US embassy cable - 05ANKARA5183

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, CY, Cyprus, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: THE POST-GYMNICH VIEW FROM ANKARA:  TURKS MAY 
GRUDGINGLY ACCEPT CURRENT COUNTER-DECLARATION TEXT 
 
REF: A. 1 SEPTEMBER 2005 SKINNER/BLAHA ET AL. E-MAIL 
 
     B. 2 SEPTEMBER 2005 TURNER/BLAHA ET AL. E-MAIL 
 
 (U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  GOT officials express differing degrees of 
displeasure with the draft text of an EU counter-declaration 
to the July 29 Turkish declaration of non-recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC).  In the end, the Turks will 
probably accept it if the text does not vary from the current 
draft (ref a).  The Turkish MFA is not/not currently 
contemplating  a "counter-counter-declaration."  The 
counter-declaration text could help the UK avoid significant 
changes to the Negotiating Framework, the next Turkey/EU 
point of contention.  Changes to the current Framework text 
on "open-ended" negotiations or "privileged partnership" 
would cross Turkish redlines.  The Turks need to keep up 
their moderate rhetoric, avoiding the sensitive issue of 
opening ports and airports to the ROC; focus on substantive 
issues the EU cares most about; and not threaten to boycott 
the opening of negotiations.  CDA meets MFA U/S Tuygan 
September 7 for his readout.  End Summary. 
 
Reactions to Proposed Counter-Declaration 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) GOT officials express differing degrees of 
displeasure with the draft EU counter-declaration to the July 
29 Turkish declaration of non-recognition of the ROC.  The 
Brits here recounted an emotional September 2 meeting between 
FM Gul and Foreign Secretary Straw.  FM Gul said he could not 
sell the EU text in Turkey and it could derail the process. 
However, according to the Brits, when PM Erdogan and Gul 
spoke by phone after the meeting, Erdogan told Gul he did not 
think the counter-declaration language was offensive.  The UK 
Ambassador is convinced the Turks will accept it in the end 
if it does not change significantly. 
 
3.  (C) In our meetings, some GOT officials have not been as 
negative as Gul.  MFA EU DDG Turkmen was not happy with the 
text and said Turkey will try to change it, but added Turkey 
would grudgingly accept it.  Deputy SecGen of the GOT's EU 
Affairs Secretariat Acet did not appear very concerned about 
the current text, saying it "merely stated the facts." 
 
4.  (C) MFA Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs DDG Bilman, 
who accompanied Gul to the Gymnich, gave us a significantly 
more downbeat assessment.  He told us Gul is "disturbed" by 
language emphasizing the importance the EU attaches to "de 
jure normalization of relations between Turkey and all EU 
Member States" because he believes it could amount to 
recognition of the ROC.  The Brits confirm that Gul 
emphasized this point to Straw.  "I cannot emphasize enough 
how big this is," Bilman added.  However, Bilman did not say 
that this could derail the process. 
 
5.  (C) Bilman and Turkmen both told us Turkey is not/not 
contemplating a "counter-counter-declaration." 
 
6.  (C) According to UK Ankara Embassy, the 
counter-declaration text will be the main topic at the 
September 7 COREPER; the UK hopes to finalize it then. 
Although the UK will try to hold the line, the UK thinks the 
text could get tougher. 
 
"De Jure Normalization":  How to Waffle Recognition? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
7.  (C) Gul and our contacts argue there is no difference 
between "de jure normalization" and recognition.  In his 
meeting with Gul, Straw pushed back, reminding Gul this was 
compromise text to avoid "the R word" and that the EU is not 
demanding recognition now.  According to the Brits, the UK 
Presidency may be able to substitute an alternate German text 
to the effect that "EU membership presupposes recognition of 
all Member States," which the UK assesses as more "sellable" 
to the Turks. 
 
"Constructive Ambiguity" on Implementation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) The Turks are also resisting any text on 
"implementation" requiring them to open their ports and 
airports to the ROC.  This is extremely difficult politically 
when Turkish Cypriot ports and airports remain closed, and 
the EU proposal for direct trade with the "TRNC" languishes 
due to ROC objections.  According to DDG Bilman, "TRNC 
President" Talat is very upset at the prospect of opening 
ports and airports. 
 
9.  (C) For the Turks, any timetable or deadline for opening 
ports and airports is an EU deal-breaker.  However, Bilman 
told us he "might be able to sell" language to the effect 
that this issue will be resolved with existing Customs Union 
mechanisms.  Bilman and UK Deputy Head of Mission Roberts 
believe this process will delay the matter long enough to 
give the GOT breathing room to accept it. 
 
10.  (C) In the short run, the UK Presidency is hoping to get 
to October 3 with "constructive ambiguity" on the ports and 
airports issue.  They want the Turks to reaffirm their 
intention to fully implement the Customs Union extension 
protocol; avoid public statements about ports and airports; 
and if pushed, say they will be guided in implementation by 
the Council and Commission legal services.  This papers over 
the crucial differences in timing and puts off the debate for 
another day -- after October 3. 
 
11.  (C) But the UK worries that public statements by Turkish 
officials about not opening ports and airports increase the 
chances of more specific -- and for the Turks, worse -- 
language in either the counter-declaration or Negotiating 
Framework.  Gul made such a statement before he left for the 
Gymnich, but Straw pressed him on this point and Gul has not 
repeated it. 
 
Worries About "Review" 
--------------------- 
 
12.  (C) The Turks are also worried about the "review" 
mechanism referred to in the draft counter-declaration text. 
DDG Bilman interprets this as a "deadline" for Turkey to open 
ports and airports; Turkmen expressed concern this might 
become a condition for continuing accession negotiations. 
The UK Ambassador here believes the latter point is the core 
Turkish concern about the review mechanism.  To the extent 
the Turks can be reassured this is indeed "no more than a 
review" (ref b), with no new conditions, they would accept 
it.  According to Turkmen, if the review merely results in a 
negative reference in the annual EU progress report, Turkey 
can live with it. 
 
The GOT Looks to "Save the Framework" 
------------------------------------ 
 
13.   (C) According to their Ankara Embassy, the UK is not 
certain the negotiating framework will be discussed on 
September 7, but this is the next Turkey/EU point of 
contention.  According to MFA EU DDG Turkmen, who brushed off 
the counter-declaration, the GOT priority is to "save the 
Framework."  The GOT wants to keep Cyprus-related language in 
the counter-declaration out of the Framework.  The UK is 
urging the Turks to accept tough counter-declaration 
language, in part, in hopes of keeping it out of the 
Framework, but the UK cannot guarantee this. 
 
14.  (C) The Turks remain extremely sensitive to any new, 
broader language on "open-ended" negotiations or "privileged 
partnership."  EU Secretariat Deputy SecGen Acet called this 
a Turkish "redline"; MFA DDG Turkmen said this would be cause 
for Turkey to walk away from negotiations.  Even DDG Bilman, 
normally focused only on Cyprus, called it an invitation to 
"second-class citizen status." 
 
15.  (C) Over the last several days, Gul and Erdogan have 
both publicly threatened that Turkey will abandon EU 
accession in the event of new conditions or a proposal for 
anything short of full membership.  Most Turkish commentators 
from across the political spectrum  welcomed Gul's and 
Erdogan's remarks.  However, the Embassy here tells us the UK 
worries that such rhetoric will help Turkey's EU opponents. 
The UK thinks the Turks should focus instead on issues the EU 
cares about:  the Orhan Pamuk case, religious freedom, the 
foundations law. 
 
16.  (C) Comment:   At this stage, the EU should know where 
Turkish redlines are.  As long as the EU does not insert into 
the Framework specific language that will provoke the GOT, 
Turkey's candidacy should reach October 3 leaking, but 
afloat.  Even so, the run up to October 3 illustrates that 
the Cyprus issue will plague the process for years to come. 
End Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY