US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI6841

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, IN, SY, External Political Relations, India-Syria 
SUBJECT: INDIA-SYRIA RELATIONS (C-NE5-00868) 
 
REF: A. STATE 145434 
 
     B. DAMASCUS 4183 
     C. NEW DELHI 6735 
     D. 04 NEW DELHI 8053 
     E. NEW DELHI 6804 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (S/NF) Summary: Indian West Asia Envoy Gharekhan's recent 
trip to Syria was focused on Iraq.  India's broader interests 
in Damascus include Syria's influence on the Israel-Palestine 
conflict and Iraq, and the GOI's desire to burnish relations 
with the Muslim world.  End Summary. 
 
Gharekhan's Visit to Syria 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF) Charge and PolCouns met Indian West Asia Envoy 
Chinmaya Gharekhan on August 10.  In the course of that 
meeting, they inquired about his June trip to Damascus per 
Ref A.  Gharekhan related that his meeting with Syrian 
Foreign Minister Shara was focused on Iraq, and India's 
desire to be involved in Iraq's future.  Shara used the 
meeting as an opportunity to insist on Syria's innocence of 
charges that it has supported infiltration of insurgents into 
Iraq.  Gharekhan told us that he conveyed to Shara India's 
message that words are not enough, but that Syria needs to 
show action in clamping down on fighters crossing the border 
-- not to appease the US, but to maintain good ties with the 
new Iraqi government. 
 
3.  (S/NF) Gharekhan commented that he was passing along 
Shara's statement "for what it's worth," implying that he did 
not believe Syria's claims of innocence. 
 
Gharekhan's Role in Policy 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (S/NF) On August 31, Poloff quizzed retired Ambassador to 
Iran and Saudi Arabia Hamid Ansari, now a member of the Prime 
Minister's National Security Advisory Board, on Indian policy 
in the Middle East and Gharekhan's role.  Ansari believed 
that Gharekhan acts as both envoy of the Foreign Minister and 
a source of policy input to the GOI on policy toward Syria. 
Gharekhan is sufficiently senior that he could report to the 
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister or Foreign Secretary as he 
wished, Ansari said, but gave his opinion that he commonly 
reports to Foreign Minister Natwar Singh.  However, Ansari 
added, the Middle East is sufficiently important to India 
that there is no lack of interest from the Foreign Minister 
and Foreign Secretary in making policy. 
 
Indian Interest in Syria: Not Much? 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (S/NF)  In general, India's bilateral relations with 
Syria are very thin.  India's interests in the Middle East 
are drawing more high-level attention in the GOI than in the 
past, but the foci of those interests are: 
 
-- Gulf Cooperation Council countries, for their predominant 
share of India's oil supplies, and the large number of 
Indians working in those countries (Ref D); 
 
-- Iran, which India sees as a growing energy source, an 
important balancing neighbor on Pakistan's opposite border, a 
Muslim swing state, and India's access point to Central Asia 
(Ref E); and 
-- Israel-Palestine, both for India's growing strategic and 
defense relationship with Israel, and its historical 
rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood (important for 
domestic politics). 
 
In contrast, Syria falls outside of any of the standard 
Indian areas of concern in the Middle East, and there are 
few, if any, shared interests.  Our contacts tell us that 
India's prime concern with Syria is for its influence on the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict, where India is trying to carve 
out a role for itself, after recognizing New Delhi's 
increasing marginalization.  The other current interest, as 
illustrated by Gharekhan's recent Damascus visit, is India's 
desire to find low-risk options for re-engaging on Iraq. 
 
Why Engage Syria? 
----------------- 
 
6.  (C) Greater engagement with Middle East states, including 
Syria, fits into two broader goals of Indian foreign (and 
domestic) policy, particularly under the ruling UPA 
government.  The UPA derives an important portion of its 
support from India's 150 million Muslims, and it came to 
power in May 2004 with a stated goal of recalibrating India's 
relations with the Muslim world, especially on the 
Palestinian question.  Portraying itself as a defender of 
Muslims in India and a champion of the Palestinian cause, the 
UPA has made reinvigorating ties with Middle East and Muslim 
countries a high priority.  The second goal is to rally 
support for India's perennial battle to be admitted in some 
status to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which 
has been critical of India's Kashmir stance.  Although both 
of these goals derive mostly from domestic electoral 
political considerations, rather than strictly foreign policy 
objectives, New Delhi has recognized that its lackluster 
relations with Arab and Muslim states have become a foreign 
policy liability, and is working to rectify that (Ref D). 
 
7.  (S/NF) As part of these broader goals of deeper 
engagement in the Middle East, New Delhi has floated 
suggestions recently that it could play a mediating role in 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict, as a state with growing 
working relations with Israel and (at least) bona fides in 
the eyes of Palestinians (Note: Ref C reports on the latest 
disappointing India-Israel interaction.  End Note).  However, 
given its generally weak relations with most Middle Eastern 
countries and lack of gravitas, most dismiss this vision as 
unrealistic. 
MULFORD