US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1304

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: EU/TURKEY:  CZECHS REMAIN FAVORABLE, BUT NOT FIRM; 
LINKAGE TO CROATIA POSSIBLE 
 
REF: A. PRAGUE 1256 
     B. PRAGUE 1243 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d. 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Czechs continue to support moving 
forward with the Oct 3 negotiations on Turkish accession. 
They are engaged in negotiating the EU's counter-declaration, 
with the focus not on recognition but the modalities of the 
Customs Union, i.e, restrictions at Turkish ports.  The 
Czechs remain increasingly forward-leaning on Croatian 
accession.  At this point they do not intend to link the two, 
but the Czech assurances are weak enough that support for 
such linkage is conceivable down the road.  The Turkish 
Ambassador visited Ambassador Cabaniss on Sept 7 to complain 
that he feared the Czechs were becoming increasingly 
supportive of the Austrian position on Turkey.  Ambassador 
raised Turkey in a meeting with PM Paroubek on Sept 5, and 
will continue the discussion at a follow-up meeting on Sept 
9.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Numerous discussions over the past week with Czech 
officials all indicate that the Czechs support the EU 
launching accession talks with Turkey on Oct 3.  Current MFA 
focus remains (refs) on legal questions stemming from the 
Turkish declaration on non-recognition of Cyprus.  In terms 
of the proposed EU counter-declaration, MFA staff report the 
Czechs are not concerned about the specific language related 
to recognition, but rather the details involving full 
implementation of the Customs Union.  MFA Director of the 
Balkan Department, Tomas Szunyog, told Pol-Econ Chief that 
the Czechs, as new members who continue to see restrictions 
on movement of labor, are particularly sensitive to any 
limits placed on full implementation of a binding agreement 
like the Customs Union, i.e., Turkish refusal to accept 
certain Cypriot vessels at the ports.  While focused on these 
technicalities, none of the staff we have spoken with in the 
MFA and Prime Minister's office suggested that they would be 
sufficient to block the start of talks next month. 
 
3. (C) Of greater concern, potentially, is Turkish activity 
on Croatia.  As discussed ref A, PM Paroubek has been 
increasingly outspoken that EU talks with Croatia begin 
immediately, regardless of the status of war criminals.  In a 
rare show of agreement, Czech President Klaus, during a visit 
to Croatia this week, said the same.  MFA officials confirm 
that the shift in Czech policy on Croatia is firm.  When 
asked about a linkage between EU talks with Turkey and 
Croatia, Ivan Busniak, Foreign Policy to PM Paroubek, 
insisted that Czech policy has not linked the two, but left 
this open as a possibility should this become part of a 
broader political deal on Turkey among EU leaders. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador raised U.S. support for Turkish accession 
during a Sept 5 meeting with PM Paroubek on Katrina relief. 
Paroubek was not able to respond during that meeting, but 
Ambassador will raise again when the two meet on Sept 9. 
 
5. (C) Turkish Ambassador Duatepe asked to meet with 
Ambassador on Sept 7.  He said that for the first time in his 
two years in Prague he is sensing that Czech support for 
accession is weakening, and specifically that the Czechs are 
supporting the "Christian Democratic" position on Turkey 
typified by Austria.  He urged USG to continue to engage with 
both PM and FM on the question. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  As discussed reftels, we share the Turkish 
Ambassador's assessment that FM Svoboda, a Christian 
Democrat, has been able to exert greater influence in shaping 
the GOCR position on Turkish accession than was the case in 
recent years.  Still, our discussions over the past month 
have tended to increase confidence that the Czechs will 
support a clean launch of negotiations next month.  That 
said, the Czech position is far from firm (certainly not as 
robust as their new stance on Croatia), and can be shaped by 
outside forces, notably the political debates among European 
leaders.  The Czechs could well emerge as a strong supporter 
of a deal to link Turkish and Croatian accession.  We will 
continue to engage the Czechs at the highest levels on both 
Turkey and Croatia. 
CABANISS