US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2833

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002833 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958:DECL: 10/11/2007 
TAGS: PBTS, PREL, MOPS, MARR, PINS, CM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: IMPLEMENTING THE BAKASSI RULING, A 
GON CLARRIFICATION 
 
 
REF: A) ABUJA 2813; B) BROWNE-FULLER 10/10/02 TELCOM 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
 
1.  (U) On October 10 MFA Permanent Secretary Dan Hart 
phoned Ambassador to clarify a statement made during 
their earlier October 7 meeting on Bakassi (Reftel A). 
 
 
2.  (C) At the earlier meeting, Hart stated the GON 
wanted a "Joint Implementing Committee" with Cameroon 
in order to manage the post-decision implementation 
process.  Instead of a joint implementation committee 
focused solely on the Bakassi, Hart said the GON would 
rather create a "Reconciliation and Good 
Neighborliness Committee."  According to Hart, the 
committee would be all embracing.  While the ICJ 
ruling and its implementation would be an important 
part of its work, the Committee as envisioned by the 
GON, would deal with all aspects of bilateral 
relations, from consular matters to trade. 
 
 
3.  (C) As part of GON efforts to establish stronger 
ties with Cameroon, there had been discussions within 
the Abuja government about urging Cameroon to join 
ECOWAS. 
 
 
4.  (C) Hart also said that Obasanjo would call 
Cameroonian President Biya immediately after the 
judgement was announced. We have no details yet about 
the call. 
 
 
5.  (C) Comment: The GON is exploring ways to lessen 
the sting of an adverse ICJ judgement. The obtusely 
named Reconciliation Committee is one such approach. 
By engaging the Cameroonians on other issues besides 
their border dispute, the GON hopes the give and take 
on these other fronts will spill over into discussions 
about the ICJ decision.  Moreover, the more the GON 
can focus Yaounde on the benefits of an enhanced 
bilateral relationship, the less likely Yaounde may 
push for swift implementation of the Bakassi ruling. 
The GON wants to make it appear that the practical 
effect of a "new" relationship with Cameroon trumps 
the legal ruling and that the situation on the ground 
will not undergo swift, radical change.  If the GON 
can create this perception, they will be able to 
better manage public opinion and internal GON hard- 
liners that might want to fight in order to save the 
land "stolen" by the ICJ. The big question for Nigeria 
is whether Cameroon is willing to play. 
JETER