US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3584

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: EPET, ENRG, EFIN, MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PTER, IZ, BAGHDAD, Security, Energy Sector 
SUBJECT: GOI RECOMMENDS BAGHDAD FUEL RATIONING, 
STRENGTHENING INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3427 
     B. ANKARA 4880 
 
Classified By: A/DCM David C. Litt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: An August 28 emergency session of the 
National Energy Council (NEC) addressed the critical fuel 
shortage in Iraq.  The NEC recommended fuel rationing in 
Baghdad and, to increase security for critical oil and 
Electric power infrastructure, augmenting the Strategic 
Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) with regular Iraqi Army 
and Ministry of Interior units.  Chalabi criticized the 
performance of SIBs that have yet to receive training from 
MNSTC-I.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi chaired an emergency 
meeting of the NEC August 28, which was attended by Minister 
of Finance Ali Allawi, Minister of Oil Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum, 
Minister of Electricity Muhsin Shallash, Minister of Defense 
Sa'dun al-Dulime, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr, Iraqi Army 
(IA) Chief of Staff LTG Abadi, and Infrastructure 
Coordination Cell Director BG Kamal. IRMO Deputy Director for 
Operations MG Robert Heine and Embassy Econ and Pol/Miloffs 
also attended the meeting. 
 
3.  (C) DPM Chalabi opened the meeting by declaring, 
"Baghdad is under siege."  DPM Chalabi told the group that 
"the city is isolated and the energy crisis in the country 
is catastrophic."  The Ministry of Oil is unable to move 
oil to the refineries, he said, because of pipeline 
interdictions caused by insurgent attacks and routine 
breakage. Furthermore, said Chalabi, Iraq has not received 
any fuel from Turkey since August 24, referring to the GOT 
decision to halt exports to Iraq due to unpaid arrears of 
$750 million, according to Chalabi. (Eleventh hour action by 
the Iraqis to pay the arrears seems to have prompted oil 
imports from Turkey (septel).) 
 
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Increased Security the Priority 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) After reviewing the recent increase in attacks on 
the oil pipelines and power lines, DPM Chalabi turned the 
discussion toward action the NEC could recommend to 
improve infrastructure security. (There was no discussion of 
the payment issue with Turkey.) Acknowledging the poor 
performance of the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) 
along the key Bayji to Baghdad corridor, Chalabi pressured 
LTG Abadi to move Iraqi Army (IA) forces and the MinInt to 
identify forces to assist.  Chalabi placed a series of 
calls to Ambassador Khalilzad, Prime Minister al-Ja'fari, 
MNF-I LTG Brim, and MNSTC-I LTG Petraeus, enlisting U.S. 
support to move the necessary IA battalions. 
 
5  (C) DefMin al-Dulime and MinInt Jabr also worked the 
phones, eventually determining that, within the next 72 
hours, the IA 2nd Division could move one battalion (TBD), 
the IA 5th Division could move its 3rd Battalion of the 3rd 
Brigade, and that MoI could move one brigade to guard the 
Baghdad Product Ring.  BG Kamal suggested that he could 
move the 20th or 18th SIB (with MNF-I assistance) to augment 
protection along the Baghdad to Bayji corridor. 
 
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Chalabi Critical of SIB Performance 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) LTG Abadi informed the Council on August 29 that the 
20th SIB would move into the 9th SIB sector, south of 
Samarra, as soon as possible, and that MoD and the IA will 
need logistical assistance to move these and two or three IA 
battalions that could be moved to the Baghdad to Bayji 
Corridor.  Clearly frustrated, Chalabi told LTG Abadi, "I 
have made a decision.  I don't want the 9th and 10th SIBs 
guarding the pipelines anymore.  Send them home, do 
anything...but don't let them guard the pipeline."  Chalabi 
insisted that these SIB units should be "sent home" and "not 
allowed to guard anything," and directed IA Col. Hussein 
Shaya Dalimie to "take control" of the 16th SIB, given the 
unit's particularly poor performance in providing security 
for repair crews.  MNF-I liaison noted that Chalabi would be 
reviewing plans September 1 to train and equip these SIB's as 
a part of the Phase II SIB plan. 
 
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Rationing For Baghdad Governorate 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The Council also noted the necessity to reduce 
gasoline consumption in Baghdad Governorate (which accounts 
for 70 percent of all automobiles in Iraq) and agreed to 
recommend a plan to limit the number of cars on the road by 
allowing even-number-plated autos to travel on even-number 
calendar days, and odd-number-plated vehicles to travel on 
odd-number calendar days.  Assuming 700,000 POVs in Baghdad, 
Ministry of Finance representatives said this plan could lead 
to a significant drop in fuel consumption. 
 
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Priorities For Repair 
--------------------- 
 
8.  (C) In a follow-up meeting August 29, Minister al-Ulum 
said the Oil Ministry's repair priorities are the 22 inch 
product line from Bayji to Baghdad, and the 12/16 inch line 
from Bayji to Baghdad; the three interdictions along the 18 
inch line between Karbala, Latifiyah and Doura; and the two 
interdictions on the West side of the 10/12 inch Baghdad 
"product ring."  Minister of Electricity Shallash said the 
ME's repair priorities as the Baghdad West number 2 line; the 
Bayji to Baghdad West number 1 line; and the interdiction 
between Kirkuk to Diyala (repaired August 29). 
Khalilzad