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| Identifier: | 05BOGOTA8292 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BOGOTA8292 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2005-09-01 21:56:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PHUM PREL CO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 008292 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, CO SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) 1. (U) August 23, 2005, 5:00-6:00 PM, Casa de Narino, Bogota 2. (U) Participants: U.S. ---- Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General Ambassador William B. Wood Jeffrey Taylor, Counselor to the Attorney General Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Thomas Monheim, Associate Deputy Attorney General Tasia Scolinos, Director, Public Affairs, DOJ Paul Vaky, DOJ Justice Reform Program Manager Carmen Colon, JUDATT Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Polcouns (notetaker) Colombia -------- Alvaro Uribe Velez, President Carolina Barco, Foreign Minister Camilo Ospina, Minister of Defense Luis Alberto Moreno, Ambassador to the U.S. Mario Iguaran, Prosecutor General Mauricio Gonzalez, Presidential Legal Adviser Jaime Bermudez, Presidential Communications Director Francisco Gonzalez, MFA (notetaker) ------- Summary ------- 3. (C) During a positive and candid discussion, President Uribe thanked the Attorney General (AG) for U.S. support, expressed concern that his goal to eradicate drugs in Colombia would not be met by the end of his administration, hoped to achieve better results against drug cultivation by increased spraying and expanded manual eradication, and requested additional U.S. support to arrest the country's principal narco-traffickers. The AG thanked Uribe for being a good friend to the U.S., applauded the U.S.-Colombian extradition relationship, and said the U.S. would continue its close cooperation and assistance to Colombia. Uribe said there were safeguards in the Justice and Peace law which prevented the principal narco-traffickers from receiving benefits. The AG reiterated U.S. commitment to help bring narco-traffickers to justice but stressed that the U.S. would continue to press for extradition of all those who violated U.S. laws. Uribe expressed concerns about the willingness of the U.S. to honor assurances required under the Colombian constitution in extradition cases and the proposed amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act dealing with extradition that would negatively impact Colombia. The AG said the U.S. would meet its extradition obligations and commitments, and agreed to work with the State Department to address the amendments. Uribe reviewed GOC efforts on justice reform, in particular the implementation of the oral accusatory system, and requested additional U.S. assistance. Uribe said he wanted a rigorous implementation of the Justice and Peace law and planned to create an international commission to monitor the process. Ambassador Moreno had approached former President Clinton to lead it in an effort to persuade Senate Democrats the process was credible. The AG responded positively noting that he had wanted to encourage the GOC to do more work with the Congress. On demobilization, Uribe said he needed international support and assistance. The AG responded that the U.S. was already providing some assistance and would see what additional assistance could be provided. Moreno also requested DOJ assistance to help the GOC investigate the killings of labor leaders and relief from a DOJ appeal in a California court case that prevented the Colombian's tuna industry from breaking into the U.S. market. End Summary. -------------------- Counter-Drug Efforts -------------------- 4. (C) Uribe opened by expressing his gratitude to the Attorney General for U.S. assistance to Colombia in the fight against drugs and terrorism. Progress to date had been the result of the determination of the Colombian people and the "permanent strategic help from the United States." But more help was needed, he said. Uribe raised concerns that he would not be able to meet his goal of eradicating drugs from Colombia in the one year left in his administration. There were still many hectares of drugs to be destroyed, and many drug traffickers to be captured and brought to justice. He said the GOC was proceeding with extraditions "with determination" but more had to be done. 5. (C) The Attorney General thanked Uribe for being a good friend and ally to the U.S. He expressed appreciation for the extraordinary U.S.-Colombian extradition relationship, underscoring its importance to DOJ. The Colombian example was a model to be replicated elsewhere. The AG stressed that the Bush Administration was committed to continuing its close cooperation with and assistance to Colombia. 6. (C) Uribe said he wanted better results in his fight against drugs. Spraying had increased by 30 percent in 2005. Manual eradication would expand to 30,000 hectares by the end of the year. He hoped to see a significant drop in cocaine production as a result. Uribe reiterated his determination to arrest the country's principal drug traffickers. He stressed that, although some paramilitaries involved in the peace process have been involved in drug trafficking, those whose principal activities were narco-trafficking vice paramilitary would not be accepted into the process. He underscored that all illegal armed groups -- paras and guerrillas -- were contaminated by drugs and it would be difficult to draw the line. Despite this, the GOC had already determined which cartels would not be allowed to participate in the peace process, and those were the ones who needed to be brought to justice. The risk of not taking immediate action, he said, was that some demobilized paramilitaries could be swayed to join the cartels, swelling the ranks of the illegal armed groups once again. 7. (C) The AG reiterated the U.S. commitment to help bring the narco-traffickers to justice. We want to help in any way we can and look forward to working with you to achieve that objective, he said. At the same time, the AG stressed that the U.S. would continue to press for the extradition of all those who have violated U.S. laws and caused harm to U.S. citizens. -------------- Justice Reform -------------- 8. (C) The AG applauded Colombia's justice reform efforts, especially the implementation of the new accusatorial criminal system. He said DOJ was committed to continuing law enforcement and justice sector training and development support. Uribe acknowledged some problems in one of the trial cities and reviewed GOC efforts to evaluate it and make the necessary modifications. The AG emphasized that Uribe had to push forward and not be discouraged with minor setbacks. Ambassador Wood noted that the prosecutor general had recently requested additional support for training, which was under consideration. --------------------------- GOC Concerns on Extradition --------------------------- 9. (C) Uribe said he wanted to avoid extradition becoming a political issue. He expressed concerns about both the U.S. honoring assurances required under the Colombian constitution in extradition cases, and the proposed amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act which could negatively impact Colombia and the U.S.-Colombian extradition relationship. On the former, he hoped an agreement could be reached between the DOJ and the judges on the Colombian Supreme Court. The AG responded that the U.S. would assure members of the court that it fully recognized and intended to meet its extradition obligations and commitments. On the amendments, the AG said DOJ was as concerned as the Department of State and would work to address the problem. He was confident that the potential consequences for Colombia were in fact not what the drafters had intended. --------------------------------------------- ------------ International Commission to Monitor Justice and Peace Law Implementation --------------------------------------------- ------------ 10. (C) Uribe reviewed the basic elements of the Justice and Peace law, a legal framework for the demobilization of thousands of paramilitaries. He stressed that past Colombian peace processes and the laws governing them had never included a justice component. While the law was controversial, it was a significant step forward over previous efforts. He insisted that the GOC wanted a rigorous implementation. To that end, Uribe planned to create an international commission to monitor the law's implementation. He wanted U.S. endorsement of the plan. Ambassador Moreno said Senate Democrats had raised the most concerns about the law. Therefore, he had contacted former President Clinton to head such a commission. Clinton, in turn, had talked to former Senators Graham and Thompson about their participation. Moreno stressed that the GOC needed an oversight group of this stature to permit a credible implementation of the law. He reported that Clinton was already making calls to Senate Democrats in support of the law. 11. (C) The AG responded positively, noting that he had intended to leave the message that the GOC needed to do more work with the Congress. This sounded like a good approach. -------------- Demobilization -------------- 12. (C) Uribe said the number of demobilized paramilitaries would exceed 20,000 in the next few days. It was an expensive process and the GOC needed international support. Attention to the internally displaced was also important. Uribe insisted that demobilization of the paramilitaries was an effective way to neutralize the "ring leaders" and cut them off from their troops. What can Don Berna do now that he is "one half in jail," away from his men, and surrounded by the police, he asked rhetorically. His wings have been cut. At the same time, Uribe acknowledged that the GOC had to pay close attention to all aspects of the process to ensure dismantlement of the paramilitary blocs. The AG responded that the U.S. was already providing some assistance for the demobilization process. I know you need more, he said, and we will see what additional assistance we can provide. ----------------------- Two Additional Requests ----------------------- 13. (C) At the direction of Uribe, Moreno presented two additional requests: (1) Under the rubric of FTA/TLC negotiations, the problem for Colombia on labor issues was not labor standards but the security of labor leaders. Some labor leaders had been killed; others continue to receive threats. Could DOJ provide specific assistance to assist the GOC investigate these assassinations? Moreno said this would be a win/win issue for Colombia and the U.S.; (2) DOJ had appealed a recent ruling of a California court that affected the Colombian tuna industry's ability to break into the U.S. market. Could the AG help in some way? WOOD
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