US embassy cable - 05ANKARA5114

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, TU, IZ, PKK 
SUBJECT: STATE OF PLAY ON TURKEY-PKK 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2973 (NODIS) 
     B. ANKARA 4186 
     C. ANKARA 5038 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary: The PKK issue remains at the top of the 
political agenda in Turkey.  Ethnic tensions--along with the 
death toll--are on the rise, while crowds at funerals of 
soldiers killed in PKK attacks have added "Damn the USA" to 
their traditional chant, "Damn the PKK."  The Turks 
appreciate increased U.S. intelligence and our offers of 
enhanced law enforcement cooperation against the PKK in 
Europe.  But their central concern is the PKK's command and 
control center in northern Iraq, and they continue to make 
reference to potential unilateral action there.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Renewed PKK violence in Turkey is consuming the 
attention of the public, press, policy makers and military 
leaders, and threatens our still-recovering relationship with 
Turkey.  From the Prime Minister and the CHOD, all through 
the military and the bureaucracy, and increasingly among the 
public, Turks ever more insistently are asking if the United 
States is serious about helping Turkey deal with the PKK 
terrorist threat emanating from northern Iraq.  The press 
highlights the funerals of Turkish soldiers killed by the 
PKK, fueling the sense of outrage.  Mourners now shout "Damn 
the USA" along with timeworn "Damn the PKK." 
 
3. (C) The violence has returned the "Kurdish problem" to the 
fore of Turkish domestic politics.  Prime Minister Erdogan's 
visit to Diyarbakir earlier this month, itself a product of 
the PKK's ramped-up violence, has sparked a debate about what 
non-military measures should be taken to address the poverty 
and feeling of disenfranchisement prevalent in the 
predominantly Kurdish southeast.  During his August 25-26 
visit to Ankara, EUR DAS Bryza emphasized measures against 
the PKK that Turkey and the U.S. could take together outside 
of Iraq; this approach was well received by Foreign Minister 
Gul, TGS/J3 MG Zorlu and the media.  A long-time contact from 
Hakkari (Turkey's southeastern-most province and a PKK 
stronghold) told us Aug. 27 that Turkey's Kurds are fed up 
with both the PKK and the military; the people are much more 
interested in economic opportunity than the dream of an 
independent Kurdish state.  Yet the PKK still manages to 
influence and/or intimidate the local population. 
 
4. (SBU) Recent ugly incidents in Turkey are increasingly 
evoking memories of the "bad old days" of the 1980s and 
1990s.  On Aug. 27, protesters who went to the local hospital 
in Batman (deep in the southeast) to collect the bodies of 
six PKK terrorists killed by Turkish security forces clashed 
violently with police, resulting in the death of a protester 
and many injuries on both sides.  Mobs in Trabzon and Izmir 
reportedly attempted recently to lynch PKK suspects.  The 
press further reported Aug. 31 that security forces arrested 
nine DEHAP (pro-Kurdish party) activists for calling a PKK 
terrorist killed in Turkey "a martyr."  The Chief of the 
Turkish Land Forces, GEN Yasar Buyukanit, reflected in an 
Aug. 30 speech that the unrest threatened to turn Turkey into 
"another Palestine," referring to an intifada-type 
resistance.  U.S. policy and inaction against the PKK in 
northern Iraq is played out in the context of this political 
tension. 
 
5. (S/NF) Privately, Turkish officials tell us they 
appreciate that we are providing intelligence support for the 
Turks' struggle against this terrorist organization in Turkey 
and that we are forming a plan to pursue diplomatic, 
intelligence, and law enforcement measures in Europe.  But 
the Turks rightly point out that the PKK's command and 
control center is in Iraq, where it appears that the 
organization operates relatively unencumbered. 
 
6. (C) While it is hard to pinpoint exactly how many Turkish 
soldiers and civilians have been killed since the PKK revoked 
its unilateral cease-fire in June of last year, we have heard 
estimates that range as high as 150.  The PKK has also 
expanded its attacks on civilians by bombing buses and 
passenger trains, or the tracks in order to make the trains 
derail.  The PKK almost always attacks through the use of 
IEDs, rarely taking on the Turkish military, Jandarma or 
police in firefights. 
7. (SBU) The PKK has also moved into tourist areas, killing 
five civilians (including two foreigners) in the July 16 bomb 
attack in the western resort town of Kusadasi, and seriously 
wounding a Dutch tourist in the July 23 bombing at an 
Istanbul restaurant. 
 
8. (C) While the Turks still hold out hope that the U.S. (or 
the ITG) will take steps against the PKK in Iraq, the 
military has increasingly been looking at options for taking 
unilateral steps.  The CHOD, GEN Hilmi Ozkok, previewed this 
thinking during Amb. Edelman's May 25 farewell call (ref a). 
Ozkok outlined the increase in violence in Turkey, and said 
that Turkey may once again have to resort to cross-border 
operations against PKK camps in northern Iraq.  Then-D/CHOD 
GEN Ilker Basbug subsequently discussed cross-border 
operations and the concept of "hot pursuit" at length with 
then VCJCS Gen Pace on June 8 at the Pentagon.  Basbug then 
gave a lengthy press conference in Ankara on July 19, in 
which he argued that under international law Turkey has the 
right to take unilateral action if a terrorist threat is 
emanating from Iraq.  He drew a sharp distinction between hot 
pursuit (chasing PKK terrorists who attempt to escape from 
Turkey into Iraq) and cross-border operations, which would be 
larger actions to include attacking PKK camps in northern 
Iraq (see ref b). 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: Despite our efforts to promote Turkey-Iraq 
dialogue on this issue through trilateral talks, and our 
initiative to increase cooperation with Turkey in dealing 
with PKK activities in Turkey and in Europe, we still face 
the potential that the Turks may feel compelled to take 
unilateral military steps in northern Iraq.  They are now 
balancing this impulse--and the pressing need to do and say 
something publicly--against the significant negative 
ramifications this would provoke from the ITG, the EU, and 
us.  However, should the situation continue to worsen, we 
cannot assume that Turkey would forego taking such action 
indefinitely. 
MCELDOWNEY