US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1256

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, HR, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECHS ON GYMNICH/TURKEY/CROATIA:  NOT YET FIRMLY 
ON BOARD 
 
REF: A. STATE 153187 
 
     B. PRAGUE 1245 
     C. PRAGUE 1243 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Czechs continue to deliberate their 
position on Turkish EU accession and to send mixed signals. 
Visiting Turkish MFA officials last week heard what they 
wanted to hear:  the GOCR supports the Oct 3 starting date 
and will not impose new conditions.  But during an Aug 29 
speech outlining foreign policy priorities, PM Paroubek did 
not say a word about Turkey, although he spoke firmly in 
favor of moving ahead with Croatian accession.  FM Svoboda is 
sympathetic to Angela Merkel's proposal for an alternate 
status for Turkey.  Continued USG engagement will be 
important to keep the Czechs on board.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sensoy visited Prague on 
Aug 25. Turkish DCM and MFA Director for European 
Institutions Ulicny both separately told Pol-Econ Chief that 
the meetings went well, with the Czechs (MFA Deputy Minister 
Mueller and PM Paroubek's Foreign Policy Advisor Busniak) 
both stating that the Czechs will not oppose the start of 
accession talks on Oct 3.  Turkish DCM noted the Czechs did 
express concern about the implications of the Turkish 
declaration on Cyprus, but stated that Ankara is "not worried 
about the Czech position."  Ulicny, as he had in our previous 
meeting (ref C), indicated that the GOCR continues to focus 
on the practical steps that the GOT will take to implement 
the Ankara Protocol, for instance, to permit Greek Cypriot 
ships to call at Turkish ports.  Ulicny also indicated the 
Czechs were slightly taken aback by Sensoy's strident 
salesmanship, but agreed that on the whole it was a positive 
visit. 
 
3. (C) However, Ulicny noted a number of potential problems. 
He described a 90-minute meeting led by FM Svoboda after the 
Sensoy visit in which the FM expanded on the themes he had 
highlighted in his Aug 23 op-ed (ref C; Ulicny emphasized to 
Pol-Econ Chief that Svoboda had penned the article himself): 
that the EU can not afford any controversial expansion 
debates that will distract from the critical need to focus on 
EU integration and healing following the constitution 
referendum defeats.  Ulicny described PM Paroubek as in 
accord with Svoboda's views, as demonstrated by a speech 
Paroubek made to a meeting of Czech ambassadors on Aug 29 in 
which he focused on EU reform issues, promoted Croatian 
accession (see below), but pointedly failed to mention Turkey. 
 
4. (C) Ulicny described FM Svoboda as very sympathetic to 
Angela Merkel's position that Turkey receive a privileged 
partnership rather than full membership.  And he pointed out 
that in the Czech Republic, as in Germany, pre-election 
politics are also playing a part in the Turkey debate:  the 
opposition ODS is strongly in favor of Turkish accession 
(although they have recently been silent on the issue); 
Paroubek may be inclined to support Svoboda's views as a way 
of distinguishing himself from ODS.  This tendency will be 
supported by a poll last week that shows 51% of Czechs oppose 
Turkish EU membership, versus only 30% in favor. 
 
5. (C) In response to remaining points on the Gymnich agenda 
(refs A and B), Ulicny noted that the Czech MFA had been 
traditionally supportive of the USG position on Croatian 
accession:  that General Gotovina's transfer to the 
International Tribunal was a necessary first step.  However, 
Ulicny said the Prime Minister had overruled the MFA on the 
issue.  In that day's speech he had called for swift movement 
on talks, terming "one General" insufficient to hold up the 
accession process, and expressing his satisfaction that the 
Croatian government is doing its best to bring Gotovina to 
justice.  Paroubek and his Hungarian counterpart intend to 
lobby the Slovak and Polish Prime Ministers at the Aug 30 
Visegrad-4 meeting in Budapest to sign a joint letter to Tony 
Blair urging him to move forward on Croatia. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  Our latest discussions confirm that the 
Czech position on Turkey is soft and that continued USG 
engagement is important.  We intend to seek meetings in the 
coming weeks with FM Svoboda and PM Paroubek to discuss, 
inter alia, both Turkish and Croatian accession. 
MUNTER