US embassy cable - 05HARARE1209

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC MP COLTART ON PLANNED U.S. VISIT; REQUEST FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL MEETING 
 
REF: HARARE 1156 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) MDC Shadow Minister of Justice, Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs David Coltart on August 25 told the CDA 
that together with Zimbabwean exiled businessmen Strive 
Masiyiwa and Nigel Chanakira, he was employing church 
connections in the United States to seek a meeting with 
President Bush in October.  He planned to tell the President 
that change in Zimbabwe remained a real possibility in the 
short term and that the U.S. should continue assistance to 
civil society.  Coltart said Parliament would likely pass the 
Constitutional Amendment Bill on August 30 and that he would 
personally be a prime target of new travel restrictions.  He 
confirmed that the MDC opposed wider trade sanctions and IMF 
expulsion, but favored stepped up international pressure on 
the GOZ, including at the UN Security Council.  End Summary. 
 
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Wants Meeting With the President 
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2. (C) Coltart told the CDA that he and two colleagues were 
seeking a Washington meeting with President Bush in October 
to discuss Zimbabwe.  The two colleagues were Econet 
principal owner and former Daily News publisher Strive 
Masiyiwa and Kingdom Bank owner Nigel Chanakira.  The three 
shared a common religious faith, and were seeking the meeting 
through their senior religious contacts in the U.S. rather 
than through official channels.  The group might also seek 
meetings on Capitol Hill, especially if they failed to secure 
a meeting with the President.  Coltart said the trip was 
intended to be low-key with no media profile and that he 
would not be meeting the President in his guise as an MDC 
politician but rather as a fellow believer. 
 
3.  (C) Coltart said the group,s message to the President 
would be to match the USG's strong rhetoric on Zimbabwe with 
continued resources.  The U.S. was cutting back on democracy 
assistance at exactly the wrong time.  Change in Zimbabwe 
remained a very real prospect in the next two-three years and 
U.S. assistance was badly needed to get civil society and the 
opposition through the current difficult period. 
 
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Predicts Constitutional Reforms Passage 
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4.  (C) Coltart said he expected Parliament to pass the GOZ's 
proposed constitutional amendments bill (reftel) on August 
30.  Of immediate potential impact to the MDC was the bill's 
restraint on travel by perceived regime enemies.  He said 
ZANU-PF MPs had made clear during the debate over the bill 
that he would personally be one of the provision's principal 
and early victims.  This could prevent his leaving Zimbabwe 
including to meet with the President but in that event his 
two colleagues would still make trip to Washington. 
 
5.  (C) Coltart added that the MDC had introduced its own 
proposal for constitutional amendments to point up the 
undemocratic nature of the bill.  Among other things, the MDC 
proposal included a requirement that constitutional 
amendments be put to national referendum within two years of 
passage.  Coltart also noted that the GOZ would likely 
conduct senate elections within three months of the bill's 
passage, notwithstanding its lack of budget for it.  He 
reported that the MDC continued to debate whether or not to 
participate and had not reached a position. 
 
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MDC To Continue Legal Challenges 
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6.  (C) Coltart said the MDC was continuing its campaign in 
the courts against GOZ and ruling party abuses.  The cases 
(which are funded in part by USAID) kept the spotlight on GOZ 
electoral abuses and underscored the MDC,s non-violence and 
respect for rule of law.  The challenges also tied up GOZ 
resources; CIO operatives typically outnumbered MDC 
functionaries in court.  The current focus of the court 
challenges was the 2002 presidential election.  The MDC had 
pursued a two-part case.  The first part had been 27 legal 
and constitutional challenges to the election's conduct.  Had 
the courts found in the MDC,s favor the election result 
would have been null and void.  However, in June 2004 the 
High Court had dismissed the MDC,s case (though without 
providing any reasoning).  The MDC was now moving forward on 
the second part: establishing that the election had been 
fraudulent. 
 
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MDC Opposes IMF Expulsion But Wants UNSC Attention 
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7.  (C) Coltart said Zimbabwe,s economic distress posed a 
dilemma for the MDC, which didn,t want the country to 
collapse and the suffering of common citizens to rise but did 
want to see the regime pay for its misrule.  Accordingly, the 
party remained opposed to generalized trade sanctions but 
continued to support targeted sanctions on GOZ and ZANU-PF 
leaders.  In addition, Coltart confirmed that the MDC opposed 
IMF expulsion but nonetheless hoped to see the international 
community, and especially the UN increase the pressure on the 
Mugabe regime, by recognizing Operation Restore Order as a 
crime against humanity.  Coltart said he further hoped to see 
the UN Security Council adopt a resolution that would invite 
the International Criminal Court to investigate the 
operation.  He acknowledged this could be problematic for the 
U.S. but noted a precedent on Sudan and urged the U.S. not to 
block such a development were it to occur. 
 
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Comment 
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8.  (C) Coltart has asked for neither Embassy nor Department 
assistance in securing the meeting with the President and we 
are unable to assess whether his connections are likely to be 
able to secure an appointment.  That said, we believe his 
message to the President is the right one: the Mugabe regime 
has weakened itself over the past three months, the chances 
for real change in the next few years have improved as a 
result, and the U.S. should continue to maintain its support 
for democratic elements in Zimbabwe. 
DELL