US embassy cable - 02HANOI2465

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VIETNAM: APEC OCTOBER MEETING (C-AL2-00879)

Identifier: 02HANOI2465
Wikileaks: View 02HANOI2465 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Hanoi
Created: 2002-10-10 07:41:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PINR ECIN VM KPRP APEC CTERR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

100741Z Oct 02

2002HANOI02465 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2721

PAGE 01        HANOI  02465  01 OF 02  100745Z 
ACTION INR-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AGRE-00  AID-00   AIT-03   AMAD-00  CIAE-00  
      COME-00  DINT-00  DODE-00  DOTE-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00    
      EUR-00   OIGO-00  E-00     FAAE-00  FBIE-00  TEDE-00  LAB-01   
      MMP-00   MOFM-05  MOF-01   DCP-01   NSAE-00  OIG-03   SSO-00   
      STR-00   TRSE-00  EPAE-00  DSCC-00  LBA-00   DRL-02   G-00     
      NFAT-00  SAS-00     /016W
                  ------------------F4DECB  100807Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7764
INFO APEC COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/12 
TAGS: PINR, ECIN, VM, KPRP, APEC, CTERR 
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: APEC OCTOBER MEETING (C-AL2-00879) 
 
REF:  STATE 184827 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY CLAIRE A. PIERANGELO, ECONOMIC 
 
COUNSELOR.  REASON 1.5 (C). 
 
2.  (C)  POST HAS HAD A NUMBER OF DISCUSSIONS WITH GVN 
OFFICIALS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS REGARDING APEC AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02465  01 OF 02  100745Z 
VIETNAM'S ROLE.  WHILE VIETNAM IS WORKING HARD TO 
PARTICIPATE IN MORE APEC ACTIVITIES, IT IS HAMPERED BY ITS 
SEVERE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AS WELL AS A 
CHRONIC LACK OF "DEEP THINKING" AT SENIOR-MOST LEVELS.  WE 
FIND IT A VERY DIFFERENT STORY AT THE GVN'S WORKING LEVEL, 
BUT DO NOT SEE THAT ENERGY AND CREATIVE THOUGHT PROCESS 
TRANSLATING INTO OVERALL GVN POLICY ON APEC - YET. 
OVERALL, DECISION-MAKING WITHIN THE GVN REMAINS VERY MUCH 
TOP-DOWN AND CONSENSUS-BASED, FURTHER LIMITING THE GVN'S 
ABILITY TO RESPOND TO -- MUCH LESS PROPOSE -- NEW 
INITIATIVES. 
 
3.  (C)  THE PRIMARY GOAL FOR VIETNAM AT THE UPCOMING 
OCTOBER MEETING IS TO GET APEC AGREEMENT FOR VIETNAM TO 
HOST APEC IN 2006.   VIETNAM'S LONG-TERM GOAL FOR ALL APEC 
MEETINGS IS TO USE THE APEC PROCESS TO FURTHER DOMESTIC 
ECONOMIC REFORM GOALS (CAPACITY BUILDING) AND ITS BROADER 
OBJECTIVE OF MULTI-LATERALIZING AND DIVERSIFYING ITS 
FOREIGN RELATIONS AS WELL AS INCREASING REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION.  IN MANY WAYS, VIETNAM STILL SEES APEC AS ONE- 
WAY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STREET; CHANGING THAT ATTITUDE 
WILL BE DIFFICULT.   LEADING UP TO 2006, THE GVN HAS A 
SPECIFIC POLICY OF HOSTING A NUMBER OF VARIOUS WORKING 
GROUP MEETINGS EVERY YEAR AS PREPARATION.  ACCORDING TO 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS, ASEAN HAS TOLD 
VIETNAM THAT IT IS VIETNAM'S TURN TO HOST IN 2006 AND THE 
GVN IS TREATING IT VIRTUALLY AS A DONE DEAL.  SOME MOFA 
OFFICIALS HAVE CHARACTERIZED VIETNAM'S DESIRE TO HOST IN 
2006 PARTIALLY AS VIETNAM'S "DUTY" AS AN ASEAN MEMBER AND 
PARTIALLY AS VIETNAM'S "DUE."  VIETNAM WILL WANT TO USE THE 
OCCASION TO RECONFIRM 20 YEARS OF "DOI MOI" (ECONOMIC 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02465  01 OF 02  100745Z 
RENOVATION), AND RECONFIRM ITS POLICY OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION.  ACCORDING TO MINISTRY OF TRADE OFFICIALS, 
ASEAN ACTUALLY TRIED TO CONVINCE VIETNAM TO HOST IN 2003 
AND THE GVN HAD BEEN CONSIDERING IT.  HOWEVER, MOT AND 
OTHER MINISTRIES OPPOSED THAT DATE, NOTING THAT VIETNAM WAS 
ALREADY HOSTING THE SOUTH-EAST ASIAN GAMES AND WAS NOT 
READY TO TAKE ON SUCH AN EXPENSIVE CHALLENGE.   SOME 
WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS AT MOT AND MINISTRY OF FINANCE (THE 
BUDGET MASTERS) CONTINUE TO QUESTION WHETHER VIETNAM WILL 
BE READY INTERNALLY TO HANDLE HOSTING APEC FROM FINANCIAL, 
PERSONNEL AND SUBSTANTIVE PERSPECTIVES.   ADMINISTRATIVELY, 
HOWEVER, FEW QUESTION VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO MEET THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE.  BUT QUESTIONS DO REMAIN ABOUT 
WHETHER GVN LEADERS WILL USE THE OCCASION SIMPLY TO 
CONGRATULATE THEMSELVES FOR PAST REFORMS, OR TO CONTINUE TO 
PUSH THROUGH CURRENT AND FUTURE REFORMS IN ORDER TO 
SHOWCASE REAL RESULTS. 
 
4.  (C)  ACCORDING TO MOFA AND MOT OFFICIALS, VIETNAM FEELS 
THAT MEXICO IS DOING AS GOOD A JOB AS IS POSSIBLE UNDER 
"THE CIRCUMSTANCES" -- "MEXICO IS TRYING HARD, BUT THE 
PROBLEM IS NOT MEXICO, IT'S APEC."   THEY RESERVED THEIR 
STRONG CRITICISM FOR THE APEC SECRETARIAT STAFF.  MOT IN 
PARTICULAR HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH THE APEC SECRETARIAT AND 
FEELS THAT THE STAFF NEEDS TO BE MORE PROFESSIONAL AS WELL 
AS DO A BETTER JOB AT SCHEDULING MEETINGS AND IN REIGNING 
IN MEMBERS REGARDING LAST MINUTE PROPOSALS, WHICH LEAVE 
LITTLE TIME FOR MEMBERS TO STUDY THEM ON A SUBSTANTIVE 
BASIS.  (THIS IS PARTICULARLY A PROBLEM FOR VIETNAM, WHICH 
NORMALLY NEEDS ADDITIONAL STUDY TIME ON ANY ISSUE, NO 
MATTER HOW MINOR.)   MOFA AND MOT OFFICIALS AGREED THAT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02465  01 OF 02  100745Z 
THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE APEC MEETINGS BECOME MORE 
FOCUSED, WITH FEWER AND BETTER INITIATIVES.  VIETNAMESE 
OFFICIALS ARE CLEARLY FEELING OVERWHELMED AT THE VOLUME OF 
INITIATIVES WHICH IS AT A LEVEL BEYOND THEIR CAPACITY TO 
REVIEW AND EVALUATE THEM ALL. 
 
5.  (C)  VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS ARE POSITIVE REGARDING 
MEXICO'S THEME AND NOTED NO REAL CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, WITH 
THE EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING TIMING 
ISSUES FOR REQUIREMENTS FOR CT INITIATIVES (SEE BELOW). 
 
6.  (C)  THE GVN SHARES OUR COUNTER-TERRORISM CONCERNS BUT 
HAS RAISED REAL CONCERNS ABOUT ITS OWN ABILITY TO CARRY OUT 
A NUMBER OF THE PROPOSED ACTIONS UNDER STAR.   THERE IS AN 
HONEST LACK OF PERSONNEL, RESOURCES, AND TRAINING THAT 
POSES DIFFICULTIES.  THE GVN WILL PUSH FOR LONGER DEADLINES 
FOR ITSELF AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.  IT MAY WELL 
PUSH TO TAKE A PATHFINDER APPROACH TO THE STAR (AND OTHER) 
CT INITIATIVES.  IT WILL PUSH FOR THE U.S. AND OTHER 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO ATTACH SPECIFIC OFFERS OF 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE VARIOUS CT ACTION ITEMS. 
 
7.  (C) THE GVN OFFICIALLY SUPPORTS APEC ACTIONS THAT 
SUPPORT THE BOGOR GOALS BUT HAS NOT REALLY ARTICULATED WHAT 
THAT MEANS IN PRACTICAL ACTION. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2722 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  02465  02 OF 02  100745Z 
ACTION INR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AGRE-00  AID-00   AIT-03   AMAD-00  CIAE-00 
      COME-00  DINT-00  DODE-00  DOTE-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00 
      EUR-00   OIGO-00  E-00     FAAE-00  FBIE-00  TEDE-00  LAB-01 
      MMP-00   MOFM-05  MOF-01   DCP-01   NSAE-00  OIG-03   SSO-00 
      STR-00   TRSE-00  EPAE-00  DSCC-00  LBA-00   DRL-02   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00     /016W 
                  ------------------F4DEDB  100807Z /38 
R 100741Z OCT 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7765 
INFO APEC COLLECTIVE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 002465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
8.  (C) REGARDING THE LEADERS' MEETINGS, WE HAVE HEARD NO 
CRITICISM FROM THE TOP LEVELS OF THE GVN, BUT AT THE 
WORKING LEVEL, OFFICIALS COMPLAIN ABOUT THE QUANTITY OF 
 
WORK INVOLVED AND THAT THE MEETINGS HAVE "TOO MUCH SHOW AND 
NOT ENOUGH SUBSTANCE." 
 
9.  (C)  SENIOR LEVEL GVN OFFICIALS PRAISE APEC AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02465  02 OF 02  100745Z 
VIETNAM'S PARTICIPATION IN IT, BUT HAVE HAD LITTLE 
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE FUTURE DIRECTION FOR THE 
ORGANIZATION OR ITS MANAGEMENT.  IT WORKS FOR THEM, 
APPARENTLY.  HOWEVER, AT THE WORKING LEVEL, WE HAVE HEARD 
SERIOUS CONCERNS REGARDING THE INCREDIBLY BROAD REACH OF 
APEC -- "SO MANY ISSUES, SO MANY PROPOSALS, AND NO TIME TO 
DEAL WITH THEM."   MOT OFFICIALS HAVE COMMENTED THAT 
MEMBERS ARE SO OVERWHELMED THAT THEY JUST APPROVE 
INITIATIVES BECAUSE IT'S EASIER THAN ACTUALLY READING THE 
DOCUMENTS AND DEBATING THE ISSUES.  THEY HAVE ALSO 
COMPLAINED THAT THE RESULT IS THAT NO ONE FEELS COMPELLED 
ACTUALLY TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THEIR OWN 
GOVERNMENT (THEY HAVE SOMETIMES HAD THE SAME COMPLAINT ABOUT 
ASEAN). 
 
10.  (C)  GVN OFFICIALS ARE RETICENT TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE 
OF THE PRC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TAIPEI IN APEC BEYOND THE 
GVN'S OFT-STATED "ONE CHINA" POLICY AND ITS AGREEMENT THAT 
APEC IS NOT A POLITICAL FORUM AND SHOULD NOT BE USED AS 
SUCH. 
 
11.  (C) MOFA AND MOT OFFICIALS ARE "POSITIVE" BUT NON- 
COMMITTAL REGARDING APEC FTAS.  IN THEORY, THEY AGREE THAT 
IT IS DESIRABLE TO WORK TOWARD FTAS IN APEC, BUT IN 
REALITY, THE GVN WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY MAKING ANY SUCH 
COMMITMENTS AT THIS TIME. 
 
12.  (C)  THE GVN IS IN FAVOR OF THE PATHFINDER INITIATIVE 
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS VIETNAM TO OPT OUT OF TECHNICALLY OR 
POLITICALLY DIFFICULT INITIATIVES.  AT THE SAME TIME, GVN 
OFFICIALS WORRY THAT TOO MANY INITIATIVES WILL GO THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02465  02 OF 02  100745Z 
PATHFINDER WAY AND VIETNAM WILL BE LEFT EVEN FURTHER 
BEHIND.  THE GVN WILL LIKELY PUSH FOR A "SPECIFIC PLAN" 
THAT LAYS OUT POSSIBLE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE 
COUNTRIES THAT OPT OUT OF PATHFINDER INITIATIVES, ALLOWING 
THEM TO CATCH UP IN A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD. 
 
13.  (C)  THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION TO THE OCTOBER MEETINGS 
WILL BE LED BY PRIME MINISTER PHAN VAN KHAI, AND INCLUDE 
FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DY NIEN, DEPUTY MINISTER OF TRADE 
LE DANH VINH AND OTHER LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS WORKING ON APEC ISSUES. 
THE GVN HAS REPEATEDLY REQUESTED A BILAT WITH PRESIDENT 
BUSH BUT UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN, APART 
FROM THE PROXIMITY OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER AT 
THE DINNER AND LUNCH FOR LEADERS (AT WHICH A WHISPER 
INTERPRETER WILL BE ALLOWED THIS YEAR, UNLIKE IN SHANGHAI). 
BURGHARDT 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 


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