US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3566

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SUNNI ARAB OFFICIALS ON HOW TO HELP THE CONSTITUTION

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD3566
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD3566 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-08-31 21:16:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV QA IZ Parliament Sunni Arab
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003566 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, QA, IZ, Parliament, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB OFFICIALS ON HOW TO HELP THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3498 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1. 
4 (b) AND (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Fatwa Association (Salafist) Dr. Mahmud al 
Mashadani told the Ambassador August 30 that changes to the 
draft constitution in four areas -- Arab identity, Iraqi 
unity, placement of statement on Islam and human rights, and 
clarification of ownership of future oil and natural gas 
discoveries -- may be sufficient to win moderate Sunni 
support for the Constitution.  Ambassador cautioned that 
making new changes would be difficult.  He encouraged 
Mashadani, however, to put into writing within 48 hours the 
readiness of the Negotiating Group of 15, the Iraqi Islamic 
Party, and Sunni Waqf previous leader Adnan al-Dulaimi and 
current leader Ahmed Abdelghafur Samarai'e, to support the 
Constitution if these changes were made.  Convincing persons 
like Dulaimi to support the constitution could be tough: in 
his August 30 meeting with the Ambassador (septel) he was 
angry about alleged extra-judicial killings by Iraqi police, 
and he blasted the draft constitution.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U) On August 30 Ambassador met with former Sunni Waqf 
Head Adnan al-Dulaimi; Dr. Mahmud al Mashadani, a member of 
the Salafists from the Fatwa Association; and a member of the 
Group of 15.  Mashadani was accompanied by Saad al Janabi, 
Secretary General of the Iraqi Republican Group and an expert 
 
SIPDIS 
to the Group of 15. 
 
------------------------ 
ANGER AT RECENT KILLINGS 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Mashadani expressed deep concern over the recent 
discovery of the bodies of 36 Sunnis in Wasit Province, who 
according to Mashadani were thought to have been detained by 
Iraqi Police (IP) (septel).  Mashadani stated that some of 
the 36 were his relatives, and that these incidents always 
occur after curfew, suggesting CF acquiescence to this 
activity.  The Ambassador said he would press MOI to address 
the allegations of abuse and extra-judicial killings by the 
IP.  Mashadani agreed that having the Iraqi Army in charge of 
security would be preferable to the IP. 
 
----------------------------------- 
THE CONSTITUTION - What Went Wrong? 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (C)  Mashadani said that after their August 27 meeting 
with the Ambassador and the UK Ambassador Patey (reftel), he 
and other Sunni leaders from the National Dialogue felt 
comfortable with the constitutional draft process.  They then 
received a call from President Talabani's assistant and were 
invited to a celebration.  They asked to see the final draft 
of the Constitution, which the TNA members had not even seen. 
 When they finally did receive a copy, these Sunni leaders 
realized that their proposals were not there.  They went to 
Speaker Hasani to express their concerns and were told that 
their rejection of the draft would lead to divisions. 
Concerned about armed groups in the country, the Group of 15 
finally agreed to the draft with strong reservations on five 
points. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador expressed disappointment that despite 
extensive U.S. efforts to effect changes to the Constitution 
to accommodate the Sunni Arab negotiators, Sunni Arab support 
for the document is still lacking.  Mashadani distilled Sunni 
Arab concerns to four points:  a) Iraq's Arab identity -- 
references to the Arab League are insufficient;  b) Iraqi 
unity - the constitution must emphasize that Iraq cannot be 
divided; c) Article 2, in Chapter 1 of the Constitution 
(which states that no law can contradict Islam, principles of 
democracy, or rights and basic freedoms) should be moved to 
Chapter 2 (the section on rights and freedoms) to prevent 
Muslim extremists from saying that Iraq has "two religions" - 
Islam and democracy; and  d) provisions about the ownership 
of future discoveries of oil or natural gas must be better 
explained. 
 
--------------- 
THE WAY FORWARD 
--------------- 
 
6. (C) Mashadani stated that if these four elements could be 
addressed, many Sunni Arabs would come forward, including the 
Iraqi Islamic Party, Sunni Waqf leader Abdelghafur Samarai'e 
and Sunni People's Conference leader Adnan Dulaimi.  The 
Ambassador proposed that Mashadani put these points in a 
letter signed by the Group of 15, al-Dulaimi, and the 
National Dialogue Council, with the commitment to support the 
Constitution if these changes are made.  If they agreed to 
support the text with such changes, the Ambassador pledged he 
would consider what could be done.  He urged Mashadani to act 
quickly, within 48 hours.  Mashadani recommended that the 
supporters of the constitution gather into one group that 
would speak publicly together.  He proposed that President 
Talibani could host an event, followed by a visit to 
Kurdistan to visit Barzani to talk about the needed changes 
to the text. 
 
7. (SBU) Mashadani also stressed the need for a campaign to 
bring mainstream Sunni nationalists (vice Baathists) on board 
with the new constitution.  He proposed that Iraqi leaders 
tour major Arab countries like Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia to explain the draft constitution.  Mashadani also 
asked for U.S. pressure on the Emir of Qatar to stop 
financing Shaykh Harith Al-Dhari's Muslim Ulema Council. 
(Comment:  We defer to our colleagues in Doha about the 
possible relationship between the Qataris and the hard-line 
Ulema Council here.  End Comment.) 
Khalilzad 

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