US embassy cable - 05VIENNA2944

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 002944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ECIN, TU, CY, AU, EUN 
SUBJECT: TURKISH EU ACCESSION:  CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER 
VISITS AUSTRIA -- "NO VETO" 
 
REF: VIENNA 2827 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Carol van Voorst. 
Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  On August 31, EconPolCouns met with the 
Foreign Ministry's Assistant Secretary-level Director for 
Southern European Affairs, Clemens Koja, to receive a 
readout of the Cypriot Foreign Minister Georgios Iacovou's 
August 30 visit to Vienna and to discuss Turkey's accession 
talks with the EU.  Koja reiterated that Austria would not 
"veto" the start of the Turkish talks on October 3. 
Austria opposed a link between Cyprus and Turkey, he said. 
Koja said Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik's letter to the 
British Foreign Secretary -- the text of which appeared in 
the Austrian wire service almost immediately -- restated 
the Austrian view that, while the talks could lead to full 
Turkish membership in the EU, the negotiating framework 
should specify alternatives if full membership were not 
possible.  However, Austria had very little support for 
this position -- Plassnik told the Austrian press that the 
tally was "one against 24" -- and would drop it if this 
remained the case.  Koja said Austria had no desire to link 
Croatia and Turkey.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Talks will Take Place October 3 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Koja said Iacovou expressed frustration with 
Turkey's position on recognition of Cyprus.  Nevertheless, 
Iacovou and Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik 
agreed, as they stated in a press conference, that they 
would not/not "veto" the start of Turkey's accession talks 
with the EU on October 3.  Plassnik said publicly that 
Turkey would have to recognize Cyprus when it enters the 
EU, but "now we're talking about another issue -- the issue 
of the start of the (accession) talks."  Koja noted that 
French statements seemed to be backtracking from a hard 
link between Turkish talks and recognition of Cyprus.  He 
added that Iacovou had told Plassnik that the French 
statements were simply the result of the internal battle 
between President Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy to show who 
could be tougher on Turkey. 
 
3.  (C) Talk of delaying the start of Turkey's accession 
talks was mere posturing, Koja opined. The December 17 
agreement to set the date for the Turkish talks was a 
decision of the Heads of Government.  There was no regular 
meeting of Heads of Government before October 3 (although 
the British were now floating the idea of an extraordinary 
meeting on September 24) and it would be almost unheard-of 
for Ministers to overturn a decision of their superiors. 
(Comment:  this may or may not be true, but the fact that 
Koja took the trouble to spin out this scenario indicates 
that the Austrians are not thinking of derailing the 
talks.  End Comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
------ 
Plassnik-Straw Letter:  "include alternative or interim 
solutions" 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
------ 
 
4.  (C) Koja gave us a copy of a letter FM Plassnik had 
sent to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on August 29 
(text para 6 below).  Koja said the letter simply restated 
Austria's position.  In the letter, Plassnik argues that, 
"while negotiations may lead to full membership in the 
future," the negotiating framework for the Turkish 
accession talks should include specific wording on 
alternative outcomes should agreement on membership not be 
possible.  Reiterating what he told us a week ago (reftel), 
Koja said there was very little support for the Austrian 
position in the EU.  In fact, Plassnik has admitted as 
much.  In the press conference with Iacovou, she said the 
Austrian view was "not broadly shared" among EU member 
states.  She was even more explicit at the "Gymnich" 
meeting in Wales, telling the press, "In reality, it's oen 
against 24."  Koja all but admitted that the purpose of the 
Austrian position -- which was a personal initiative of 
Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel -- was to address domestic 
concerns about the possibility of Turkish accession.  Only 
ten percent of Austrians approve of Turkish accession, and 
it was important to the Chancellor to show his constituency 
that he was reflecting their views.  That said, it was less 
important for the Chancellor to achieve a change in the 
negotiating framework than for the public to know that he 
had tried.  (It was therefore no surprise that the full 
text of Plassnik's letter appeared on the Austrian Press 
Agency (APA) wire service on August 30.)  Koja said Austria 
had no intention of blocking the start of the Turkish talks 
because of this issue, and would "bow" to the majority view 
among EU countries.  (Note:  this does not mean that 
Plassnik's protestations that the objective should be to 
restore Europeans' confidence are false.  End note.) 
 
------------------ 
No Link to Croatia 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Koja was aware of British allegations of a cabal 
among some Central European countries to link the start of 
the Turkish talks to movement toward giving Croatia a date 
for talks.  Koja said the British were mistaken about 
this.  Austria and its neighbors were not coordinating 
their policies to the extent the British implied.  They 
agreed, however, that Croatia was a prime candidate for EU 
membership, both for geostrategic reasons and for reasons 
of trade and commerce.  Austria and like-minded countries 
believed that, while the Croatian government had spent a 
long time shielding Ante Gotovina from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), it had 
reversed that position over a year ago and was now doing 
everything it could to meet ICTY demands.  None of this had 
anything to do with Turkey, however, Koja asserted.  In 
fact, it was the British who had recently floated a "deal" 
by which the British would work to obtain an ICTY 
certification of Croatian cooperation if Austria would 
agree to start the Turkish talks on October 3.  Koja said 
Austria would not "play that game" -- for one thing, 
Austria thought there was sufficient movement toward 
reaching agreement in the EU to give Croatia a date for 
talks that it did not need a deal with the British.  For 
another, Austria had already agreed that the Turkish talks 
would proceed.  Finally, Austria had no desire to link the 
idea of Croatian accession to the EU, which was very 
popular in Austria, with Turkish accession -- which is not. 
 
6.  (U) Text of Plassnik-Straw Letter (original in 
English): 
 
29 August 2005 
 
Dear President, Dear Jack, 
 
We will meet in Newport shortly to discuss enlargement at 
our informal meeting. 
 
In the Austrian view, our shared objective over the next 
months will be to reconnect with Europeans, restore trust 
and thus resolve the current crisis of confidence.  Much 
will depend on our visible and credible capacity to respond 
to the concerns of citizens, not least those expressed 
during the recent referenda.  In particular, Europeans 
request greater clarity about the extent and pace of 
eventual future enlargements. 
 
In this context, I would like to reiterate the Austrian 
position with regard to Turkey: 
 
Austria has consistently expressed full support for the 
remarkable political and economic reform process under way 
in this important partner country.  It is in the interest 
of both the Union and Turkey to start negotiations on an 
even closer relationship. 
 
While negotiations may lead to full membership in the 
future, such negotiations cannot at this stage exclusively 
aim at full membership.  They must include alternative or 
interim solutions should the Union not have the capacity to 
absorb new members or Turkey not meet all membership 
criteria.  In our mind, this is the very essence of 
open-ended negotiations. 
 
In substance, such an alternative or interim relationship 
would go considerably beyond the present association 
agreement.  It would establish a specifically designed 
Turkish-European Community.  While providing a more 
realistic medium-term objective for both Turkey and the EU 
member states, such a partnership would not exclude the 
perspective of full membership. 
 
For Austria, the Union's absorption capacity, the 
open-endedness of negotiations with Turkey and a specific 
alternative to full membership are of the utmost 
importance. 
 
As requested at our last Council meeting in July, these 
elements must definitely be more clearly reflected in the 
wording of the negotiating framework proposed by the 
European Commission which has to be adopted unanimously. 
Best regards, 
 
Ursula 
 
End text. 
Brown