US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3628

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003628 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2010 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PTER, PGOV, KISL, IZ, Sunni Arab, Security 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINDEF AL-DULIME 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador, accompanied by A/DCM, met 
with Iraqi MinDef Dulime on September 3.  They discussed low 
Sunni representation in the Iraqi Army, including pressure to 
fire one of two Sunni division commanders.  Also discussed 
were efforts to enhance western security, with the idea of 
using local tribes under MOD authority to augment security 
operations.  Dulime raised his long term goal of 
standardizing Iraqi Army equipment -- ideally with U.S. gear 
-- although for now he has to settle for cheaper Russian-type 
weapons.  He also recommended drawing in certain Iraqi 
Islamic Party members to build Sunni support for the draft 
constitution.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) In a cordial meeting at his residence on September 3, 
the Ambassador, accompanied by A/DCM, met with Iraqi MinDef 
Sadoun al-Dulime.  Discussion began with Dulime dispelling a 
rumor that he was to be replaced as MinDef, with him 
confirming that his position was secure. 
 
SHIA-DOMINATED MOD 
------------------ 
 
3. (C) Discussion then turned to lack of Sunni representation 
in the MOD.  Dulime, a Sunni, confirmed the high proportion - 
70 percent, he said - of Shia personnel in the Ministry, 
including that four of ten division commanders are Shia 
(three are Kurd, one is a Turcoman).  He also confirmed that 
he was under pressure from the PM to fire MG Mahmoud 
al-Shamiri, Baghdad Division Commander and one of the two 
Sunni division commanders.  Shamiri was being fired because 
he had relieved a Shia brigade commander and two Shia 
battalion commanders, who were Islamists.  These three were 
replaced with Shia, but not Islamists.  A SCIRI National 
Assembly member, Jalal Al-Saghiri, had called repeatedly for 
Shamiri's dismissal. 
 
4. (C) Dulime lamented this action, stating that Shamiri is a 
good officer and one of the few Sunnis in senior command.  He 
added that many Sunnis are eager to join the Iraq Army, but 
lack of outreach as well as Shia discrimination prevent many 
Sunnis from joining.  Dulime and the Ambassador concurred 
that better recruitment efforts must be made with the goal of 
developing a professional army representative of all of 
Iraq's groups -- without MOD and MOI being politicized. 
 
TRIBES - HOW TO USE THEM 
------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Dulime discussed the security situation in western 
Anbar province, again raising the idea of bringing local 
tribes under MOD authority.  He said he could muster up to 
5000 individuals, but that one battalion and two companies 
(approx. 1200 men) would suffice for now.  The Iraqi Army 
could supply field grade officers to command these units, he 
noted.  He particularly referred to the Kata'ib al Hamza 
(KH), composed of members of several different western 
tribes.  The KH had fought against coalition forces in the 
past, but avowed to him that they had made a mistake and that 
Zarqawi was their real enemy.  The Americans will one day 
leave, they argued to Dulime; Zarqawi not only will remain, 
but he will try to transform the tribes into religious 
zealots.  Dulime also repeated his confidence in the loyalty 
of the Al Bu Mahal tribe, who are also desperate for support 
in their efforts to combat Zarqawi units and other takfiris 
in the west.  Finally, Dulime stated that extremist Mohammad 
Mahmud Abd al Latif recently told him  that he and his 
supporters also opposed the takfiris and Zarqawi affiliates. 
While not formally loyalists, Abd al Latif had contributed to 
opening registration centers in Ramadi and encouraged popular 
participation in the national elections.  Abd al Latif merits 
attention in the fight against Zarqawi, Dulime concluded. 
 
6. (C) Dulime stated that drawing in local armed tribes to 
support government and Coalition security efforts would 
effectively complement existing security.  Their inclusion 
directly under the security force apparatus at MOD would 
diffuse any threat they might pose, while increasing security 
against insurgents.  He contrasted this effort with 
authorizing armed militias, which he believed should remain 
banned. 
 
STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Dulime said the Iraqi Army eventually should have a 
standardized inventory of equipment -- preferably American. 
He admitted that American weapons, vehicles, communications 
equipment, etc., were very expensive, and he was glad MNSTC-I 
was currently providing a lot of it.  He regretted, however, 
that for Iraq's own purchases, Baghdad had to depend on 
cheaper equipment, especially from Eastern Europe.  He agreed 
that standardized inventories saved money and effort in the 
long-run because of the simplicity of acquiring spare parts, 
maintenance, tool kits, and training. 
CONSTITUTION - GETTING SUNNI SUPPORT 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Ambassador said some Sunni Arabs are raising new ideas 
to garner more Sunni support for the draft Constitution, 
especially regarding Iraq's Arab identity.  He mentioned in 
particular the notion of alluding to Iraq's founding and 
active role in the Arab League, and its commitment to the AL 
charter.  Dulime was not sure this would be sufficient, but 
he indicated the Constitution was a good document, and worth 
our efforts.  He suggested working with Iraqi Islamic Party 
leader Mohsen abd al Hamid, and the party's spiritual 
advisor, Husama Tikriti. 
Khalilzad