US embassy cable - 05PARIS6033

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, FR, TU, EUN, NATO 
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH EUROPEAN DIRECTOR BRIATTA 
ON EU ENLARGEMENT AND TURKISH ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  French MFA A/S equivalent Briatta told A/S 
Fried September 2 that he was "reasonably optimistic" that 
the EU could work out a declaration on Turkey that would 
allow accession negotiations to begin as scheduled on October 
3, so long as the Greeks and Cypriots did not insist on new 
concessions.  But he expressed concern about growing public 
sentiment against future EU enlargements, which he viewed as 
the main reason for the May 29 French rejection of the EU 
constitutional Treaty.  While agreeing with Fried's arguments 
about the strategic value of future enlargements, Briatta 
stressed that EU enlargement was more properly a domestic 
than a foreign policy issue, given the EU's impact on 
domestic legislation.  While saying France was prepared not 
to close the door on future enlargements, Briatta expressed 
particular concern about the impact of eventual Ukrainian 
accession on the giant in the back room, Russia.  He did not 
believe that the current French emphasis on "concrete 
actions" to demonstrate the EU's value would have a negative 
impact on the NATO-ESDP relationship. 
 
2.  (C) Presidential diplomatic advisor Gordault-Montagne 
separately confided to Fried on September 1 that French 
maneuvering was motivated entirely by domestic political 
considerations and that France would not block the beginning 
of accession talks with Turkey.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (C) EUR A/S Dan Fried's September 2 discussions with 
French MFA European Affairs A/S-equivalent Gilles Britta 
focused on French views toward EU enlargement and the 
beginning of EU accession negotiations with Turkey.  Fried 
was accompanied by NEA DAS Scott Carpenter and Acting 
Political Minister-Counselor.  This message also includes 
comments on Turkey from Fried's September 1 discussions with 
presidential diplomatic advisor Maurice Gordault-Montagne 
(septel). 
 
EU-Turkey accession negotiations 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Fried reminded Briatta of studied U.S. discretion in 
dealing with the latest round of EU-Turkey tensions and asked 
whether accession talks with Turkey would begin as planned on 
October 3.  Briatta described himself as "reasonably 
optimistic" that this would be the case.  The UK had tabled a 
good draft that addressed 90 percent of France's political 
needs and added no new conditions.  Asked about the reference 
to 2006 in the EU draft declaration, Briatta described it as 
no more than a periodic review, but said it had been 
necessary to obtain something on Cyprus in order to make the 
deal acceptable to French public opinion. 
 
5.  (C) Separately on September 1, presidential diplomatic 
advisor Gordault-Montagne also assured Fried that the GOF 
would not block the beginning of accession negotiations.  In 
an unusually frank aside, he explained the French reaction to 
Turkey's declaration as motivated entirely by internal 
politics, specifically PM de Villepin's need to position 
himself vis-a-vis his main rival, Interior Minister and 
center-right governing party leader Nicholas Sarkozy.  He 
argued that France had needed to do something dramatic, at 
the risk even of isolating itself within the EU, in order to 
satisfy French domestic constituencies.  He said the French 
goal did not go beyond making Turkey repeat what it had 
already said in the past on eventual Cyprus recognition. 
 
6. (C) As a next step, the Brits and the French planned to 
share the text with the Turks while encouraging them not to 
present a counter-declaration to the EU declaration.  Briatta 
said that the Turks, once they were convinced that France 
would not derail the beginning of accession talks, had not 
allowed themselves to be baited by French domestic political 
posturing.  Fried said the U.S. would do its part to reassure 
Turkey. 
 
7.  (C) Briatta said the situation would nonetheless remain 
dicey, given Greek interest in Turkish concessions on Aegean 
issues and public opposition that threatened to break the 
current consensus on Turkey in Greece between Pasok and New 
Democracy.  At the same time, many in Turkey were suspicious 
of Erdogan's intentions.  Fried argued that accession 
negotiations were the best way to keep Turkey's reform 
efforts on track; prospective membership had worked well with 
Central and Eastern European countries.  Briatta agreed, but 
cautioned again that the number of problems linked to 
enlargement was growing rapidly. 
 
French fears of enlargement 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Briatta said the Turkish problem was symptomatic of 
the French public's rejection of EU enlargement generally, as 
reflected in the failed referendum on the EU constitutional 
treaty.  It was a "fairy tale" that the EU would be able to 
enlarge and to deepen simultaneously.  In addition, the 
government had failed to understand the degree to which 
"Europe" had become a domestic rather than a foreign policy 
issue.  President Chirac was in a tight spot, given the 
breadth of opposition to Turkish membership in the parliament 
and his own governing party, not to mention Germany.  He also 
acknowledged that the EU had broken all its own rules in 
allowing Cyprus to join the EU in advance of a Cyprus 
solution.  If Turkey entered the EU, then it would be able to 
vote on laws that would take immediate effect in France. 
Briatta agreed with Fried's arguments about the strategic 
value of enlargement for peace and stability in Europe, but 
likened Turkish EU membership to Mexico's becoming the 
fifty-first state of the U.S. 
 
9.  (C) Fried noted that a viable EU enlargement process was 
important for others in addition to Turkey, in particular for 
the Balkan states.  It was a fact, even if left unstated, 
that NATO and EU accession offered the best prospects for 
fixing the Balkans.  This was of strategic importance even 
more for EU countries than for the U.S., since an explosion 
in the region would not affect everyone equally.  Fried said 
it was important for the EU to continue to demand that 
Croatia hand over its war criminals as a precondition for 
accession talks, since not to do so would have too serious 
implications for war criminals in Bosnia (Republika Srpska) 
and Serbia.  As for other countries such as Ukraine, it was 
important to enunciate the "prospect in principle" of 
membership, even if this would not be a realistic prospect 
anytime soon.  This was a powerful incentive for reform. 
 
The Russian shadow behind the curtain 
------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Briatta said European governments would not succeed 
in foisting future enlargements on their citizens without 
their explicit approval.  Discussion of Ukraine would 
immediately raise questions as to the futures of Belarus, 
Georgia, and Moldova -- and eventually, Russia.  He described 
relations with Russia as the EU's biggest challenge.  This 
was a question that would arise sooner or later, given 
Russia's long de-facto role as a "European power."  Fried 
responded that Russia so far showed no signs of wanting to 
join the EU, given its sense of its own specialness, its 
temporary mood of nostalgia and its habit of trying to 
dominate its neighbors.  Briatta fretted that European 
dependence on Russia was increasing rather than diminishing, 
particularly in the energy sector. 
 
11.  (C) Fried said the EU had made an important strategic 
decision to consider the area between it and Russia as part 
of its "new neighborhood."  He assured Briatta of the 
continuing U.S. desire to work together with the EU on 
Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, where the track record 
so far was very positive.  He noted that it would be 
appropriate for NATO to take the lead on some issues, and the 
EU on others. 
 
No Impact on EU-NATO relations 
------------------------------ 
 
12.  (C) Asked whether the calls of his ministers for more 
"concrete measures" and EU visibility portended increased 
difficulties for NATO-ESDP relations, Briatta responded that 
this was not the case.  According to Briatta, French thinking 
over the short term would focus on security in the areas of 
counterterrorism, health (avian flu), and air travel. 
Military security, he said, was not the key issue for now; 
proving the usefulness of the EU to its citizens was. 
 
13.  (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried. 
STAPLETON