US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3642

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003642 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS R 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, ELAB, PINS, EAID, KISL, IZ, Sunni Arab, Reconstruction 
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB OUTREACH IN IRAQ: MISSION PLANS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
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1.  (U)  The US Mission Baghdad, including MNF-I, is 
committed to achieving broad Sunni Arab support for a 
democratic Iraq. The Mission is aware of the beginnings of a 
psychological shift in the tide since the January elections 
regarding participation in the electoral process, and we will 
use a range of resources, programs and contacts throughout 
Iraq to accelerate Sunni Arab buy-in, and to weaken the 
insurgency. This cable will lay out the causes of Sunni Arab 
discontent, our goals and the strategies for achieving them, 
and a sampling of initiatives designed to address the causes 
of dissatisfaction. 
 
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CAUSES OF SUNNI DISCONTENT 
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2.  (S)  First, we note at the outset that some Iraqi Sunni 
Arabs will never agree to participate in a democratic Iraq, 
and are irreconcilably wedded to violent opposition. They are 
principally Saddamists who will settle for nothing but the 
return of the former Baath party; "takfiri" and other radical 
religious extremists calling for the return of the Caliphate; 
and the partisans of terrorist groups like Zarqawi's. We must 
help the Iraqis isolate these groups and individuals from the 
rest of society, and either detain or destroy them. We also 
note that some of Sunni Arab behavior is explained by sheer 
intimidation and terror at the hands of insurgents and others 
in their neighborhoods and towns. Much of this waxes and 
wanes, such that an improved security environment and growing 
political momentum in favor of participation will help dispel 
personal fear. 
 
3.  (S)  Our focus will be on the rest of the Sunni Arab 
population and its deep seated anxieties. For the vast 
majority, their discontent and the factors that contribute to 
their support for the insurgency are: 
-the fear of political disenfranchisement; 
-the lack of economic opportunity; 
-conflicting views on the role of central government; 
-Coalition Force and Iraqi Security Forces operations, 
including holding Sunni Arab detainees; and, 
-concern over Iranian influence in Iraq. 
 
4.  (S)  Political Disenfranchisement: A segment of Iraq's 
Sunni Arabs, who constitute 20 percent of the country's 
population, equate the introduction of democratic 
institutions with domination and subjugation by the Shia. 
Sunni political disenfranchisement has to a degree become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. The decision of the vast majority 
of Sunni voters to boycott January 2005 elections weakened 
their community's role in the emerging political process. 
This has contributed to increased Sunni skepticism about the 
Iraqi Transitional Government and the new draft constitution. 
At the same time, other Sunni have openly indicated readiness 
to participate in the new Iraq. Examples include Deputy 
President Al-Yawr, Deputy Prime Minister Al-Jaburi, Minister 
of Defense Al-Duleimi, and Minister of Industry Najafi. Many 
such Sunni identify themselves as "secular" or "liberal" and 
have openly indicated readiness to work with Shia and Kurds 
in building the new Iraq. The political future of such 
individuals depends upon the constructive involvement of the 
majority of Sunnis in Iraq's political process. 
 
5.  (S)  Economic Disempowerment: Many Sunnis lost their 
livelihood in 2003 with the disbandment of the army and the 
collapse of Saddam's governmental institutions. Since then, 
many perceive that the doors have been locked to their 
reentry into the work force, often owing to their former 
Baath party affiliation. In some locations, unemployment of 
40 to 70 percent and lack of hope for economic recovery have 
caused significant backlash among the Sunnis. Sunnis at all 
levels highlight lack of jobs and training as a major reason 
for discontent, especially because government jobs offer the 
most secure form of employment in Iraq. 
 
6.  (S)  The Role of the Central Government: For historical 
reasons, dating back 13 centuries, many Sunni Arabs view 
themselves as Iraq's natural leaders. (NOTE: Some Sunni even 
continue to maintain that they constitute the country's 
majority population, despite evidence to the contrary.) In 
contrast to the Kurds and Shia who have suffered at the hands 
of a series of central governments, the Sunni population 
strongly leans in favor of concentrated decision-making in 
the hands of Baghdad officials. They fear that the Kurds, and 
potentially the Shia, will use the federalism provisions in 
the new constitution to pull the country into three separate 
entities. Many Sunni further worry that they would then be 
left as the poor stepchild, as the oil wealth of the country 
lies beneath the Kurdish and Shia regions in the north and 
south. 
 
7.  (S)  Chafing at Foreign Occupation/Lower Representation 
in Security Forces: For many Sunnis, the presence of Western 
military troops in Iraq is a great humiliation. Stories of 
intimidation, dishonor and abuse at the hands of coalition 
forces easily make the rounds among Sunni Arabs, on websites 
and in the street. At the same time, the dissolution of the 
Iraqi military of Saddam's regime removed Sunnis from the 
security apparatus of the Iraqi government, especially the 
Police Forces. Now, many Sunni fear that Shia-dominated 
police forces have targeted members of their community for 
arrest, torture and even murder with impunity. Until this 
year, the MOD and MOI had significant difficulty recruiting 
Sunnis - who were fearful of reprisals against themselves and 
their families - into their ranks. A strong public stance by 
some religious and tribal leaders advocating participation in 
the security forces changed that psychology to some extent, 
especially for army recruitment. 
 
8.  (S)  Perceptions of Targeted Detentions: Closely related 
to the problem of the military occupation, Sunni Arabs are 
extremely dissatisfied with the perceived Coalition Forces 
(CF) and ITG handling of the detainee issue. Many believe 
that CF detain massive numbers of innocent Sunnis without 
charge. Stories often mutate into Coalition arrests of Sunnis 
as a result of perniciously false accusations by Shia 
security and intelligence. 
 
9.  (S)  Fear of Iranian Domination: There is a pervasive and 
elemental fear throughout the Sunni population of growing 
Iranian influence in the Shia-dominated south and the Iraqi 
Transitional Government in Baghdad. (NOTE: Many Iraqi Arab 
Shia, especially secular moderates, also share this concern.) 
 
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STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH SUNNI CONCERNS 
------------------------------------ 
 
10.  (S)  Ambassador has established a Mission task force to 
develop the USG strategy to address these causes of Sunni 
Arab discontent, and has examined USG-wide programs that 
promote that strategy.  The overarching strategic outcome we 
seek is to weaken the insurgency by achieving broad Sunni 
Arab support for a democratic Iraq. First we will seek to 
separate the irreconcilable extremists from Sunni Arabs who 
desire a better future. Second, we will work to promote the 
importance of their participation in their political and 
economic lives, and to raise awareness of the extent and 
impact of USG/ITG programs in their communities. A main goal 
here is to elevate the confidence and hope of Sunni Arabs in 
their future, inextricably tied to political, economic, and 
social participation, and not destructive violence. The task 
force will work with Sunni Arabs throughout Iraq, but 
specifically will focus on tribal leaders, the unemployed and 
underemployed, veterans and military personnel, Islamists, 
urban intellectuals 
 and secular moderates. 
 
12.  (S)  Essential to the success of this outreach strategy 
is to enlist the assistance of influential Iraqi 
organizations and individuals, such as various political, 
economic and social opinion makers; Iraqi NGOs; religious 
leaders; military and veterans' leaders; and the media 
organizations that can distribute messages to Sunni Arabs 
across the country. Each of these Iraqi entities will be able 
to influence various Sunni groups, and working through all of 
them will spread the broader message of encouraging Sunni 
Arab support for a democratic Iraq. 
 
13.  (S)  The task force also believes that centers of Sunni 
influence outside of Iraq should be engaged to reach out to 
Iraqi Sunni Arabs. These would include Egypt, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Algeria, and Arab organizations such as the Arab 
League. The group envisions encouraging political and 
religious centers of influence in these countries to engage 
Sunnis in Iraq, exhorting them to participate fully and 
peacefully in the developing political process in Iraq. To 
this end we recommend the Ambassador's direct involvement 
with leaders in the region in support of Iraq and its Sunni 
Arab population.  We also believe other actors in the region 
are capable of affecting the Sunni community, such as Turkey, 
Syria and Iran. These nations have the capability to stem the 
flow of unhelpful and disruptive elements into Iraq, and have 
an abiding interest in seeing the development of a stable and 
democratic Iraq. 
 
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SPECIFIC INTIATIVES 
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15.  (S)  Post has developed a matrix of program initiatives, 
both ongoing and in the planning stages, to achieve the 
following objectives, each matched to dispel a source of 
discontent: 
 
i.    Political participation and empowerment 
ii.   Employment and economic opportunity 
iii.  Understanding and appreciating the role of the national 
government in a federal system 
iv.   Participation in and support for Iraq's security forces 
and its allies 
v.    Preventing undue Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs 
 
A sample list of some of the major initiatives follows, keyed 
to the principal objectives each contains (of course, many 
projects can directly and indirectly satisfy several 
objectives): 
 
-Maximize Sunni Arab voter registration throughout the 
nation, but with major focus on the four provinces with a 
Sunni majority (i,iii); 
 
-Prepare and execute substantial, meaningful detainee 
releases to gain Sunni Arab credence in our bona fides, 
increase confidence in the rule of law, and diminish their 
perception of the risks of political participation (i,iv); 
 
-Mobilize external regional Sunni support for Iraq's 
political and economic growth, in favor of Iraqi Sunni Arab 
participation and reconciliation, and against terrorist 
infiltration and murder (the Ambassador, along with the U.K. 
Ambassador, to travel to regional states to develop support 
for this initiative) (i,ii,iv,v); 
 
-Engage Sunni leaders in a direct dialogue to develop ideas 
to stabilize predominantly Sunni Arab regions (ii,iv) 
 
-Reach out and develop links with tribal elements to give 
them a role in the political, economic and security processes 
(i,ii,iv); 
 
-Speak with the Waqf to influence mosque sermons towards 
moderation, participation (including in the security forces) 
and non-violence (i,iv); 
 
-Substantially reduce the risk of Coalition military 
operations offsetting and counteracting Sunni Arab outreach 
efforts (i,iv); 
 
-Focus efforts to recruit military and police personnel from 
Sunni Arab regions (ii,iii,iv,v); 
 
-Reach out to veterans groups to ensure that they have a 
stake in the system, and are provided for by the Iraqi 
government (i,ii,iii,iv); 
 
-Continue USAID employment programs and explore additional 
opportunities to create job opportunities in Sunni regions 
(ii,iii); 
 
-Publicize reconstruction projects in Sunni areas, developing 
public relations campaigns that highlight efforts underway 
(ii,iii); 
 
-Publicize critical infrastructure security attacks, 
explaining the impact of sabotage operations, reducing 
insurgency support (i,iv); 
 
-Educate Sunni groups regarding their rights and 
opportunities with regards to the political process, 
encouraging participation in the October constitutional 
referendum and December election (i,iii); 
 
-Mediate an understanding between Sunni and Iraqi government 
leaders regarding the staffing and practices of Iraqi 
Security Forces in order to ensure that all communities can 
have confidence in these institutions (iii,iv); 
 
-Examine Sunni concerns regarding the level of Iranian 
influence in key Iraqi institutions and regions (v); 
-Encourage involvement by Sunni leaders in a moderate, 
cross-ethnic, cross-sectarian political coalition for the 
December election (i). 
Khalilzad