US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI6840

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006840 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA, NEA, NP, AC, EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015 
TAGS: MNUC, PREL, KNNP, PINS, MOPS, IN, IR, India_Iran 
SUBJECT: A NUCLEAR IRAN STILL UNACCEPTABLE TO INDIA, BUT 
DELHI QUESTIONS EVENTUAL ARMED CONFRONTATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 163143 (NOTAL) 
     B. STATE 158145 (NOTAL) 
     C. NEW DELHI 6804 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Indian FS Saran listened attentively to 
Ambassador's views on Iran, including our disappointment with 
FM Natwar Singh's public statements on his September 3-4 
visit to Tehran; and reaffirmed India's long-standing policy 
on Iran, ie, that Iran must comply with its international 
commitments, that Iran has a right to a peaceful nuclear 
energy program, and (when pressed at the end of the meeting) 
that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable.  The Foreign Secretary 
also repeatedly questioned what he characterized as the 
ultimate outcome of our aggressive approach to Iran -- 
namely, military confrontation.  The Foreign Secretary urged 
giving dialogue with Iran more time.  Ambassador pushed Saran 
hard to consider that India's own policy of fence-sitting in 
the hope that something positive would  happen would only 
give Iran more time to work on its clandestine weapons 
program, and ultimately weaken prospects for a peaceful 
solution.  Saran promised to convey the gist of our briefing 
and demarche, as well as an offer to brief the PM, to Natwar 
Singh, who had just returned from Tehran.  Our message and 
briefing may have hit home finally with Saran; we will 
follow-up to see if India's calculus shifts toward helping us 
more in Vienna before the September 19 IAEA BOG meeting.  End 
Summary. 
 
Delivering the Mail (Wrapped in a Brick) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (S) As instructed, the Ambassador, joined by Washington 
briefers and Embassy officials, delivered points in Ref A to 
Indian Foreign Secretary Saran and MEA J/S (Americas) Dr. 
Jaishankar on September 5, 2005.  The Ambassador took Saran 
to task for what we had perceived in media reports as an 
unacceptably weak set of statements on Iran's nuclear program 
by Natwar Singh while visiting Tehran.  Ambassador explained 
that the time was drawing near for fence-sitters to make hard 
decisions for the good of regional security and stability. 
Many in Congress and throughout Washington, he reminded 
Saran, were watching India's treatment of Iran prior to 
Congressional debate on the US-India civilian nuclear 
initiative.  The IAEA BOG meeting September 19 offered India 
a chance to be helpful.  The Ambassador stressed the moment 
of truth was approaching, particularly as it was now clear 
that the Iranians were working feverishly to weaponize 
despite their public statements and undertakings to the EU3. 
India had a key voice in the NAM and could swing opinion in 
the BOG; it was time, he said, for us to know where India 
stood. 
 
Our Tune Hasn't Changed 
----------------------- 
 
3. (S) Saran insisted there had been no ambiguity in Natwar 
Singh's statements in Tehran; the Minister had stuck with 
India's consistent formula, ie, the GOI recognizes Iran's 
right to pursue a peaceful civilian nuclear energy program, 
and Iran should comply with its international treaty 
commitments with regard to its nuclear programs.  India 
believed Iran's nuclear programs was best "sorted out" with 
the EU3, and "a slide into confrontation" would not be 
useful.  After Natwar's visit to Tehran, India realized the 
regime was "hard line," but Saran affirmed India's support 
for continued dialogue.  Any rupture, said Saran, would end 
whatever leverage the EU3 or IAEA might wield.  Saran 
professed his belief that referral to the UNSC would cause 
greater turmoil in energy markets, which would be detrimental 
to India.  India, he said, would continue to use its ties 
with Iran to convince it to avoid confrontation and stay on 
track. 
 
Thrust and Parry 
---------------- 
 
4. (S) Ambassador again reminded Saran that the entire time 
Iran had talked to the EU3, it had been cheating in secret, 
as the briefing we provided demonstrates.  More delay and 
dialogue would just buy Iran the time it needed to complete 
its plans.  The Ambassador called Saran out on neglecting to 
mention one key element of India's long-standing position, 
that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability was unacceptable. 
Saran demurred, saying even the IAEA had cited Iranian 
cooperation in its latest report, while noting unresolved 
questions; was that, he said, not enough proof that Iran was 
trying to be in compliance?  The Ambassador dismissed that 
logic out-of-hand, saying Iran had already had three years of 
negotiations during which it had continued to develop a 
nuclear bomb in secret. 
 
5. (S) At this juncture, Washington visitors delivered the 
briefing referred to in Ref B.  Saran characterized the 
briefing as being more evidence of a delivery system than a 
bomb program, but the analysts outlined evidence of related 
technical functions and design characteristics that could 
only relate to the delivery of a nuclear weapon.  Moreover, 
the analysts said denial and deception had continued in 
parallel with EU3 and IAEA talks.  More talking would just 
give Iran more time to be "completely dishonest."  Faced with 
the evidence, Saran again asked what it would take for the US 
to avoid the UN route.  The Ambassador was clear: given 
Iran's clear willingness to deceive, time was of the essence. 
 We have to act.  A/DCM added that Washington still sought to 
make diplomacy work; Indian help at the BOG meeting would 
enhance diplomatic prospects for a solution.  The EU-3 effort 
was launched in 2003 in lieu of UNSC referendum.  Since that 
effort has run its course, it is time to go to the Council. 
At this, Saran conveyed that the Iranians had affirmed to 
Natwar their desire to avoid a confrontation, but needed a 
"face-saving way out." 
 
All We Are Saying Is Give Peace a Chance 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Saran again said armed confrontation was not helpful. 
It would, he said, be "quite disastrous" and the consequences 
needed to be thought through carefully.  Armed conflict with 
Iran would impact India's interests.  War was unacceptable to 
India, insisted Saran, and counseled us not to pursue a 
course of action with an unforeseen outcome.  The Ambassador 
emphasized that India now had to calculate for itself which 
option was the least destructive of its national interests. 
America could not afford a nuclear Iran; could India? 
 
When Squeezed: A Nuclear Iran is Unacceptable to India 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
7. (S) When Ambassador for the second time reminded Saran of 
India's long-standing policy that a nuclear Iran was 
unacceptable, Saran reiterated that third pillar of the 
formula.  However, he again insisted that armed confrontation 
was also problematic.  "How do we get where we want to get?" 
The Ambassador said if we keep letting the Iranians string us 
along, a weaponized Iran would be inevitable.  India's policy 
seemed to be to keep the current diplomatic process going and 
hope that something "works out."  The Ambassador expressed 
the view that India needed to face the reality that the 
something that would "work out" if this approach were 
followed is a nuclear weapon in the hands of Iran. 
Meanwhile, the Ambassador emphasized that the diplomatic 
avenue was not yet at an end, but we needed our friends to 
use their influence.  Saran promised to convey our points and 
the gist of our briefings to his leadership, especially EAM 
Natwar Singh, who had just returned from Tehran. 
 
Ready to Brief PM Singh As Well 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (S) The Ambassador said we would be happy to have the team 
brief the Prime Minister at his convenience, preferably 
before he saw POTUS at UNGA in September.  Saran promised to 
convey the offer. 
 
COMMENT: Do We Detect a Chink in the Armor? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (S) COMMENT:  Ref C lays out our assessment of India's 
strategic interests with Iran.  India needs to balance those 
interests with its expanding ties with Washington.  We pushed 
Saran pretty hard, and although he pushed back with equal 
vigor we may have gotten our message through:  it is time for 
India to make some hard decisions.  We are approaching the 
moment when fence sitting will not be an option.  We will 
keep pressing to see if India's position on Iran shifts as we 
head into the September 19 IAEA BOG meeting in Vienna.  India 
has in the past played a helpful role on Iran in the BOG; we 
need to ensure they do so again.  END COMMENT. 
MULFORD