US embassy cable - 05PARIS5818

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 005818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MNUC, PTER, FR, EUN, UNSC 
SUBJECT: CHIRAC DEFINES FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN ANNUAL 
SPEECH TO AMBASSADORS 
 
REF: A. 04 PARIS 6396 
 
     B. 04 PARIS 6355 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  President Chirac delivered a speech August 
29 to France's assembled ambassadors in an annual event this 
year focused on France's policy toward the EU in the wake of 
the failed May 29 referendum on a constitutional treaty.  As 
such, it was clearly aimed more at reassuring French citizens 
and France's partners than setting out new directions.  In 
areas where French views are different from those of the 
U.S., Chirac toned down differences or referred to them 
indirectly.  Noticeably absent were overtly provocative 
remarks directed against the United States, with Chirac 
stressing the EU's vocation as an equal partner of, rather 
than a rival to, the United States (although he never once 
mentioned NATO).  Multipolarity received little play, but 
Chirac emphasized the need to strengthen UN institutions 
through UNSC enlargement and proposed new structures to deal 
with globalization.  He also reiterated his proposal for an 
air tax and announced France's intention to host a conference 
to promote it.  While Chirac had little new to say about Iraq 
or U.S. BMENA initiatives, he did say the right things about 
Iran by insisting that it comply with the Paris Agreement. 
On Turkey, he limited himself to seeking "clarification" of 
Turkey's intention to implement the extended customs union, 
without suggesting that France intended to add preconditions 
related to diplomatic recognition of Cyprus or to delay the 
beginning of accession negotiations on October 3.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (U) President Jacques Chirac opened on August 29 the 13th 
annual conference for France's nearly 200 ambassadors with a 
speech centered on the threats to international peace and 
security (terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the regional 
stability in the Middle East) and on next steps for the 
European Union following the May 29 French rejection of an EU 
constitutional treaty (full text faxed and emailed to 
EUR/WE).  The European Union is indeed the main focus of this 
year's conference, with round tables on August 30 scheduled 
to take up as many as eight different EU-related themes after 
FM Douste-Blazy's opening remarks that morning.  Chirac's 
comments on the upcoming scheduled accession negotiations 
with Turkey will be studied carefully in other EU capitals. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
3.  (U) Chirac paid only short shrift to the threat of 
international terrorism before moving rapidly to the 
proliferation threat posed by Iran.  He noted that the 
legitimate pursuit of nuclear energy should not be a pretext 
for developing a military nuclear arsenal.  He recalled 
Iran's clandestine nuclear program, enumerated European 
efforts to engage Iran in negotiations, and called on Iran to 
return to those negotiations on the basis of the Paris 
accords.  Failure to take responsible action to reestablish 
confidence, he warned, would leave no choice but to seize the 
UN Security Council. 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
4.  (U) Chirac judged the Middle East to be the main source 
of regional instability in the world, stressing the 
importance of achieving a resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  He praised the efforts of both 
sides in evacuating the Gaza strip and called for a 
resumption of negotiations on the basis of the Roadmap. 
 
5.  (U) He had little to say on Iraq, preferring to stress a 
"long and painful" path toward the consolidation of the 
country's institutions.  He nonetheless cited the need to 
assist Iraq to maintain its territorial integrity and develop 
as an inclusive society.  He called on other states of the 
region to work for stability.  There was no mention 
whatsoever of Coalition efforts or the draft Iraqi 
constitution. 
 
6.  (U) Chirac gave more attention to Lebanon, noting 
"exemplary" international cooperation and the need to ensure 
the implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1595 and 1614 in 
order to restore the country's full sovereignty.  Chirac 
refrained from direct criticism of Syria; instead, he called 
on Syria merely to seize the occasion to reestablish its 
relations with Lebanon on a new foundation in accordance with 
the wishes of the international community. 
 
7.  (U) On democratization and reform, Chirac saw the 
resolution of regional conflicts as a necessary precondition, 
while nonetheless calling reform inexorable.  He acknowledged 
a new dynamic in the region, with "taboos falling" and "fear 
dissipating."  Success, however, should be achieved through 
peaceful means that respect each nation's specific identity, 
do not lead countries into chaos, and are not imposed from 
the outside.  Calling for true partnership with governments 
as well as civil society, he extolled Europe's Barcelona 
Process as the most appropriate way forward, citing as an 
example France's draft friendship treaty with Algeria. 
 
Globalization and UN Reform 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) Evoking the putative threat posed by globalization to 
cultural diversity, the environment, internal stability, and 
disparities in wealth and education, the president called for 
a more just and democratic collective response, to be 
achieved through the United Nations.  He praised UNSYG 
Annan's proposal for consolidating the international order 
based on responsibility, security and solidarity, to be 
achieved primarily through enlargement of the UN Security 
Council.  Chirac lauded the G-4 resolution, proposed by 
Germany, Brazil, India and Japan, as reflecting the need for 
a more regionally representative Security Council, 
particularly with respect to Africa.  Chirac hoped for 
Security Council reform by the end of the year, at the 
latest, if not by the September summit.  He called for the 
"association of the main powers but also the inclusion of 
emerging poles and regional groupings."  Chirac also called 
for a reinforcement of global governance through the creation 
of an UN organization for the environment and a new structure 
for economic and social governance. 
 
9.  (U) On security, the president urged that proliferation, 
terrorism, and peace maintenance be at the center of UN 
discussions in New York, to include an international 
definition of terrorism, a commission on peace consolidation 
and a reinforced mechanism for the protection of human 
rights.  Finally, on solidarity, he reiterated his proposal 
for an international tax on air travel -- shared, he said, by 
Germany, Algeria, Brazil, Chile and Spain -- and announced 
France's intention to host a conference in February 2006 to 
further that aim.  He said France would contribute at a later 
stage to the international financing structure proposed by 
the UK. 
 
10.  (U) Chirac called attention to avian flu and elaborated 
on the preventative measures France was already taking and 
stated France's interest in the development of effective 
vaccines.  On WTO, he said the December Doha round in Hong 
Kong would be decisive and reiterated his proposal for an 
immediate moratorium on agricultural export subsidies 
(comment: though not offering better market access or 
eliminating domestic subsidies) for products destined for 
Africa.  He urged ratification of the UNESCO Convention on 
Cultural Diversity by October 2006. 
 
La Francophonie 
--------------- 
 
11.  (U) Chirac declared that the association of 
French-speaking countries, while originally aimed at 
preserving cultural diversity, was now directed also toward 
democratization and social justice.  He proposed that the 
biannual France-Africa summit, hosted in December in Bamako, 
be devoted to youth and the questions of education, health, 
employment and security. 
 
12.  (U) On political issues, he called for free presidential 
elections in Cote d'Ivoire and expressed confidence in South 
African mediation within the framework of the African Union. 
There was no mention of other African countries. 
 
The European Union 
------------------ 
 
13.  (U) Chirac declared that, "in this multipolar world, 
only the European Union has the critical mass to establish a 
dialogue of equals with its larger partners."  He also 
asserted that "a strong Europe would contribute also to the 
vitality of the kind of balanced transatlantic linkage" -- 
without however any explicit mention of NATO -- "necessary 
for world stability and based on relations of cooperation and 
confidence with the United States, with whom we share so many 
common values."  Indeed, he cites this as the reason, at this 
time of European crisis, to seek new European momentum. 
 
14.  (U) Acknowledging the need to bring Europe closer to its 
citizens in the wake of the failed May 29 referendum on an EU 
constitutional treaty, Chirac called for ways to associate 
the parliament and local political and civil institutions 
with European decisions.  He recalled France's shared vision, 
with Germany, of a Europe that is "political, ambitious, 
social and in solidarity" and emphasizes that Europe's vision 
must go beyond that of a free market (Comment: the presumed 
UK vision) to include a political project based on common 
values. 
 
15.  (U) Chirac called for a budget solution for the years 
2007-2013 based on proposals of the then-Luxembourg 
Presidency made in June and "respect for agreements already 
reached" (Comment:  presumably the EU's approval of the 2002 
Franco-German agreement that governs the EU's Common 
Agricultural Policy until the end of 2013).  In the same 
vein, he called for a harmonization of European fiscal and 
social policy and said France would remain "vigilant" with 
respect to new directives on services and the work week.  He 
also called for the creation of "European champions" of 
industry and a reinforcement of economic governance within 
the Eurozone through a more demanding dialogue between the 
Eurogroup and the European Central Bank (Comment: reflecting 
French dissatisfaction with the constraints of the Stability 
Pact). 
 
16.  (U) Chirac delivered a subtle message on European 
enlargement, arguing indirectly that the failure of the 
referendum on an EU constitution and the absence of effective 
institutions for an enlarged Europe rendered the question of 
Europe's geographical limits all the more pertinent, echoing 
his remarks to the European Council in June.  He said France 
would respect its past commitments as long as prospective 
candidate countries respected theirs.  In the case of Turkey, 
for whom "the opening of negotiations is but a long and 
difficult path with an uncertain outcome," Turkey would need 
"to provide clarifications and assurances to the 25 about its 
intention to respect fully its obligations" as a result of 
its unilateral declaration on Cyprus. 
 
17.  (U) On ESDP, Chirac said Europe needed to make its 
presence felt "on all continents," and enumerated EU 
involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo and Darfur.  Here also, there 
was no mention of NATO.  He cited the EU's involvement in the 
Aceh province of Indonesia as evidence of Europe's strategic 
partnership with ASEAN.  Finally, he called for a 
reinforcement of the EU's Operations Center in order better 
to support future autonomous operations such as those in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis in 2003).  He also 
stressed the importance of developing the EU's technological 
development through the European Defense Agency or through 
the common training of pilots and naval officers. 
 
Wrap-Up 
------- 
 
18.  (U) Chirac concluded his speech with an expression of 
confidence in France to address its problems with 
unemployment and economic growth through high technology, 
with ITER being cited as an example of France's continuing 
attractiveness for investment and research. 
 
19.  (U) He concluded with a rapid tour d'horizon of the rest 
of the world, citing his upcoming visits to Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine; reinforcement of France's partnership with Russia 
and its strategic relations with China (he noted his plans to 
return to China next year), India and Japan; and his 
intention to visit Brazil and Chili. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
20.  (C) Chirac's speech was clearly aimed at being 
reassuring rather than provocative, the result of the failed 
May 29 referendum on the EU constitution.  It is thus not 
surprising that he focused most of his efforts on the need to 
boost confidence in and stress the importance of the EU and 
emphasized its role as partner, rather than competitor, of 
the U.S.  What remains to be seen is whether the current 
sense of EU vulnerability, and/or French weakness within the 
EU, leads to more or less NATO/EU competition in practice, 
especially if France sees increased EU purposefulness and 
visibility on the international scene as the primary means of 
offsetting its internal confusion.  Chirac's remarks suggest, 
however, that France may be content to lie low for the 
moment, so long as EU equities are protected.  That said, he 
made clear France's vision of a global role for the EU, 
politico-militarily as well as economically. 
 
21.  (C) Chirac's careful and relatively nuanced comments on 
Turkey suggest that France may in the end be satisfied with 
something less from Turkey than a promise to recognize Cyprus 
as the price of beginning accession negotiations on October 3 
as planned. 
 
22.  (C) Finally, though Chirac may have had little positive 
to say about Iraq, he muted his skepticism and refrained from 
direct criticism.  His comments on Middle East reform 
repeated familiar French slogans on not imposing reform on 
the region and on working with governments vice civil 
society, but he did acknowledge that reform was inevitable. 
On Iran, by contrast, he was explicit in reiterating France's 
willingness to refer Iran to the UN Security Council if 
necessary. 
23.  (C) In sum, in those areas where French policy differs 
from that of the U.S. -- Iraq, the UN, and the EU vs. NATO -- 
Chirac deliberately chose to tone down his opposition or 
express it more indirectly.  While this does not signify a 
change in French positions, it suggests that the government 
does wish to keep bilateral frictions to a minimum. 
 
STAPLETON