US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI6797

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, EAID, IN, AF, PK, IR, India-Afghanistan 
SUBJECT: PM'S KABUL VISIT: TERRIFIC OPPORTUNITY TO WORK 
WITH INDIA ON AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5446 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 6308 
     C. NEW DELHI 6695 
     D. NEW DELHI 4124 
     E. KABUL 3508 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's August 28-29 
visit to Kabul is playing as a resounding foreign policy 
success in New Delhi.  The announced USD 50 million 
additional assistance, proposals for new areas of 
cooperation, Parliament ground-breaking and ribbon cutting of 
the Habibia school all point to closer India-Afghanistan 
cooperation in the future.  The PM used his visit to 
underline GOI support for Karzai, and appeared to take heed 
of our earlier advice that New Delhi should be careful not to 
be perceived as favoring any one ethnic or regional group. 
New Delhi looks forward to expanding its influence in 
Afghanistan to cement its credentials as a donor nation and 
regional power, to ensure against a Taliban resurgence, and 
to solidify its position to make economic inroads into 
Central Asia.  Competition for influence with Pakistan should 
not overly concern us; the Indians will be useful to our 
Afghanistan goals as they, too, abhor the Taliban and are 
committed to Afghan democracy.  Overland transit from India 
to Afghanistan would be the single most useful transformation 
in Indo-Pak relations.  We recommend using the good will 
generated by this visit, and MEA's suggestion that we jointly 
ask the GOA what its requests are, to enlist Indian 
participation in collaborative assistance projects in 
Afghanistan.  In Kabul, the Indians are wearing the white 
hats.  Let's use them.  End Summary. 
 
(Nice) Big Brother Is Here to Stay 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) New Delhi clearly relishes the image it has earned in 
Afghanistan as a kindly, generous donor and protector.  PM 
Singh's warm welcome in Kabul was a front page story in 
nearly all Indian newspapers, and the media have repeatedly 
highlighted the unprecedented USD 550 million commitment of 
Indian resources to Afghan reconstruction and assistance.  In 
addition to the PM's public announcement of additional aid, 
including small-scale village development projects and 
security assistance for Afghan police (but not ANA -- Ref E), 
MEA Joint Secretary Dilip Sinha has assured us repeatedly 
that India is sincere in its offer to provide whatever 
assistance and training the GOA requests of it. 
 
3.  (C) Retired diplomat Hamid Ansari, currently a member of 
the PM's National Security Advisory Board, told Poloff on 
August 31 that India's economic and assistance relations with 
Afghanistan are sufficiently mature that a head of government 
visit was not needed to advance those areas, but Singh's trip 
to Kabul added a personal dimension to the relationship.  The 
high profile visit was also intended to help bolster Karzai's 
domestic profile on the eve of Parliamentary elections, he 
added, illustrating the ambitious role India seeks to play in 
Afghanistan, and the Indian elites' comfort with Karzai. 
 
Competing with Pakistan for Influence 
------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) India's actions in Afghanistan cannot be isolated 
from the Indo-Pak relationship.  The GOI views the 
persistence of the Taliban as clear evidence of Pakistani 
designs on Afghanistan.  Ansari argued that for a stable 
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan must recognize that influence 
in Kabul is not a zero-sum game.  "We don't see Afghanistan 
as our strategic backyard, and we would like Pakistan to 
realize it is not their strategic backyard either," he 
claimed.  However, Afghan Political Counselor in New Delhi 
Abdul Shoogufan dismissed concerns about India using 
Afghanistan as an arena to spar with Pakistan, observing to 
Poloff that whether or not India tries to gain influence, 
Pakistan still sees Afghanistan as a field for its 
activities.  (Comment: There is no problem here for us; the 
Indians hate the Taliban, and all that they stand for.  End 
Comment.) 
 
5.  (C) Complaining that Pakistan believes that Afghanistan 
should remain a captive market for its exports, Shoogufan 
emphasized the importance to Afghanistan of opening an 
India-Afghanistan land passage through Pakistan.  Afghanistan 
would like to engage with SAARC, he observed, but this is 
pointless until Pakistan permits Afghanistan to access the 
SAARC region across its territory.  (Comment: The longer the 
Indians have to wait for direct access, the more they work 
with Iran (septel) to get their goods in to Afghanistan and 
beyond.  This trend would end quickly if Pakistan allows such 
transit.  Indeed, MEA's Dilip Sinha complained to us recently 
that Iran has not been entirely helpful to India's road 
project from Zaranj to Delaram.  End Comment) 
 
India-Afghanistan Strategic Relationship? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Shoogufan welcomed increased Indian interest in 
Afghanistan, pointing out that the Afghan people trust 
Indians working in Afghanistan far more than they would other 
nationals.  In addition to ongoing GOI development 
activities, he said Afghanistan would appreciate more Indian 
concern for Kabul's interests.  Illustrating the type of 
policy support Shoogufan desired, the PM's trip produced 
headlines in India focusing on Singh's statement that 
Pakistan must "fall in line" to support better 
India-Afghanistan ties, and his appeal for a stable 
Afghanistan as a prerequisite for regional peace. 
 
7.  (C) Shoogufan reported that Kabul has suggested entering 
into a "strategic relationship" with India that would boost 
Afghanistan on the international stage, but New Delhi has not 
yet responded to the offer.  Ideally, Afghanistan would 
appreciate cooperation with India at a political level, but 
not a formal alliance out of deference to Pakistani 
sensitivities.  Shoogufan suggested that New Delhi could use 
its "good offices" with Moscow and particularly Tehran to 
help defuse frictions that have affected Kabul's "sensitive" 
relationships with those capitals. 
 
What Next? We Should Partner with India 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) With the expansive mood in New Delhi following 
Singh's visit, we have an opportunity to suggest 
collaborative efforts between the USG and GOI that will 
provide the greatest support for our goals in Afghanistan. 
India can offer much in the way of technical assistance and 
training whose reach could be extended by American support 
and collaboration.  MEA has already invited US participation 
in a vocational training project that they plan to begin soon 
(Ref A).  Alternatively, India could be asked to contribute 
in discrete areas in larger US efforts, such as contributing 
doctors, engineers or development experts to serve on PRTs. 
Refs B and C point out that Afghanistan is a ripe area for 
cooperation on the new US-India Global Democracy Initiative, 
including providing joint support to the Afghan Parliament in 
the form of training for Parliamentary staff or newly-elected 
MPs. 
 
9.  (C) Informal conversations with MEA Director 
(Afghanistan) Tsewang Namgyal indicate that the GOI would 
respond favorably to proposals to establish training or study 
centers located in Afghan universities.  Namgyal suggested 
that having our two missions in Kabul sit down together with 
GOA officials to ask them where they would like joint 
US-India assistance would be the most effective way of 
identifying opportunities.  Mission recommends that we pursue 
all of these options, particularly focusing on democracy 
institution and capacity building, for which we will find 
receptive audiences in New Delhi and Kabul.  (Comment: MEA's 
suggestion that we have a trilateral meeting illustrates how 
much progress we have made in working with the GOI in 
Afghanistan.  Before our collaboration to work out details of 
the Kabul to Pul-i-Khumri power transmission line (Ref D), 
New Delhi had steadfastly refused to consider joint projects. 
 This change of heart is a golden opportunity for us to 
increase our and India's effectiveness in Afghanistan.  End 
comment) 
 
Overland Transit the Holy Grail 
------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Nothing would strengthen New Delhi's efforts to 
provide assistance and expand its access to Central Asia more 
than Pakistan allowing overland transit for Indian goods 
bound for Afghanistan (and beyond).  Although we do not need 
to act as cheerleaders for Indian ambitions to export to 
Central Asia, it is strongly in the US interest for Pakistan 
to allow at least the transit of Indian humanitarian 
assistance to Afghanistan.  The GOI has repeatedly pointed 
out that any savings resulting from sending goods through 
Pakistan instead of Iran will be redirected to development 
aid for Afghanistan.  This would be good for India, good for 
Afghanistan, good for the US, and good for Pakistan, who 
would stand to earn fees for providing the transportation. 
We should press hard for this no-brainer. 
 
11.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi) 
MULFORD