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| Identifier: | 05WARSAW3234 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05WARSAW3234 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Warsaw |
| Created: | 2005-08-30 14:02:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PHUM TU PL EUN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 003234 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TU, PL, EUN SUBJECT: POLISH APPROACH TO SEPTEMBER 1-2 EU GYMNICH REF: STATE 153187 Classified By: Deputy Pol Counselor Bill Mozdzierz, reasons 1.4bd 1. (C) Responding to reftel points, Polish MFA Director for CFSP Beata Kolecka confirmed that Poland will hold a firm line against any new conditions for the start of Turkish accession talks, resist efforts to soften ICTY conditionality for Croatia, and maintain positions complementary to the U.S. approach on Iran, the Middle East peace process, and Iraq. At the Newport Gymnich meeting, Polish Foreign Minister Daniel Rotfeld is likely to highlight the challenges posed by Belarus, Kolecka reported, and will also encourage EU engagement in Ukraine in the course of discussions on enlargement. 2. (C) Turkey: Kolecka reiterated Polish opposition to any new conditions for the start of EU accession talks October 3. Turkey has fulfilled its obligations, she stressed, and now the EU must keep its commitments. Furthermore, talk of a "privileged partnership" for Turkey is unacceptable, Kolecka stated flatly, indicating that Poland will insist that the process must be open to full membership. Kolecka admitted that Turkey's declaration concerning non-recognition of Cyprus was unhelpful, but noted that Polish legal experts have determined that this declaration was not legally binding and therefore should not prove an obstacle to launching negotiations on schedule. 3. (C) Croatia, Balkans: The Polish position on Croatia has not changed, despite pressure from some member states, most notably Hungary, to dismiss concerns about ICTY compliance. Poland will continue to insist on full cooperation with the Tribunal, Kolecka assured us. Concerning Romania and Bulgaria, Kolecka indicated that Poland wants to stick to the target dates for accession and believes that it remains premature to discuss any postponement. 4. (C) Middle East: Solana will arrive at the Newport meeting directly from the Middle East, and so will provide the foreign ministers with a fresh report on developments there and what steps can now be taken to move the process forward. Kolecka highlighted concerns among EU members, Poland included, about unhelpful moves by Israeli authorities, including evictions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and establishment of new settlements in the West Bank. The Sharon government's actions in Gaza were extremely positive, Kolecka observed, but this momentum should not be slowed by these other measures. 5, (C) Iran, Iraq: Poland's objectives with regard to Iran remain supporting EU efforts to get Iran to suspend its enrichment activity and to return to the negotiating table, Kolecka said, while also ensuring that the EU consults closely with key partners such as the United States. We must begin to look ahead to next steps in the context of the next IAEA report due in September, she noted. On Iraq, Poland will continue to press to have the EC office opened in Baghdad as quickly as possible, and will urge EU enhanced engagement, such as judiciary and police training, and establishment of more bilateral diplomatic missions. 6. (C) Belarus, Ukraine, Russia: Kolecka explained that the Poles were unsuccessful in getting Belarus added to an admittedly already-ambitious Gymnich agenda, but that FM Rotfeld will certainly highlight Polish concerns about the deteriorating situation there and may also make a general appeal for EU support for independent media (if not specifically mentioning the external broadcast project). In the context of discussions on enlargement, Rotfeld will encourage the EU to remain engaged with Ukraine and to move forward with the action plan. On Russia, the Polish foreign minister will likely make a philosophical presentation, Kolecka explained, reviewing the challenges of responding to retrograde actions by Putin while maintaining vitally important cooperation with Russia on non-proliferation, terrorism, energy and other issues. Rotfeld, she said, is certain to highlight the importance of ensuring that dialogue between Europe and Russia is not restricted to the governmental level, but includes all elements of civil society. Ashe
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