US embassy cable - 05ROME2874

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002874 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, TU, IT, EUN 
SUBJECT: ITALY SAYS TURKEY WILL LIKELY DOMINATE SEPTEMBER 
1-2 GYMNICH 
 
REF: A. STATE 153187 
     B. ROME 02720 
     C. ROME 01509 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Jonathan Cohen, for reasons 1.4 (b) 
(d) 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary.  On August 24, Poloff met separately with 
Sergio Mercuri of the MFA's EU office and Stefano Ravagnan of 
the MFA's Southern Europe office to discuss ref A demarche. 
Poloff also met with Raimondo De Cardona from the MFA's 
Balkans office on August 29.  Mercuri and Ravagnan stated 
that Italy's position heading into the COREPER and Gymnich 
track closely with the points provided ref A.  Italy will 
stay the course on fully supporting Turkey's bid to join the 
EU.  Israel's pullout of Gaza is a positive step but new 
Israeli settlements could hinder progress on the roadmap. 
Italy is hoping that Iraqi authorities can keep to the 
timetable for the referendum and elections following the 
announcement of a draft constitution.  Kosovo, Bosnia, and 
Montenegro bear watching during the next six months as key 
political events come to a head.  End Summary. 
 
Turkey 
------ 
 
2.  (C) Mercuri and Ravagnan said Italy continues to strongly 
support accession negotiations for Turkey without 
preconditions (see also ref B).  According to Ravagnan, who 
served for four years in Turkey in the late 1990s, Italy's 
support for Turkey cuts across party lines (with minor 
reservations at the political fringes), and Italian policy in 
that regard is managed from the top.  Prime Minister 
Berlusconi relies heavily on personal connections with world 
leaders, Ravagnan said, and he maintains a strong personal 
connection with Turkish PM Erdogan.  (In 2003, Berlusconi was 
a witness at the wedding of one of Erdogan's sons.) 
 
3.  (C) Italy has consistently maintained that Turkey has the 
right to be a part of the EU and that Ankara's eligibility 
should be considered on its own merits.  Italy is headed into 
EU negotiations confident that the final goal is full 
membership for Turkey, according to Ravagnan--there were no 
other alternatives envisaged in the December 2004 European 
Council declaration.  He added that Italy would continue to 
champion Turkey's cause because having another major 
Mediterranean country in the Union is politically and 
economically important for Italy. 
 
4.  (C) Ankara's declaration rejecting recognition of Cyprus 
was not helpful and was ill-timed, Ravagnan acknowledged, but 
it was done for domestic reasons and should not be over 
dramatized.  He said within the EU, Italy is counseling a 
"constructive and flexible" approach to Turkey, with no 
linkage between accession talks and Turkey's recognition of 
Cyprus.  Nicosia will certainly demand some type of EU 
"counter-declaration" either at the August COREPER or later, 
but will probably only get a mild statement on the issue. 
Ravagnan advised that, although Cyprus is free to exploit the 
matter, it should be careful not to become a single-issue 
country that will quickly lose credibility in the EU. 
 
5.  (C) Ravagnan suggested that Turkey's future is in 
Erdogan's hands and he was confident the Turkish Prime 
Minister will be able to "pass something" on Cyprus that will 
satisfy the EU, although likely not before October 3. 
Turkish public opinion on Cyprus, he said, makes it too 
difficult for Erdogan to change direction just before the 
October start date.  Once Turkey begins down the accession 
path, Ravagnan added, Ankara will find it difficult to break 
off negotiations and will seek ways to work with the EU. 
Domestic anticipation of eventual accession (especially if 
chapter negotiations proceed relatively smoothly) will be a 
great motivating factor for Turkey.  Ravagnan did not foresee 
any surprises before October and dismissed the likelihood 
that some members might veto or block the start of 
negotiations. 
 
Middle East/Gaza 
---------------- 
 
6. (C) Mercuri, who just arrived from the Italian Embassy in 
Washington, agreed that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza was a 
 
 
significant milestone and said Italy was in general agreement 
with USG views on the way forward.  On the specifics 
regarding EU or EC assistance, Mercuri warned that the 
Gymnich is not a decision-making body and that the most we 
could expect is a signal of members' willingness to continue 
the momentum of the past few weeks.  The EU, as part of the 
Quartet, continues to support the roadmap strategy and Italy 
will continue lobbying all sides to maintain that process. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
7.  (C) Mercuri said Italy hopes the Iraqis will be able to 
maintain the timetable for a constitutional referendum in 
October and elections in December.  Mercuri acknowledged that 
it was unclear whether the EU would come up with funding or 
staff for the elections, but offered that something could be 
coaxed out of the EU's CFSP office.  At this time, Italy is 
not considering any bilateral aid. 
 
 
Western Balkans 
--------------- 
 
8.  (C) On Kosovo, De Cardona estimated that Special Envoy 
Kai Eide's comprehensive review would be released sometime in 
September and perhaps coincide with the UNGA.  At the same 
time, De Cardona believed Eide would delay releasing the 
report if his conclusions about the current state of 
standards implementation were largely negative.  In that 
case, Eide may release a simple status report noting what 
further steps must be taken to meet the standards.  De 
Cardona said Italy believes that the fundamental solution for 
Kosovo is future EU membership, but there is a long road 
ahead and it will be difficult to convince some EU members 
skeptical of further enlargement. 
 
9.  (C) De Cardona said that dealing with Bosnia is more 
complicated, where relatively minor issues such as police and 
public broadcasting reforms threaten to block continued 
progress.  The Bosnians must overcome these obstacles before 
the EU will agree to open negotiations on a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement.  Italy, according to De Cardona, is 
willing to consider initiating negotiations with the 
stipulation that the police and broadcasting reform issues 
will be solved before an agreement is signed.  De Cardona 
noted that High Rep Ashdown takes a harder line, loathe to be 
seen as giving in to Bosnian intransigence.  De Cardona made 
another pitch for Laura Mirachian as Italy's candidate to 
succeed Ashdown (see ref C) and wondered aloud about the USG 
position on her candidacy. 
 
10.  (C) De Cardona said Italy fully supports the current 
Serbia and Montenegro union but understands that Montenegro 
has a fundamental right to call a referendum on independence 
if that is the public will.  However, the international 
community should closely monitor the situation and possibly 
flex its muscle if it appears that President Djukanovic will 
call a referendum next spring.  The timing of a referendum 
will be crucial, said De Cardona, because next year many 
events related to Kosovo, Bosnia, etc., will be coming to a 
head; a Montenegro referendum will only complicate matters. 
What will we do with Montenegro as an independent country? De 
Cardona asked rhetorically.  It has no democratic tradition 
and no viable economy.  Serbia's reaction also could be 
worrisome.  Independence for Montenegro must be managed 
correctly to ensure that it does not spiral out of control, 
De Cardona advised.  Montenegro has a history of involvement 
in trafficking; immediate freedom could open the door to 
smugglers and create a haven for terrorists willing to 
exploit the void. 
SPOGLI 
 
 
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	2005ROME02874 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL