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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD3566 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD3566 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-08-31 21:16:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV QA IZ Parliament Sunni Arab |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003566 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015 TAGS: PGOV, QA, IZ, Parliament, Sunni Arab SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB OFFICIALS ON HOW TO HELP THE CONSTITUTION REF: BAGHDAD 3498 Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1. 4 (b) AND (d) 1. (C) Summary: Fatwa Association (Salafist) Dr. Mahmud al Mashadani told the Ambassador August 30 that changes to the draft constitution in four areas -- Arab identity, Iraqi unity, placement of statement on Islam and human rights, and clarification of ownership of future oil and natural gas discoveries -- may be sufficient to win moderate Sunni support for the Constitution. Ambassador cautioned that making new changes would be difficult. He encouraged Mashadani, however, to put into writing within 48 hours the readiness of the Negotiating Group of 15, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Sunni Waqf previous leader Adnan al-Dulaimi and current leader Ahmed Abdelghafur Samarai'e, to support the Constitution if these changes were made. Convincing persons like Dulaimi to support the constitution could be tough: in his August 30 meeting with the Ambassador (septel) he was angry about alleged extra-judicial killings by Iraqi police, and he blasted the draft constitution. End summary. 2. (U) On August 30 Ambassador met with former Sunni Waqf Head Adnan al-Dulaimi; Dr. Mahmud al Mashadani, a member of the Salafists from the Fatwa Association; and a member of the Group of 15. Mashadani was accompanied by Saad al Janabi, Secretary General of the Iraqi Republican Group and an expert SIPDIS to the Group of 15. ------------------------ ANGER AT RECENT KILLINGS ------------------------ 3. (C) Mashadani expressed deep concern over the recent discovery of the bodies of 36 Sunnis in Wasit Province, who according to Mashadani were thought to have been detained by Iraqi Police (IP) (septel). Mashadani stated that some of the 36 were his relatives, and that these incidents always occur after curfew, suggesting CF acquiescence to this activity. The Ambassador said he would press MOI to address the allegations of abuse and extra-judicial killings by the IP. Mashadani agreed that having the Iraqi Army in charge of security would be preferable to the IP. ----------------------------------- THE CONSTITUTION - What Went Wrong? ----------------------------------- 4. (C) Mashadani said that after their August 27 meeting with the Ambassador and the UK Ambassador Patey (reftel), he and other Sunni leaders from the National Dialogue felt comfortable with the constitutional draft process. They then received a call from President Talabani's assistant and were invited to a celebration. They asked to see the final draft of the Constitution, which the TNA members had not even seen. When they finally did receive a copy, these Sunni leaders realized that their proposals were not there. They went to Speaker Hasani to express their concerns and were told that their rejection of the draft would lead to divisions. Concerned about armed groups in the country, the Group of 15 finally agreed to the draft with strong reservations on five points. 5. (C) The Ambassador expressed disappointment that despite extensive U.S. efforts to effect changes to the Constitution to accommodate the Sunni Arab negotiators, Sunni Arab support for the document is still lacking. Mashadani distilled Sunni Arab concerns to four points: a) Iraq's Arab identity -- references to the Arab League are insufficient; b) Iraqi unity - the constitution must emphasize that Iraq cannot be divided; c) Article 2, in Chapter 1 of the Constitution (which states that no law can contradict Islam, principles of democracy, or rights and basic freedoms) should be moved to Chapter 2 (the section on rights and freedoms) to prevent Muslim extremists from saying that Iraq has "two religions" - Islam and democracy; and d) provisions about the ownership of future discoveries of oil or natural gas must be better explained. --------------- THE WAY FORWARD --------------- 6. (C) Mashadani stated that if these four elements could be addressed, many Sunni Arabs would come forward, including the Iraqi Islamic Party, Sunni Waqf leader Abdelghafur Samarai'e and Sunni People's Conference leader Adnan Dulaimi. The Ambassador proposed that Mashadani put these points in a letter signed by the Group of 15, al-Dulaimi, and the National Dialogue Council, with the commitment to support the Constitution if these changes are made. If they agreed to support the text with such changes, the Ambassador pledged he would consider what could be done. He urged Mashadani to act quickly, within 48 hours. Mashadani recommended that the supporters of the constitution gather into one group that would speak publicly together. He proposed that President Talibani could host an event, followed by a visit to Kurdistan to visit Barzani to talk about the needed changes to the text. 7. (SBU) Mashadani also stressed the need for a campaign to bring mainstream Sunni nationalists (vice Baathists) on board with the new constitution. He proposed that Iraqi leaders tour major Arab countries like Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to explain the draft constitution. Mashadani also asked for U.S. pressure on the Emir of Qatar to stop financing Shaykh Harith Al-Dhari's Muslim Ulema Council. (Comment: We defer to our colleagues in Doha about the possible relationship between the Qataris and the hard-line Ulema Council here. End Comment.) Khalilzad
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