US embassy cable - 05MADRID3151

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SPAIN ON AUSTRALIA GROUP BIOLOGICAL AGENTS WORKING GROUP

Identifier: 05MADRID3151
Wikileaks: View 05MADRID3151 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2005-09-06 13:25:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM PREL ETTC SP CBW Non
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 003151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM AND EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, SP, CBW, Non-Proliferation Issues 
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON AUSTRALIA GROUP BIOLOGICAL AGENTS WORKING 
GROUP 
 
REF: STATE 149921 
 
Classified By: ESTHOFF KEN FORDER PER 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1.  (C)  ESTHOFF passed reftel points August 23 to MFA 
Disarmament Affairs Deputy Director General Marcos Rodriguez 
Cantero, requesting Spanish views regarding the U.S. proposal 
to add 23 biological agents to the Australia Group's (AG) 
control list.  Rodriguez Cantero informed ESTHOFF September 2 
that the Spanish response to our request would be provided by 
Industry Ministry Deputy Director General for Foreign Trade 
in Defense and Dual Use Equipment Antonio Segura.  Segura 
called ESTHOFF September 6 and made the following points: 
 
--  biological weapons proliferation will become an 
increasing priority for both our nations and the AG plays a 
critical role in combating this threat; 
 
--  Spain agrees that the AG needs to increase the number of 
controlled agents; 
 
--  however, Spain does not think the AG should continue with 
only one all-encompassing control list; 
 
--  instead, there should be at least two lists, one for the 
most dangerous agents, the other for agents of less 
importance; 
 
--  multiple lists are already employed in other multilateral 
nonproliferation fora such as the MTCR and the CWC; 
 
--  furthermore, restricting the number of agents on the 
higher priority list would ease the burden on licensing 
agents, who generally lack the expertise to focus on a 
too-large list. 
 
2.  (C)  Segura also noted that the EU is currently 
considering controlling high priority biological agents in an 
even more restrictive fashion than that employed by the AG. 
He said the AG and the EU needed to coordinate their efforts 
to make sure they do not work at cross purposes. 
 
3.  (C)  Segura concluded by underscoring that Spain would 
not/not block any AG consensus position in favor of the U.S. 
proposal to add the 23 agents.  It merely believes that its 
"two lists proposal" is a better idea and should be 
considered as well. 
AGUIRRE 

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