US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS1861

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

BLUE LANTERN UPDATE

Identifier: 05ALGIERS1861
Wikileaks: View 05ALGIERS1861 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Algiers
Created: 2005-08-31 17:19:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ETTC KOMC MASS AG Blue Lantern
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001861 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2015 
TAGS: ETTC, KOMC, MASS, AG, Blue Lantern 
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN UPDATE 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 1677 
 
     B. STATE 143058 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) In an August 30 meeting dealing with a number of 
issues, Ambassador, accompanied by PolEc Chief, raised the 
suspension of equipment licenses to Algeria under the Blue 
Lantern program with MFA Director General for the Americas 
Chikhi.  Ambassador said we were perplexed by Algeria's 
recent unwillingness to perform Blue Lantern verifications, 
since in the past the GOA routinely cooperated on such 
matters.  Then the cooperation stopped.  Because the GOA has 
not responded to our requests for pending verifications of 
two sensitive military exports, the Department has been 
obliged to suspend equipment licenses to Algeria.  As a 
result, $30 million in exports were currently blocked.  This 
is not good, either for Algeria, or the United States. 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador explained that the U.S. had complete 
confidence in Algeria, which was why we trusted the GOA to 
verify the receipt and proper use of sensitive shipments.  We 
did not, however, have the same confidence in the exporter in 
the two licensing cases in question.  In fact, we had strong 
reason to believe, Ambassador said, that the South African 
company involved has not always respected its obligations 
under the licensing agreements.  That was why we needed GOA 
confirmation that the equipment arrived and was properly 
being used. 
 
3.  (C) Chikhi, knowing the answer to his question before he 
posed it, asked if our DATT had contacted the DREC (Director 
of External Relations) at the Ministry of Defense. 
Ambassador noted that the DATT had held repeated meetings 
with the DREC on this issue, adding that he had also 
requested an appointment with MOD Minister-Delegate Guenaizia 
to press for a resolution.  Ambassador wondered aloud whether 
the problem was due to changes in personnel at the Ministry 
of Defense and lack of familiarity with the nature and 
history of the Blue Lantern program.  Whatever the case, the 
lack of cooperation with the Blue Lantern program was 
damaging for Algeria and needed to be resolved quickly. 
 
4.  (C) Comment:  Embassy DATT confirms that the Blue Lantern 
problems began with the arrival of the new DREC Director 
General (General Sefendji).  In a recent conversation, 
following several Embassy interventions at senior levels, 
Sefendji recently hinted to DATT that a "solution" to the 
problem might be found soon. 
ERDMAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04