US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2817

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2012 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, PINS, IV, NI, UV 
SUBJECT: MGIV01: ALLEGATION OF BURKINABE INVOLVEMENT 
 
 
REF: A. ABIDJAN 3334 
     B. LOME 1309 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reason:  1.5(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Former Nigerian FM Kingibe alleges that the 
September 19 coup plot was hatched in Ouagadougou by Guei and 
Burkina's Interior Minister. Kingibe has good connections 
across the region, but his version of events might be 
influenced by his role as a political consultant to the GOCI. 
 End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C) Baba Gana Kingibe is a former Foreign Minister (and 
Interior Minister) of Nigeria.  He makes his living today by, 
among other things, political consulting.  Kingibe told DCM 
October 3 that the Gbagbo government had been a client early 
in its tenure. Kingibe claimed that he had helped the GOCI 
warm its relations with Nigeria and convinced Pretoria to 
release a shipment of ARMSCOR products ordered by Bedie that 
had been frozen following Guei's coup.  The late Interior 
Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Emile Boga Doudou, had been an 
acquaintance whom Kingibe had met through "Francois," a 
business associate and mutual friend. 
 
 
3.  (C) At a point in the past Kingibe did not specify, Guei 
reportedly met in Ouagadougou with the Burkinabe Interior 
Minister (possibly a reference to Security Minister Bassole) 
at the home of an exiled Guei Minister to plot Gbagbo's 
overthrow.  However, the former Guei subordinate let it be 
known that he did not want to participate in the plot.  He 
was, Kingibe said, quickly "eliminated," but not before 
Gbagbo got wind of the scheme against him. 
 
 
4.  (C) Consequently, Gbagbo arranged for Boga Doudou to meet 
his Burkinabe counterpart in Paris to smooth things over 
between the two countries.  The meeting ended, amicably Boga 
Doudou thought.  He returned to Abidjan September 18 to be in 
place while Gbagbo went to Rome. 
 
 
5.  (C) Kingibe said "Francois" later told him that Boga 
Doudou, realizing fairly early on the 19th what had been set 
in motion by the rebel forces, jumped his back wall into the 
compound of a French expat to escape rebels who would soon be 
at his front door. He called "Francois" from that compound 
and during the conversation reportedly said, "Francois they 
are coming in.  I am shot." 
 
 
6.  (C) Kingibe opined that Campaore was probably aware of 
his Interior Minister's (Security Minister's) activities. 
Kingibe suggested that Campaore thought such machinations 
might impress Libya. 
 
 
7.  (C) Kingibe said he believed Liberia's denials of 
involvement in this particular effort to destabilize Cote 
d'Ivoire. 
 
 
8.  (C) Comment:  Kingibe is smooth and articulate and 
capable of being manipulative.  The story he tells is not 
inconsistent with what we know of pre-coup attempt events. 
Kingibe could be telling the unvarnished truth as he 
understands it, or he might be shading it to achieve a 
desired objective.  The mention of Libya was obviously 
intended to pique USG interest.  One assumes Kingibe 
continues to work for Gbagbo as a political consultant 
(Kingibe did not claim the contrary), and Gbagbo would 
benefit from the USG believing that Campaore was behind the 
rebellion.  Kingibe did not claim Campaore knew what his 
Minister was doing, but he strongly suggested it by saying 
that Campaore was constantly meddling in the affairs of 
neighboring states. 
 
 
9. (C) The picture Kingibe paints of Burkinabe instigation is 
troublesome.  It would mean that Campaore's attempt at 
rehabilitation by cutting his partnership with Charles Taylor 
is pure subterfuge.  It also suggests that Campaore had not 
tired of Taylor's antics but had tired instead of playing 
second fiddle and was ready to embark on destabilizing 
misadventures where he was the leading man. If so, this would 
make him as equally dangerous to sub-regional stability as 
his former friend in Monrovia. 
JETER