the region and Chavez.  Uribe 
said democracy was at risk.  The opposition in Venezuela was 
weak, Evo Morales was gaining in the polls in Bolivia, 
Brazil's Lula was distracted, the liberal party in Nicaragua 
remained divided which could lead to Ortega's election, and 
President Fox's party in Mexico was also losing ground. 
While he trusted Ecuador's President Palacio, his government, 
too, was weak.  Uribe said he handled relations with 
Venezuela carefully given its long border and significant 
commercial relationship.  Senator Coleman said the 
demobilization of the paramilitaries and the new justice and 
peace law were of particular interest to the Congress.  Uribe 
reviewed the state of play.  While acknowledging the law was 
controversial, he insisted it was workable.  For the first 
time Colombia had successfully introduced the principles of 
justice and reparations into a peace process.  Uribe said he 
wanted rigorous, transparent implementation and thus hoped to 
form an international commission, led by former President 
Clinton, to monitor progress and provide constructive 
criticism.  In response to a question on how Uribe would 
react to a negative constitutional court ruling on 
re-election, Uribe said he would work to elect a successor 
who continued the "fundamental lines" of his policy.  Any 
action the people might urge him to consider beyond that 
would be in strict accordance with the constitution (e.g. a 
national referendum) and determined after the ruling.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) On August 23, during a brief stopover in Bogota, 
Senators Norm Coleman and Mel Martinez and Representative 
Jeff Miller met with President Uribe at the airport.  CODEL 
Coleman was accompanied by the Ambassador, two senate aides 
and polcouns (notetaker).  Uribe was accompanied by Deputy 
Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes and MFA North American affairs 
director Francisco Gonzalez (notetaker).  The meeting lasted 
about an hour.  Uribe himself had just arrived from attending 
a funeral in Medellin and took off for Cartagena shortly 
after the CODEL departed for Orlando, Florida. 
 
3. (C) Uribe opened by expressing gratitude on behalf of all 
Colombians for U.S. support in the fight against drugs and 
terrorism.  We have not won but are winning, he said.  He 
attributed recent progress to the courage of the Colombian 
people and sustained U.S. assistance.  Senator Coleman 
remarked that progress was the result of Uribe's commitment 
and leadership.  He said he and his colleagues stopped in 
Colombia to thank Uribe, and underscore appreciation for the 
vital U.S.-Colombian partnership.  Senator Martinez agreed, 
also expressing appreciation for Uribe's leadership, and 
applauding Colombia as a great partner to the U.S., and Uribe 
as a beacon of hope for all who want peace, a better future 
and the rule of law. 
 
4. (C) Coleman noted that the demobilization of 
paramilitaries and the new justice and peace law were of 
particular interest to the Congress, and emphasized the 
importance of rigorous and energetic implementation of the 
law to ensure a credible process.  He asked about the recent 
meeting between President Bush and Uribe in Crawford.  Uribe 
described the meeting as excellent and important for 
Colombians to witness the strong partnership with the U.S. 
In Uribe's view, such an event made Colombians feel safer and 
more optimistic about the future. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Ambassador Moreno Election to IDB 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Senators Coleman and Martinez expressed satisfaction 
with the election of  Ambassador Moreno to the IDB 
presidency.  Uribe said he was thankful to the U.S. and in 
particular to President Bush for his support of Moreno's 
candidacy.  He cited the President's comments to President 
Fox as critical to securing Mexican support and putting 
Moreno over the top.  Uribe was confident that Moreno would 
do an excellent job at the IDB and that his presence at the 
bank presented an opportunity for the region.  Uribe proposed 
that the U.S. consider working with the IDB to set a new 
agenda for Latin America.  Escalating oil prices were giving 
Chavez a powerful tool to pressure weaker countries in the 
region.  Brazil was distracted by the corruption scandal. 
There were continuing accusations that Venezuela was trying 
to influence elections in Bolivia, and perhaps in Peru. 
There was growing anti-U.S. sentiment in Brazil, Uruguay, 
Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador.  A new agenda for the region 
was needed and new IDB leadership could be a useful tool to 
help establish it. 
 
6. (C) Coleman agreed that the trends in the region were 
worrying and that the IDB could be helpful in working to 
provide increasing economic stability. 
 
7. (C) Uribe then elaborated a three-step process for a new 
regional agenda: (1) Latin American countries pledge to 
comply with the UN Millennium goals; (2) the IDB declares 
that its main focus will be to help Latin countries meet 
these goals; and (3) the U.S. follows with strong support for 
the initiative, with a public declaration that Latin American 
countries meeting these goals will receive U.S. backing as 
well.  Given the economic and social development content of 
the millennium goals, Uribe said he was convinced such a 
process could effectively counter Venezuelan populism.  He 
emphasized that this was the right moment as well, given the 
many national elections scheduled for 2006 in the region. 
This would be the right way to influence in a positive way 
election results, he said. 
 
8. (C) Martinez agreed that a new effort was needed in the 
region.  The U.S. and Colombia had to advocate an agenda that 
showed a "caring heart" and focused on how people could 
secure better jobs and better lives.  Something more concrete 
was needed, he said, with results more immediately felt by 
the average person.  Uribe agreed, noting that a social 
component was critical in Latin America with its deep-rooted 
poverty. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Uribe's Assessment of the Region and Chavez 
------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) With so many elections approaching, beginning in 
December in Bolivia and Chile, Coleman requested Uribe's 
assessment of the region and of Chavez, in particular.  Uribe 
said the Venezuelans he talks to remained convinced there was 
cheating in last year's referendum but had no proof.  The OAS 
and Carter Center declared the elections clean.  Nonetheless, 
democracy in the region was threatened.  The opposition in 
Venezuela remained weak and divided and Chavez had the 
leverage of oil with surging prices.  In Bolivia, Evo Morales 
was gaining in the polls.  This was worrying.  (Former 
President and current Presidential candidate) Jorge Quiroga 
needed to keep his numbers up.  This would prevent Chavez 
from interfering in the elections.  In Nicaragua, the liberal 
party candidates had to unify or Daniel Ortega would win.  In 
Uruguay, Uribe saw no problems with President Vasquez, whom 
he believed was "a totally decent democract...an idealistic 
socialist with understandable concerns on social issues." 
In Peru, he said there were already two to three candidates 
but saw no major problems there either.  He expressed more 
concern about Mexico.  The Fox government was weak and his 
party unlikely to win in upcoming presidential elections. 
The PRI was gaining in the polls, as was the PRD's Lopez 
Obrador.  Uribe admitted that he was not sure how to approach 
these worrying trends in the region but encouraged Washington 
policy makers to keep a close eye and work with partners in 
the region to design the right strategy. 
 
10. (C) On Venezuela, Uribe said he handles relations very 
carefully.  The two countries share a long border with a 
complicated topography.  Bilateral trade could reach $3 
billion in 2005 and many small and medium-sized enterprises 
depend on sales to Venezuela.  At the same time, according to 
Uribe, Chavez understood that if he did not cooperate in the 
fight against terrorists, Colombian public forces would enter 
his territory, seize them and return them back to Colombia. 
Uribe also said he makes a point not to respond to Chavez's 
excesses publicly.  This would only give him the oxygen he 
craves, said Uribe. 
 
11. (C) On Ecuador, Uribe said he trusts and has a good 
relationship with President Palacio but the government was 
weak.  As a result, Colombia had to suffer difficult speeches 
from the Foreign Minister.  Uribe said his foreign minister 
(Carolina Barco) grew angry at the speeches of her Ecuadorian 
counterpart, but he continued to tell her to ignore them and 
be patient.  Uribe also said the porous border continued to 
be a problem as terrorists slipped back and forth.  He did 
not understand why the GOE continued to complain about 
spraying and demand it be stopped.  If the GOC stopped 
spraying, insisted Uribe, Ecuador would become flooded with 
drugs.  The government was not strong enough to stand up to 
pressures from "indigenous groups and radical political 
parties," concluded Uribe. 
 
-------------- 
Demobilization 
-------------- 
 
12. (C) Uribe reviewed the status of ongoing paramilitary 
demobilizations and the important elements of the new justice 
and peace law.  He said the total number of those demobilized 
would exceed 20,000 by week's end, 65 percent from 
paramilitaries, and 35 percent from the guerrilla groups.  In 
six months, he expected to see a total of 25,000 demobilized. 
 He stressed that earlier peace processes with the M-19 and 
other groups handled only 400 and 2,000, respectively. The 
sheer number of the current demobilization made it clear how 
difficult the process will be.  But he continued to believe 
it was the right course.  The more we demobilize, he said, 
the greater the chances that the "ring-leaders" will have 
less to fight with and that their structures will be 
dismantled. 
 
13. (C) Uribe acknowledged that the law was controversial 
but, for the first time, Colombia had successfully introduced 
the principles of justice and reparations into a peace 
process.  Past laws only dealt with amnesty, without 
requirements for reparation and justice.  He insisted that 
the law needed to be applied transparently to all illegal 
armed groups -- paras and guerrillas.  He was convinced that 
those who considered the law too soft on the paras would 
consider it too hard on the guerrillas. 
 
14. (C) To ensure rigorous implementation of the law, Uribe 
said Colombia needed a group of eminent persons to monitor 
progress and provide constructive criticism "when we are not 
getting it right."  Per reftel, he repeated his idea of 
forming a committee of "friends," led by former President 
Clinton and a few ex-senators to follow the law's 
implementation. 
 
---------------------- 
Colombia without Uribe 
---------------------- 
 
15. (C) Coleman noted that Uribe's leadership had generated 
great confidence in Washington.  As Colombia awaited the 
decision of its Constitutional Court on whether the president 
could seek re-election, Coleman wondered whether Uribe was 
concerned that his priorities could unravel and Colombians 
and others could lose confidence if he were not able to 
continue.  (Note: Senate SACFO staffers Paul Grove and Thomas 
Hawkins asked Uribe the same question on August 29. End Note) 
 
 
16. (C) Uribe said he would speak publicly about the issue 
when the court ruled and not before.  He stated categorically 
that any action he took following the ruling would be in 
strict accordance with the constitution.  If the 
Constitutional Court ruled against re-election, he would do 
his best to convince his supporters to elect a successor who 
continued the fundamental lines of his policy.  Someone who 
supported the democratic security policy and was determined 
to fight terrorism, restore investor confidence, generate 
jobs, and continue the key alliance with the U.S.  He noted 
that there were other, democratic options citizens could 
consider, if they so chose.  For example, some had suggested 
a national referendum at election time so voters could 
express their preferences directly.  It would be politically 
controversial, he said, but democratic.  Uribe hoped for a 
decision by the court soon and would weigh his options then. 
WOOD