US embassy cable - 05NAIROBI3658

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SOMALIA -- INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PREPARES TO MEET "GOVERNMENT" IN JOWHAR

Identifier: 05NAIROBI3658
Wikileaks: View 05NAIROBI3658 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Nairobi
Created: 2005-09-07 09:29:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KPAO SO KE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 003658 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF 
STATE PASS AID 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPAO, SO, KE 
SUBJECT: SOMALIA -- INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PREPARES TO 
MEET "GOVERNMENT" IN JOWHAR 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 3434 
 
     B. NAIROBI 3117 
 
Classified By: MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, REASONS 1.4 
 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (C) Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi has formally 
requested that the international community travel to Jowhar, 
Somalia -- temporary seat of the Somali President's wing of 
the Transitional Federal Government -- to convene a meeting 
of the Somali Coordination and Monitoring Committee.  In the 
absence of significant and substantive progress in addressing 
the political divisions now blocking the functioning of the 
TFG, the international community's acceptance to participate 
in such a meeting may irrevocably tilt the balance of 
legitimacy in favor of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, and 
away from the Mogadishu-based minister-warlords.  Such a move 
could prove to be the catalyst for open armed conflict among 
the various factions of the TFIs -- and provide an 
opportunity for Jihadists to capitalize on the chaos. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS A CMC IN SOMALIA 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Members of the international community (IC) met on 
September 2 for a weekly exchange of information with the UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), 
Ambassador Francois Fall.  Amb. Fall informed the group of a 
letter from Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Prime 
Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi (apparently received during the 
PM's visit to Nairobi during the week of August 22), formally 
requesting a convening of the Somalia Coordination and 
Monitoring Committee (CMC).  In the letter (reproduced in its 
entirety, para 13), the PM proposed to convene the meeting in 
Jowhar, Somalia -- the town currently used as a temporary 
capital city by a TFG faction led by President Abdullahi 
Yusuf Ahmed -- during the last week in September.  The SRSG 
asked IC members to consider the request, and proposed that 
those particularly interested in the subject should meet in a 
smaller informal group the week of September 5 to discuss 
principles and, if deemed appropriate, preparations. 
 
WHERE IS THE TFG? 
------------------ 
 
3. (C) Somalia Watcher joined on September 6 representatives 
of the Delegation of the European Commission, France, IGAD, 
Italy, Sweden, and the UK to discuss the PM's request and 
proposal.  Somalia Watcher posited that the request for a CMC 
meeting raised several difficult issues.  First, while the 
TFG's Prime Minister was the designated co-chair of the CMC 
(along with the SRSG), the IC had operated on a presumption 
that the PM would represent the Transitional Federal 
Government on the consultative body.  Unfortunately, the TFG 
remained deeply divided, with the PM unable to hold a Council 
of Ministers meeting with more than a handful of ministers. 
Therefore, it could be seen as odd for the SRSG and the IC to 
meet with a co-chair unable to represent the institutions 
which created him. 
 
4. (C) Second, Somalia Watcher pointed out that the United 
Nations Security Council had made it clear that the 
international community expected to see concerted efforts on 
the part of the members of the TFIs to enter into a dialogue, 
through the good offices of the SRSG, to resolve the 
differences that divided the institutions.  As there had not 
yet been any dialogue among the TFI members on either side of 
the divide, one could hardly state that any progress had been 
made on this front. 
 
5. (C) Last, Somalia Watcher opined that at this time, the IC 
could not in fact find a grouping of TFI members anywhere in 
Somalia that could be accurately viewed as representing the 
TFG, and should therefore be very careful as to on whom the 
IC conferred the title of "Somali government" -- the title 
having not yet been given to that group which had coalesced 
around the PM and President in Jowhar.  However, should the 
SRSG make significant progress in the coming days in 
conducting the dialogue called for in the Security Council's 
Presidential Statement, and TFI members from across the 
political spectrum back the convening of the CMC, then there 
would be grounds for a meeting to be held wherever the Somali 
consensus indicated would be acceptable 
 
THERE IS BUT ONE TFG, 
AND IT IS IN JOWHAR 
----------------------- 
6. (C) The Counselor to the "Italian Diplomatic Special 
Delegation for Somalia", Stefano A. Dejak, responded to these 
cautions with a straightforward claim of fact: That the IC 
had, by virtue of several meetings held in Jowhar of the 
Joint Planning Committee (a subsidiary body of the CMC), 
already made clear that it considered those in the "temporary 
capital" to hold the authority of the TFG.  Since, according 
to Dejak, there was no question as to who embodied the TFG, 
and where they were located, it remained only to set a date 
for the CMC meeting, and determine the agenda. 
 
7. (C) Representatives of the European Commission, Sweden, 
and the UK were more nuanced, but nonetheless favored 
proceeding with the planning of the CMC meeting.  The EC 
representative stressed that the subject of reconciliation 
should in fact figure prominently on the CMC meeting agenda, 
and that care should be taken to ensure that there would be a 
TFG delegation representative of the various positions within 
the institutions to allow for this discussion.  The Swedish 
representative cautioned that, while the IC's right to insist 
on a voice in the composition of the TFG delegation might be 
questioned, there should nonetheless be some consideration 
given to the subject. 
 
8. (C) The UK representative, speaking for the European Union 
Presidency, stated that the EU could hardly not welcome the 
PM's request, having called for the convening of a CMC 
meeting for several months.  That said, from the UK's 
perspective, the question remained as to whether there is, or 
is not, a government in Jowhar.  He thought that the very 
process of preparing for a CMC meeting might sort out this 
question, if the IC were to take the line that the meeting 
must be held with as broadly representative a group as 
possible. 
 
COMMENTS 
--------- 
 
9. (C) We see the momentum in the IC has taken the group past 
the essential question of who constitutes the TFG, having 
settled on the small group of ministers and MPs surrounding 
the President and PM in Jowhar.  Despite some caveats, 
virtually all the substantively engaged members of the 
international community have accepted the principles of (a) a 
CMC meeting at the end of September, and (b) holding the 
meeting with the Jowhar group.  (NOTE: For their part, the 
Mogadishu-based members of the TFI stick to their mantra that 
they are in full compliance with the Charter, and await the 
SRSG's direction as to when and where they should convene for 
mediation with the Jowhar-based faction.  END NOTE.) 
 
10. (C) Given the security concerns that have surrounded any 
discussion of USG personnel traveling anywhere in Somalia, 
including the relatively peaceful break-away region of 
Somaliland, Post believes it unlikely that we will be 
prepared to directly participate in the Jowhar meeting.  It 
remains for the USG to decide what it may wish to say about 
the convening of the CMC in the stronghold of one group of 
TFI members, to the likely exclusion of the rest. 
 
11. (C) Should there be a sudden burst of successful dialogue 
facilitation on the part of the SRSG in the coming days, with 
the full cooperation of the members of the various TFI 
factions, one could imagine the USG warmly welcoming the CMC 
meeting as an indication that Somalia has returned to the 
right track.  Were the PM to have sudden success in his own 
reconciliation efforts -- he has stated to the EU Heads of 
Mission that he intends to solve the differences within the 
TFIs through dialogue at the leadership, cabinet, and 
Parliament levels -- we could hardly withhold our diplomatic 
support for the CMC to meet in the context of such a dialogue. 
 
12. (C) These successful scenarios seem relatively unlikely, 
given both the track record of the members of the divided 
institutions -- both the Somalis and the IC -- and the fact 
that key members of the TFIs will be traveling to New York 
over the next two weeks in separate delegations for meetings 
of the World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments and the UN 
General Assembly.  Perhaps the reconciliation, so sorely 
needed, can occur on U.S. soil on the margins of these 
international gatherings through the facilitation of the 
SRSG.  But should such a happy turn of events fail to 
materialize, we will be faced with the prospect of the 
international community, led by the SRSG, arriving in Jowhar 
to meet with members on one side of the TFI's divisions, and 
by presence alone conferring upon these individuals the 
authority of the Government of Somalia.  What effect such an 
event would have on the Mogadishu-based minister-warlords, is 
open to debate.  A worst-case scenario, however, would have 
them deciding that, with their political marginalization now 
confirmed, there would be nothing to stop them from 
protecting their economic interests through military means. 
Or, President Yusuf could just as easily find himself 
politically emboldened enough to seek a military solution in 
Mogadishu (as he did previously in Puntland).  Combat, 
especially should it involve significant numbers of Ethiopian 
forces in support of Yusuf, would provide a golden 
opportunity to Jihadist elements in Somalia to rally forces 
against both the foreign "invader" and the TFG -- which would 
be easily portrayed as venal, secular, and dysfunctional. END 
COMMENTS. 
 
 
INVITATION LETTER 
----------------- 
 
13. (SBU) The Prime Minsiter's formal request for the 
convening of a meeting of the CMC follows: 
 
(BEGIN TEXT:) 
 
The Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia 
Office of the Prime Minister 
Ref: OPM/151/05 
Nairobi, 22nd August 2005 
 
H.E. Ambassador Francois Lonseny Fall 
SRSG of the UN Secretary General, Co-Chair of the CMC 
UN Political Office for Somalia 
Nairobi - Kenya 
 
Your Excellency, 
 
With the present, I would like to bring to your attention 
that it is quite sometime since the CMC monthly meetings were 
not held due TFG's engagement in its relocation activities 
and set up in the country.  As you know, the Transitional 
Federal Institutions have relocated to Somalia in mid-June 
2005 and engaged with very limited financial and human 
resources in the enormous challenges of bringing governance, 
peace, reconciliation and reconstruction to our beloved 
country after 14 years of ravages.  Therefore, the delay of 
convening such meetings reflects these limits and does not 
affect the unfailing commitment on our part of bringing 
forward the cooperation with the International Community we 
subscribed to both in the Declaration of Principles and the 
Structured Coordination Modalities. 
 
In the light of the above, I believe it is now appropriate 
and therefore suggest planning and fixing a date and agenda 
for the forthcoming CMC meeting to be held in Howhar probably 
the last week of September 2005 with the following tentative 
draft agenda: 
 
-- Briefing and political update after TFI's relocation to 
Somalia 
-- Modalities for better collaboration between the TFG and 
International Community in the framework of CMC 
-- Discussion and endorsement of JPC's Secretariat 
-- Review of JNA exercise 
-- CMC Secretariat 
-- AOB 
 
Regards, 
//SIGNED// 
Ali Mohamed Gedi 
Prime Minister 
CMC Co-Chair 
 
(END TEXT.) 
BELLAMY 

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