US embassy cable - 05BRASILIA2339

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

BRAZIL ON COMBATING WMD PROLIFERATION VIA FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS

Identifier: 05BRASILIA2339
Wikileaks: View 05BRASILIA2339 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Created: 2005-09-02 12:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM PREL MNUC KTFN EFIN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR OFAC AND C.MEDINA 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
STATE FOR NP 
STATE FOR S/CT 
STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KTFN, EFIN 
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON COMBATING WMD PROLIFERATION VIA 
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS 
 
REF: STATE 158275 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Bruce Williamson, reasons 1.4 
(b) and 
 (d). 
 
1. (C) Post delivered reftel demarche to Gustavo Rodrigues of 
COAF (Brazil's financial intelligence unit), Luiza Lopes da 
Silva of the Ministry of External Relations' (MRE's) Office 
for the Combat of Illicit Transnational Activities and 
Santiago Morao of the MRE's Disarmament and Sensitive 
Technologies Division.  Rodrigues responded enthusiastically 
to the points, noting that Brazil had presented a paper in 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) context calling for the 
involvement of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in 
tracking financial networks behind the trafficking of nuclear 
materials.  The paper (document number NSG(05)24 dated March 
29, 2005), was discussed at an NSG Oslo meeting in June, 
according to Rodrigues.  The dialogue in the NSG context, 
Rodrigues said, was not extremely substantive as only two 
countries' delegations, Brazil's and Norway's, included 
representatives from their FIUs. 
 
2. (C) While the GoB strongly supports the concept of using 
FIU's to combat WMD proliferation, Rodrigues noted that 
Brazil does not have domestic authority to freeze the assets 
of WMD proliferators.  Rodrigues nevertheless undertook to 
conduct a search of COAF's own databases for transactions in 
the names of the proliferating entities enumerated in U.S. 
Executive Order 13882.  He further undertook to coordinate 
with the Central Bank and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency 
(ABIN) a search of their respective databases.  The Central 
Bank, he explained, has the capability to track the 
originator and destination for all foreign exchange 
transactions made through the formal banking system. 
 
3. (C) Rodrigues acknowledged that, should these searches 
produce a hit, then the GoB would have to grapple with how to 
respond.  Econoff reiterated that UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 requires countries to combat proliferation 
and could form the legal basis for GoB action.  Rodrigues 
took the point, but said it would take some time to implement 
the UNSC resolution (usually done via presidential decree). 
Instead, he said, if assets were found in this case, the Gob 
would have to find a creative solution, perhaps freezing the 
(theoretical) assets in response to a USG request through law 
enforcement channels. 
 
DANILOVICH 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04