US embassy cable - 05CAIRO6908

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 006908 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, EG, Elections 
SUBJECT: EGYPT'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN:  UPDATE #5--FINAL 
DAYS MARKED BY CONTROVERSY OVER SUPERVISION AND MONITORING 
OF THE ELECTION 
 
REF: CAIRO 6710 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified by ECPO Minister Counselor Michael Corbin for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  The official campaign period for Egypt's first 
presidential election, which began on August 17, closed on 
September 4.  The final few days witnessed a flurry of last 
minute campaigning by the leading candidates, as well as a 
growing storm of legal controversy.  President Mubarak, Ayman 
Nour, No'man Gom'a, and the seven other candidates made their 
final pitches for votes.  More controversially, the Judges 
Club decided on September 2 that its members would fulfill 
their constitutionally-required supervision of the poll, but 
with strong recommendations that the Presidential Election 
Commission (PEC) take several remedial actions (related to 
domestic monitors, vote counting procedures, and assignments 
of judges for election work) to ensure the election's 
integrity.  In addition, the PEC said that it would refuse to 
follow a judicial order to permit access by domestic monitors 
to the polling stations--and the law appears to be on its 
side.  These developments suggest that the outcome of the 
September 7 poll will be controversial.  No one doubts that 
Mubarak will win, but how he will win--particularly if the 
judges or the monitors accuse his backers of resorting to 
fraud to boost either the turnout or his margin of 
victory--continues to be the question that matters the most 
as Egyptians go to the polls on September 7.  End summary. 
 
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Mubarak's Finale:  The Devil You Know 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Capping a week that saw him give his first press 
interview of the campaign, President Mubarak also gave an 
hour-long interview on State TV.  Mubarak has managed to 
festoon his campaign with many of the trappings of western 
democratic campaigning--such as media outreach, stump 
speeches, and rallies--while at the same time avoiding the 
riskier kinds of events--especially debates or press 
conferences--that might compel him to answer any tough 
questions. 
 
3.  (C)  Mubarak closed his campaign on September 4 with a 
rally at Cairo's Abdin Square, where he postured as an 
inheritor of the tradition of nationalist resistance to 
occupation and foreign interference that included milestones 
of Egyptian history which took place at Abdin such as the 
Urabi Revolt against the British in 1882, the British 
occupation in 1942, and the Free Officers revolution of 1952. 
 In a TV interview on the same day, Mubarak, with the 
magnanimity of the presumptive victor, said that he supported 
the right of Kifaya and others to demonstrate in the street 
and urged any citizens who opposed him to express their 
feelings through the ballot box.  (Note:  Mubarak did not 
elaborate on how citizens who have been denied the right to 
register to vote by Egypt's restrictive registration 
procedures--which closed in January, prior to his February 26 
announcement about direct election of the president--should 
express their opposition.  End note.) 
 
4.  (C)  Mubarak's lead remains unassailable, in the eyes of 
almost all analysts and ordinary Egyptians.  He has avoided 
gaffes and tough questions, and continues to present a 
presidential, if somewhat stolid and familiar, face to the 
Egyptian voters.  The ordinary Egyptians to whom we have 
talked tend to hold one of two views about the president and 
the elections. 
 
--Of those who plan to vote, most say they will vote for 
Mubarak as "the best of a bad group."  These voters say that 
Mubarak has served for too long, that his record has been 
mixed (at best), and that he is unlikely to deliver on his 
campaign promises.  They note, however, that he is a known 
and proven quantity who has kept Egypt stable and maintained 
good relations with other world leaders.  The other 
contenders, according to this line of thinking, are unknowns 
who are too risky to vote for. 
 
--Competing with the "devil-we-know" view of Mubarak is the 
other leading school of thought, generally held by ordinary 
citizens who are not registered to vote.  Evidencing the 
political apathy that many analysts say is the result of 50 
years of authoritarian rule, these disenfranchised citizens 
take a "why bother" attitude to the election.  They argue 
that politics is a game only accessible to the elite, and is 
not something they can hope to influence. 
5.  (C)  One other item of Mubarak miscellany:  Throughout 
the campaign, presidential son Gamal Mubarak has been 
publicly silent, although at the president's rallies, Gamal 
has featured among the dignitaries sitting front and center. 
Journalists and analysts have ascribed to Gamal a key role in 
the campaign, a view that is supported by Gamal's association 
with the campaign managers and his key role as head of the 
NDP's policies committee.  Breaking with the public silence 
that has been his custom during the campaign, on September 4 
in Port Said, Gamal told a party conference that his father 
had a "realistic" platform, and that the election "will prove 
to the world that democracy is a fundamental aspect of modern 
Egypt." 
 
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Ayman Nour 
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6.  (C)  Nour has continued with his dogged pursuit of the 
presidency.  Witnesses say that his appearances have often 
generated the most excitement and energy of the campaign--in 
contrast to the carefully scripted Mubarak events or the 
plodding speeches of No'man Gom'a--but it seems more likely 
that the enthusiasm results as much from the simple novelty 
of the young challenger asserting his fitness for the 
presidency.  Nour's supporters are relatively young and 
technologically savvy and they have done a good job of 
responding in high numbers of various internet polls that 
have run or are running on the internet, including several 
Egyptian and pan-Arab sites.  As a result, many of these 
polls show Nour running a strong second or even ahead of 
Mubarak.  (Comment:  All the usual caveats about internet 
polls--unscientific, self-selecting samples, etc.--must 
apply, but we are still intrigued by the Nour campaign's 
ability to upstage the Mubarak machine in this one area.  End 
comment.) 
 
7.  (C)  Nour experienced a setback to his campaign when the 
PEC ruled that his campaign theme song, unveiled in late 
August with a professionally produced video, could not be 
shown on TV since the song's composer had charged Nour with 
copyright infringement.  Predictably, Nour charged that the 
GOE was singling him out for persecution, while Nour's 
critics--especially those who back Mubarak--pointed to the 
episode as more evidence of Nour's shady character. 
 
8.  (C)  Nour's stakes in the September 7 election are 
particularly high.  If he manages to win the race for second 
place, he will gain legitimacy as the leading opposition 
figure to Mubarak.  Indeed, many analysts are suggesting the 
Nour's real goal is the next presidential election in 2011. 
In addition, a strong finish by Nour on September 7 would 
bolster him ahead of the planned resumption on September 25 
of his postponed trial on forgery charges--which Nour and 
other GOE critics have argued is driven primarily by the 
NDP's political agenda. 
 
------------------------------------- 
No'man Goma'a:  I am not a GOE Puppet 
------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Goma'a's final campaign event, in keeping with the 
lack of energy and negativity that has characterized much of 
his campaign, was a press conference on September 4 in which 
he spent considerable time denying the persistent rumors that 
he entered the presidential race only after promises/pressure 
from the GOE.  (Note:  Gom'a's last minute entry into the 
race, after hints that he favored a Wafd party boycott of the 
poll, has prompted speculation that the GOE would prefer that 
Gom'a and the Wafd emerge from the 2005 election season as 
Egypt's leading opposition.  According to this line of 
reasoning, a Wafd-dominated opposition would be relatively 
pliable and predictable.  By contrast, the Ghad, with Nour's 
charisma and commitment to challenge the ruling system, is 
seen as more of a threat.  End note.) 
 
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The Judges Decide 
----------------- 
 
10.  (C)  The Judges Club of Cairo announced on September 2 
that its membership had collectively agreed to participate in 
supervising the election, but with the caveat that the judges 
could not guarantee that the polls would be free, fair, and 
transparent unless the PEC undertook at least three major 
changes to planned procedures, including: 
 
--admitting domestic monitors to the polling stations; 
 
--allowing the judges in individual polling stations to 
release preliminary vote counts not only to the central 
collection point in Cairo, but also to the party/candidate 
agents in each polling station; 
 
--revising the assignments of judges for the election so as 
to place the most senior (and most independent) judges in the 
positions of greatest responsibility. 
 
11.  (C)  Regarding the third point, many judges and 
observers agree that the PEC has sought to sideline the most 
independent judges, either by appointing them to relatively 
junior supervisory jobs or by eliminating their names 
altogether from the supervisory lists.  In a conversation 
with poloff on September 2, however, two senior judges with 
close links to the Ministry of Justice's Supreme Judicial 
Council argued that the assignments made by the PEC were not 
the result of malign PEC intent, but rather were an example 
of "typical Egyptian chaos." 
 
12.  (C)  The Judges' Club decision to participate in 
supervising the elections in some ways was a climb down from 
their May threat to boycott unless the GOE provided legal and 
financial guarantees of independence, which it refused to do. 
 The GOE was ready to use a cadre of lower level Ministry of 
Justice employees, including junior prosecutors and 
administrative staff, to serve as electoral supervisors.  It 
appears that the Judges' Club membership calculated that a 
boycott would leave them with little direct information about 
the polls, while at the same time allowing the GOE to assert 
that its "judges" had effectively supervised the polls.  With 
their agreement to supervise, but with the caveat that they 
cannot vouch for the poll's integrity unless the GOE follows 
their three recommendations, the judges have preserved their 
central role in determining the integrity of the election. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
State Council Administrative Court Rushes In 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C)  On September 3, the State Council Administrative 
Court issued several notable rulings in election-related 
lawsuits.  In the first decision, the Court disqualified 
opposition candidate Wahid al-Uqsuri on the grounds that his 
leadership of the Egypt Arab Socialist Party was contested. 
The PEC immediately announced that Uqsuri, who has the odd 
distinction of being both a socialist and a successful 
businessman, remained eligible.  The PEC affirmed its control 
of all matters pertaining to the presidential election 
eligibility and conduct, and announced that it would 
disregard the Administrative Court's ruling. 
 
14.  (C)  More significantly, the Court ruled in favor of the 
NGO coalitions who had sued the PEC to admit domestic 
monitors to the polling stations.  The PEC's announcement 
that only judges, voters, poll workers, and candidate agents 
would be allowed to enter the polling stations prompted the 
domestic civil society groups who hope to monitor the 
election (including several funded by USAID) to sue the PEC 
to gain access.  The PEC responded to the decision by 
insisting that it would disregard the court order. 
 
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Where the Higher Courts Will Fear to Tread? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
15.  (C)  The PEC does seem to have the letter of the law on 
its side.  The law governing presidential elections clearly 
states that with the exception of criminal acts "in flagrante 
delicto," the PEC is immune from review and challenge and 
indeed is the sole authority for determining any appeals 
against its own decision (Article 36 of Law 174/2005). 
(Comment:  The creation of an imperial PEC, which is 
completely independent on paper, but widely believed to 
answer to the highest powers of the presidency, is likely to 
remain a major point of contention.  End comment.) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Kifaya:  The Mice Plan to Roar Some More 
---------------------------------------- 
 
16.  (C)  In a September 4 press conference, Kifaya leaders 
announced that they would continue their struggle against the 
dominance of President Mubarak and his family, and that they, 
along with other opposition groups, would form a "unified 
list" of opposition candidates to run against the NDP in the 
coming parliamentary elections.  Kifaya also plans to form a 
shadow government and parliament, and to increase its 
demonstrations and other activities to spread its message to 
all governorates in Egypt.  Kifaya has also announced a major 
demonstration in Tahrir Square to start at noon on election 
day.  The security forces, which demonstrated notable 
restraint in the last Kifaya demonstration in late August, 
are unlikely to allow the Tahrir demonstration to become a 
magnet for protestors.  This event will receive considerable 
scrutiny since there are elements in Kifaya that would 
welcome a clash with the security forces. 
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Comment:  It Ain't Gonna Be Over Even When the Big Man Wins 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
17.  (C)  Negad El Borai (protect), a lawyer and leader of 
one of the domestic monitoring coalitions, argued that 
regardless of how Mubarak wins this election, he will emerge 
as a weaker president.  If the GOE resorts to ballot rigging 
and other illegitimate means to win the election, the truth 
will get out, and thereby weaken Mubarak in his final term. 
Alternatively, if Mubarak and the regime take a chance on a 
free and fair process, the likely low turnout for Mubarak, 
and the emergence of an opposition with some electoral 
legitimacy will set the stage for future democratic progress. 
 
18.  (C)  In addition, the conflict between the 
judges--embodied by the pro-Government Mamdouh Marai who 
presides over the PEC and the independent-minded Zakaria 
Abdel Aziz of the Cairo Judges Club--about the supervision 
and monitoring of the presidential election will almost 
certainly spill over into the debate about the conduct of the 
coming parliamentary elections.  The high stakes of the 
parliamentary elections may mean that the judges' battle is 
only beginning.  In his public remarks on September 2, 
Zakaria Abdel Aziz invoked the specter of a Ukraine-style 
showdown between the GOE and outraged protestors.  Other GOE 
critics, including Kifaya, would like nothing less than to 
orchestrate in Tahrir Square a popular rejection of the 
election result.  We see no evidence to suggest that such an 
initiative will gain significant support, but we are also 
confident that Egypt's emboldened opposition will try to 
capitalize on any appearance of electoral impropriety as they 
continue their struggle for democracy.  End comment. 
 
 
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