US embassy cable - 02AMMAN6022

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JORDAN: ROYAL JORDANIAN SEEKS TO DELAY AIRPLANE DECISION

Identifier: 02AMMAN6022
Wikileaks: View 02AMMAN6022 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2002-10-16 15:16:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: BEXP EFIN EAIR JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 006022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR ADVOCACY CENTER - CHRISTOPHER JAMES 
USDOC/4520/ITA/MAC/ONE/COBERG 
EXIMBANK FOR ROBERT MORIN 
TDA FOR HENRY STEINGASS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2007 
TAGS: BEXP, EFIN, EAIR, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDAN: ROYAL JORDANIAN SEEKS TO DELAY AIRPLANE 
DECISION 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (c)  Samir Hanna, the Boeing VP who has been negotiating 
the sale/lease package of nine 737's to Royal Jordanian 
Airlines (RJ), reported that RJ CEO Samer al-Majali told him 
October 16 that RJ was not able to make a decision between 
competing Boeing and Airbus offers, as had been planned for 
the first part of this month.  Majali asked Boeing to extend 
the validity of their current offers and said he was asking 
Airbus to do the same.  Hanna is currently checking with his 
headquarters to if this can be done and for how long. 
 
2.  (c)  Majali told Hanna that the decision not to make a 
decision was reached on the advice of the Jordanian 
"government" (presumably the Prime Minister and key 
ministers).  Majali said the government's advice had been 
told to "hold off until we see what happens with Iraq."  This 
advice was discussed by the RJ Board on October 15. 
 
3.  (c)  According to Hanna's and local Boeing consultant 
Peter Ledger's reconstruction of the sequence of probable 
events, such advice most likely came from the government 
within the past five days, give or take a day or two.  The 
board had previously held an informal review of Boeing and 
Airbus offers on or about October 2 and Majali briefed King 
Abdullah on the state of play shortly thereafter.  Hanna and 
Ledger had received positive, but noncommittal signals 
following the first Board meeting. 
 
4.  (c)  Comment:  While they appreciate the uncertainties 
the Jordanians may be feeling over Iraq, Hanna and Ledger 
said that a delay could only work to the disadvantage of 
Boeing.  They said that if RJ's hope was to lease aircraft on 
the market instead of making a decision, RJ could find this 
more difficult than it might expect given what they said was 
RJ's poor payments track record with leasing companies. 
Furthermore, leasing companies would not be able to provide 
support packages equivalent to that being offered by Boeing. 
 
5.  (c)  Comment continued:  The Ambassador will raise this 
matter directly with the King on October 20.  Based on that 
conversation, we will make appropriate recommendations on 
next actions. 
GNEHM 

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