US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2862

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002862 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 1.6X1, 1.6X6 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU -- DISTANCING 
HIMSELF FROM OBASANJO? 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS 
1.6X1, 1.6X6. 
 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: During an October 10 meeting with 
Ambassador Jeter, Vice President Atiku Abubakar 
admitted his relationship with President Obasanjo was 
on the shoals, attributing the deterioration to 
Obasanjo's poor political skills and reliance on 
malevolent, imprudent advisors. Atiku stated Obasanjo 
had alienated Ibrahim Babangida, former military ruler 
Abdulsalami Abubakar and NSA Aliyu Mohammmed, the men 
most instrumental in Obasanjo's 1999 election. Atiku 
disavowed supporting the impeachment drive but was not 
working to quash it. The Vice President claimed 
control of PDP party machinery, with only a small 
faction loyal to Obasanjo. He saw reconciliation with 
Obasanjo as unlikely. Yet, leaving an opening, Atiku 
said that he, Babangida, Abdulsalami, and Aliyu would 
meet the President that evening to see if fences could 
be mended. Atiku spoke like a man fed up with a boss 
he considered unskilled in the calling that he has 
mastered. Candid about how his relationship with 
Obasanjo had soured, Atiku did not reveal next steps, 
but gave the impression that he was both able and 
willing to contest for the Presidency. Atiku seemed to 
be measuring whether the political aperture created by 
Obasanjo's failings and the urging of others (such as 
Babangida) for Atiku to step forward, was really the 
opportunity of a lifetime or a trap to destroy him 
politically. Some pundits and Babangida associates 
claim that IBB may be setting Atiku up, in an effort 
to destroy him politically, once and for all. Septel 
will provide Embassy's analysis of Atiku's current 
role in Nigerian politics and his prospects for the 
future. End Summary 
 
 
------------ 
HOW IT BEGAN 
------------ 
 
 
2. (C) During a ninety minute October 10 meeting at 
the Vice President's residence, VP Atiku Abubakar told 
Ambassador Jeter that his relationship with Obasanjo 
was in tatters. Although tired and under the weather 
due to the strain and pace of the last few weeks, 
Atiku provided a detailed chronology of his 
relationship with the President. Atiku said that he 
and Obasanjo were relative strangers before the 1998 
prelude to the 1999 elections. Their nexus was the 
late Shehu Yar A'dua.  Yar A'dua was second-in-command 
during Obasanjo's stint as military Head of State. Yar 
A'dua was also Atiku's political mentor. Atiku 
inherited leadership of Yar A'dua's political machine, 
the PDM, when the general died in detention, likely at 
the sinister hand of the late Sani Abacha. 
 
 
3. (S) Atiku recalled not only working for Obasanjo's 
release from prison but also assisting in his ascent 
to the Presidency. Atiku stated that he along with 
former Heads of State Babangida and Abdulsalami and 
current NSA Aliyu Mohammed were the four men most 
responsible for Obasanjo's successful climb. Seeking 
to redeem his image after the 1993 electoral debacle, 
Babangida convinced Obasanjo to run, then placed his 
considerable clout and money into the "Obasanjo 
Project."  While Babangiba pulled the strings from 
Minna, General Mohammed performed the much of the 
legwork while also drumming up other support. Then 
Head of State Abdulsalami backdated Obasanjo's pardon, 
an act that allowed him to be eligible to contest in 
the election. Abdulsalami also funneled money into the 
campaign and steered the considerable powers of 
incumbency to Obasanjo's favor. 
 
 
4. (C) Atiku's contribution was political. Exploiting 
the PDM machinery, Atiku successfully engineered 
Obasanjo's primary victories in the PDP. Along with 
Babangida and the others, he recalled working hard to 
ensure Obasanjo's nomination at the convention. It was 
at that point, Obasanjo asked Atiku, already Adamawa 
State's governor-elect and very content with that 
status, to be his Vice-Presidential running mate. 
Atiku accepted. On paper, Obasanjo had the credentials 
of a perfect leader -- a perceived detribalized Yoruba 
with ties to the North, a former military leader with 
a good record, and good standing in the international 
arena; but, in practice, he had fallen far too short 
of the mark, Atiku lamented. (Comment: Atiku's version 
of his selection differs from common lore. Most 
accounts have a reluctant Obasanjo being pressured to 
take Atiku because of need to cement the support of 
the PDM faction of the party and to balance the ticket 
with a running-mate from the North.  End comment) 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THINGS BEGAN TO SOUR -- ANENIH TO BLAME 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Although they did not know each other well, 
Atiku recalled that the two quickly melded. However, 
there was an early premonition that foreshadowed 
today's troubles. Atiku recounted having agreed with 
Obasanjo on whom they would back for the Senate 
leadership. Shortly thereafter, Atiku went to the 
United States only to discover Obasanjo had changed 
heart, selecting another person for the Senate 
President. According to Atiku, the shift was 
precipitated by presidential advisors warning Obasanjo 
that an Atiku loyalist should not be Senate President 
because Atiku already had too much influence in the 
Lower House. With one of his men as Senate President, 
they warned that Atiku could engineer Obasanjo's 
impeachment. Atiku stated that he acquiesced in the 
change in order to avoid a confrontation with Obasanjo 
so early in the Administration. 
 
 
6. (C) Atiku stated that the relationship with 
Obasanjo assumed its current negative momentum in 
April, during preparations for Obasanjo's reelection 
announcement. Pointing the finger at Works and Housing 
Minister Tony Anenih as the main culprit, Atiku 
accused Obasanjo's "handlers" of purposefully 
misinforming the President that he was angling to 
announce his presidential bid before Obasanjo's was 
announced. Obasanjo came to believe these innuendoes 
when Atiku refused to participate in Anenih's 
convoking of party figures at Obasanjo's farm in Ota 
to "request" that Obasanjo run again.  Atiku claimed 
that his absence did not signal opposition to the 
President; instead, it underscored his distaste for a 
procession he claimed was too reminiscent of the late 
Sani Abacha's effort to succeed himself by casting 
himself as a consensus candidate for civilian 
President. 
 
 
7. (C) Atiku contended that Anenih attempted to keep 
him ignorant of preparations for Obasanjo's reelection 
announcement and tried to schedule the event when 
Atiku was abroad. After talking to Obasanjo and 
disavowing intentions to break the ticket, Atiku said 
that Obasanjo ordered Anenih to stop his antics and 
have Atiku participate in the reelection event. Still, 
Atiku identified these machinations as causing a split 
that in the intervening months has only worsened. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
NO HAND IN THE IMPEACHMENT; NO HAND IN STOPPING IT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
8. (C) On the current impeachment crisis, Atiku 
claimed the President was the victim of his own 
hubris.  Because of Obasanjo's suspicions of his 
influence in the Lower House, Atiku assiduously 
avoided contact with its Members, letting the 
President's other advisors work both Chambers. The 
President's men quickly antagonized the 
Representatives. Early on, Atiku remembered telling 
Obasanjo that a close relationship with the Senate was 
essential since his advisors had spoiled his 
relationship with the House. Obasanjo erred in getting 
involved in Senate President Anyim's tussle with the 
Ebonyi State Governor over control of the party 
machinery in that State; in doing so, Obasanjo lost 
hold of the Senate. With both Houses alienated, 
impeachment became possible. 
 
 
9. (S) Atiku felt the overall aim was not to impeach 
Obasanjo but to render him unelectable.  He disavowed 
supporting the move.  With Obasanjo finally realizing 
seriousness of the threat by late August, the 
President asked Atiku to use his influence to calm the 
waters at the National Assembly. Atiku responded that 
he would meet House leaders provide Obasanjo's 
advisors not savage him by claiming Atiku's meetings 
with House leaders were signs of betrayal. Obasanjo 
promised his advisors' best behavior. Atiku met with 
House leaders; as he feared, however, Obasanjo's 
people accused him of backing the House rebellion. 
Since then, Atiku claimed to have washed his hands of 
the affair, leaving Obasanjo and his men to their own 
devices. 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
OBASANJO IN DIRE STRAITS IN THE PARTY 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
10. (C) Because of his lack of political skills, 
Obasanjo has severely compromised his position in the 
party. Atiku measured his strength in the PDP as 
vastly superior to Obasanjo's, clearly suggesting that 
Obasanjo would have a difficult time securing the 
party nomination without him. At the PDP's most recent 
National Executive Committee meeting, Obasanjo 
suffered an embarrassing defeat when his proposal for 
the sequencing of the party primaries was roundly 
defeat by Atiku loyalists. Atiku claimed to have 
passed a message to Obasanjo's men that they would 
suffer more defeats if they tried to bypass him again 
on preparations for the party convention and 
primaries.  Atiku boasted that he held the loyalty of 
most PDP governors, who generally control their state 
party machines. He also contended that he controlled 
the party NEC and that most PDP National Assembly 
members were loyal to him. 
 
 
11. (C) Atiku downplayed the potentially negative 
effect of Obasanjo not gaining the party re- 
nomination. Obasanjo, he asserted, did not have a 
large constituency of his own. Thus, his ouster would 
not convulse the party. Moreover, Obasanjo was not 
very popular with his own ethnic kinsmen so the 
Southwest would not erupt as it did with the annulment 
of the 1993 election. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
THE BIG THREE ARE ALSO MAD AT OBASANJO 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
12. (S) Perhaps more fatal to Obasanjo's chances than 
his anemic support within the party, is the anger of 
Babangida, Abdulsalami and Aliyu. Atiku claimed to be 
in regular contact with the other three whom he 
described as very disenchanted with Obasanjo. 
Babangida has sworn off any association with a second 
"Obasanjo Project," an allusion to their cooperation 
to elect Obasanjo in 1999. Abdulsalami was miffed when 
he came to ask Obasanjo for a favor and the 
President's response was to show him the door. 
Realizing Obasanjo was digging a hole for himself, 
Atiku once asked the President if he really understood 
how he had won office. He warned Obasanjo that it was 
akin to political suicide to insult these men by 
telling them they had made a "bad investment" if they 
expected favors due to their contributions to his 
election. When Obasanjo pleaded ignorance as to the 
role of the Big Three in his election, Atiku proceeded 
to summarize the contributions they and he had made. 
When the President continued to feign ignorance and 
asked how he could reconcile with the others, Atiku 
said he admonished the President for being ungrateful 
and he knew very well that he had to make amends for 
past behavior. 
 
 
13. (S) While in Abuja for the September 23 
Commonwealth meeting on Zimbabwe, South African 
President Mbeki expressed concern about Nigeria's 
internal politics. Previously, Obasanjo had dismissed 
his troubles as a teapot's tempest; this time, he 
admitted to Mbeki that he was in serious trouble. 
However, when Mbeki tried to meet Atiku, Obasanjo 
invited himself to the session and placed Mbeki and 
Atiku in an uncomfortable and embarrassing situation 
Atiku said that he choose to leave.  However, before 
Mbeki departed, he and Atiku managed to talk outside 
of Obasanjo's earshot, with the VP speaking frankly 
about the President's political mistakes. Atiku told 
us that Mbeki wanted to talk to Babangida as well. In 
the end, Babangida traveled to South Africa with 
Obasanjo's consent. Mbeki's apparent motive was to 
patch what was broken but Atiku did not give the 
venture much chance, particularly given Babangida's 
position. 
 
 
14. (S) Atiku said the President's Chief of Staff had 
admitted that Obasanjo was desperate.  In fact, the 
meeting with Ambassador Jeter was interrupted by 
several phone calls from the President's Office to 
arrange a dinner that evening for Obasanjo, Atiku and 
the Big Three, with Babangida having returned that day 
from South Africa. Atiku said that for months he had 
kept the Big Three from breaking openly with Obasanjo. 
He reminded them that they had enlisted his support 
for Obasanjo. He then told them that since they had 
backed Obasanjo together, they all must stick with him 
or leave him together. While that argument held things 
in abeyance, the day of decision was near. In a recent 
conversation, Abdulsalami cautioned Atiku about 
hitching his political future to Obasanjo's, the Vice 
President explained. (Comment: It seems unlikely that 
Obasanjo would have been in haste to hold the dinner 
without a signal from his friend Mbeki that what 
Babangida would say would not be too difficult to 
swallow. However, Mbeki could have misread Babangida. 
It would not be the first or last time someone 
misinterpreted Babangida's next steps.  End Comment.) 
 
 
15. (S) Atiku stated his rumored antagonisms with 
Aliyu and Babangida were media fabrications.  He 
stated Aliyu respected his political clout; in any 
case, the two operated in different spheres with Aliyu 
more at home on foreign policy and national security 
issues. As for Babangida, the former Head of State was 
encouraging him to run. Atiku, however, would not 
reveal his next moves, but did tell the Ambassador 
that he could "put two and two together."  He 
acknowledged the potential turmoil and paralysis of 
government that could result should he and Obasanjo 
battled for the PDP nomination. Atiku cryptically said 
he would do all he could to avoid these negative 
developments but stopped far short of disavowing 
presidential ambitions. 
 
 
16. (S) As the meeting ended, Atiku informed the 
Ambassador the meeting with Obasanjo was confirmed for 
that evening. Before going to the Presidential Villa, 
he and the Big Three would huddle to determine whether 
to walk away from Obasanjo or give him one more 
chance, spelling out concrete conditions for keeping 
their support. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
17. (S) While definitely shaped by his own biases, 
many of Atiku's observations ring true. Obasanjo is 
crippled politically, having alienated many of his 
former supporters. From almost all accounts, Atiku 
does command more loyalty within the party than 
Obasanjo. However, Atiku's self-portrait as a loyal 
but unjustly accused and wounded subordinate is 
exaggerated. There have been constant and credible 
reports for nearly a year that have Atiku testing the 
Presidential waters. He considers himself a much 
better politician that Obasanjo, and he most certainly 
is. Atiku also believes that Obasanjo has sufficiently 
fouled his own nest with little chance and dwindling 
time to rehabilitate his status.  First, to win the 
re-nomination, Obasanjo needs the Big Three to 
exercise benign indifference if they can no longer 
support him.  Additionally, Obasanjo will need Atiku's 
active support, something that Atiku currently appears 
more than content to withhold. It appears that Atiku 
is standing by watching Obasanjo progressively weaken 
and gauging the best time to make an aggressive move. 
 
 
18. (C) However, before laying his cards on the table, 
Atiku must decide whether the encouragement given by 
Babangida and others is real or are they simply using 
his own ambition to entice him into a battle with 
Obasanjo in hopes that they will neutralize each 
other.  Interestingly, in a private meeting on October 
15, the APP Governor of Gombe State, an IBB loyalist 
and former Minister in Babangida's government, told 
the Ambassador that Babangida had been working for 
almost two years to drive a wedge between Obasanjo and 
Atiku.  Atiku, he said, would probably run for the 
Presidency and Babangida would destroy him; once and 
for all.  Perhaps the Machiavelli-like "evil genius" 
has struck again.  We shall see. 
JETER