US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT3835

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR NEA/ARPI AND S/CT; NSC FOR TOWNSEND; LONDON FOR TSOU; 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, MARR, PBTS, EFIN, ASEC, CVIS, KU, TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: KUWAIT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP:  GOK TAKING 
STEPS TO IMPLEMENT CT STRATEGY TRAINING COMPONENT 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT -- 3755 GOK OFFICIALS SAY IRAQ BORDER 
        DISPUTE RESOLVED 
     B. KUWAIT 3407 -- POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY RE 
        EMBASSY KUWAIT REFUSAL OF NIV 
        APPLICATION OF NUBA M. R. A. B. ALENEZI 
     C. KUWAIT 3403 -- SENIOR KUWAITI MFA OFFICIAL'S 
        VIEWS ON GITMO 
     D. KUWAIT 3059 -- CWG: SLOW BUT RELATIVELY STEADY 
        PROGRESS ON CT 
     E. KUWAIT 2928 -- GITMO DETAINEE NASSER AL-MUTAIRI 
        ACQUITTED 
     F. KUWAIT 2438 -- REQUEST FOR EVALUATION OF 
        SECURITY INFORMATION: JIHADIST 
        PERPETRATORS TRIAL 
     G. KUWAIT 2265 -- CWG: SOME PROGRESS ON TERROR 
        FINANCE 
     H. KUWAIT 2118 -- (S/NF) REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE 
        REVIEW OF VISA HITS: MP HASSAN JOWHAR 
     I. KUWAIT 1159 -- CWG: GOK TO USE TRAINING AS PART 
        OF ITS CT STRATEGY 
     J. KUWAIT 730 -- CWG MEETING 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  The Ambassador chaired on August 22 the 
monthly meeting of post's Counterterrorism Working Group 
(CWG).  He reviewed his August 20 discussions with senior 
representatives of the GOK on the need to maintain a sharp 
focus on CT and recommendations that the arrests of wanted 
individuals would signal to the international community that 
Kuwait remained vigilant in the Global War on Terror.  The 
officials stressed that CT was a government-wide priority and 
that Kuwait was looking at the big picture and not just 
individuals.  Other sections reported that the GOK has not 
relaxed its focus on the need for more training and has 
turned to private companies and local experts for assistance. 
 While post seeks to assist the GOK through FMS, ATA, and 
in-house training, we are encouraged that the GOK has 
identified and pursued other training opportunities.  (Post's 
CWG is composed of the Ambassador, DCM, and section heads 
from CONS, ECON, DATT, RSO, OMC-K, POL, and SIMO.)  End 
Summary. 
 
Ambassador Stresses Need for Sustained Focus on CT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2.  (C)  During separate meetings on August 20 with First 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Shaykh Nawaf 
Al-Sabah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Acting Under Secretary 
and International Organizations Department Director 
Ambassador Abdullah Al-Murad, and Council of Ministers 
Secretary General Abdullatif Al-Rodan, the Ambassador 
 
SIPDIS 
acknowledged Kuwait's continuing cooperation with the U.S. on 
counterterrorism efforts and stressed the importance of a 
government-wide, sustained focus on CT.  Noting that terror 
financier Mohsen Al-Fadhli remained at large, the Ambassador 
told Shaykh Nawaf that his capture would send a strong 
message about Kuwait's commitment to the Global War on 
Terror.  The Minister responded that the GOK was working hard 
to bring to justice both Al-Fadhli and Khaled Al-Dosari, and 
was optimistic that coordination within the GOK and with the 
U.S. would yield positive results.  He cautioned, however, 
that the terror problem was greater than these two 
individuals and it was important to attack all fronts. 
 
3.  (C)  Al-Murad informed the Ambassador that the steel 
pipeline barrier being installed along the border with Iraq 
(ref A) was one of the GOK's CT tools.  There was serious 
concern about the possibility of insurgents crossing into 
Kuwait from Iraq and the GOK hoped a more secure border would 
help to stem their flow.  He added that reforming the 
educational system to promote tolerance was a priority. 
(Note:  The pipe barrier stands about three feet off the 
ground and will prevent vehicles from crossing.  It is 
complemented by technical and physical surveillance of the 
border.  End note.) 
 
4.  (C)  Al-Rodan advised the Ambassador that the Council of 
Ministers (COM) was considering approval of three treaties on 
terror:  an Arab League agreement, a GCC pact, and the UN 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. 
Additionally, the COM was reviewing as a model the terror 
legislation adopted 28 July 2004 in the UAE.  Al-Rodan said 
it was a "very good law" and could help the GOK to address 
terror finance and other types of support.  He said the GOK 
also wanted to strengthen existing legislation to address 
conspiracy and intent.  (Note:  The UAE law defines terror 
and clearly outlines the penalties for terror finance, arms 
trafficking and training, and fomenting violence, issues not 
sufficiently addressed by Kuwaiti laws.  Post would 
appreciate an assessment of the UAE laws and their 
enforcement in order to better engage the GOK on improvements 
to existing laws.  End Note.) 
 
Weak Laws Undermine State Security Efforts 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (S/NF)  Recently arrived SIMO Chief briefed the CWG on 
his initial calls on Kuwait State Security (KSS) officials. 
He reported that KSS indicated it would take a more 
aggressive approach to finding Al-Fadhli and Al-Dosari, but 
that its efforts were hampered by inadequate legislation. 
SIMO recently discussed current legal improvements with 
National Security Bureau President Shaykh Sabah Al-Khaled 
Al-Sabah, who critiqued existing laws as insufficient, but 
did not respond to an offer of assistance from SIMO.  Despite 
the legal limitations, KSS was working hard to identify 
extremists in Kuwait and was conducting name checks for the 
Ministry of Defense in an attempt to root out hardliners from 
the military.  SIMO Chief further noted that expanded 
cooperation with Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
elements in Iraq had revealed the possible presence of 
additional undesirable CT-related targets in Kuwait. 
Coordination between SIMO and JSOC in the region is 
excellent, and further targeting efforts will be pursued in 
this regard. 
 
Promises of Detention and Prosecution of GITMO Detainees 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
6.  (S/NF)  PolChief briefed the CWG on the approved transfer 
of one Kuwaiti detained at Guantanamo and the review of four 
others for transfer.  Post has asked the GOK for written 
assurances that the detainees would be incarcerated upon 
return, treated humanely, and prosecuted under Kuwaiti law. 
The GOK has given oral assurances that Kuwait will abide by 
all transfer conditions and repeated its request that all 11 
detained Kuwaitis be returned (ref C).  GOK officials added 
that Nasser Al-Mutairi, returned to Kuwait in January and 
acquitted in June, could still be retried, and remained under 
observation (ref E). 
 
Terror Finance 
-------------- 
 
7.  (S/NF)  EconChief advised the CWG that the GOK continued 
to make progress in dealing with money-laundering and terror 
finance.  He a welcomed planned visit by a team from 
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, commenting the 
visit would provide valuable opportunities to engage Foreign 
Ministry and Central Bank personnel on measures to eliminate 
funding for terror activities.  In order to have a more 
focused dialogue with the GOK, SIMO will seek to identify 
specific cases where the GOK did not take the exact action 
requested by the U.S. in order to isolate the source of any 
failure and take corrective action.  EconChief added that the 
arrival of a new U.S. Customs Law Enforcement Advisor, who 
has extensive experience in anti-money-laundering programs, 
would also help to bolster GOK anti-terror finance efforts. 
 
Training Tops All 
----------------- 
 
8.  (C)  RSO reported that Kuwait remained stable, but there 
was the possibility for terror incidents.  GOK security staff 
wanted to do a good job, but had limited resources and 
training.  The GOK has solicited special operations training 
from Blackwater for its SWAT and black operations teams, and 
welcomed continued Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training 
from the U.S.  (Note:  Post has proposed the following ATA 
training programs for Kuwait:  in FY 2006, Interdicting 
Terror Organizations-Advanced and VIP Protection MATT and in 
FY 2007, Critical Incident Management, Cyber-Consultation on 
Cyber Terrorism, Cyber-Incident Response Course, 
Cyber-Investigating Cyber Terrorism, Integrating CT 
Strategies at the National Level - Implementation, 
Integration CT Strategies at the National level - Polity, 
Interdicting Terrorism Organization - Advanced, Port and 
Harbor Security, Task Force Organization and Operations, and 
WMD Awareness.  End Note.)  RSO added that he has raised with 
GOK security officials the importance of protecting their 
critical infrastructure. 
 
9.  (S)  OMC-K informed the group of its work with the 
Preventative Security Directorate (PSD) -- a branch of the 
Ministry of Defense's J2 tasked to address counterterrorism, 
extremist groups, and external threats -- to identify 
training requirements.  Courses under consideration include 
basic and advanced Foreign Military Sales (FMS) courses for 
intelligence officers and military police, and specialized 
courses available through FMS such as Intel Support to 
Counterterrorism and Security Officer Basic.  Working with 
other agencies at post, OMC-K also hopes to provide 
specialized Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and specialized 
analysis training.  The GOK was also being proactive 
regarding training and invited Kuwait Center for Strategic 
Studies President Dr. Sami Al-Faraj to lecture about the 
spread of terrorism and the need for a sustained, coordinated 
approach to fight terrorist organizations.  He stressed the 
need for Kuwait's security and intelligence organs to work 
together, a message post has often delivered.  His comments 
were well received and re-ignited interest in CT work, 
building on J2 plans to launch a campaign against extremism 
in the military.  OMC-K is working with CENTCOM on the visit 
of a Mobile Training Team to assist with the campaign. 
 
 
10.  (S)  In addition to training needs identified by RSO and 
OMC-K, the DATT recommended additional force protection 
training and a strengthening of the military's intelligence 
services.  Not all training would need to be provided by the 
U.S.; Kuwait could also benefit from regional expertise. 
(Note:  The UK has a long-standing training relationship with 
the Ministry of Interior.  End note.) 
 
Keeping Suspected Terrorists Out of the U.S. 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (S/NF)  The Consul updated the CWG on efforts to secure 
NIVs for Kuwaiti Members of Parliament suspected of having 
ties to violent organizations.  MPs Waleed Al-Tabtabei and 
Awad Barrad Al-Enezi were recently approved for G visas to 
attend a UN parliamentary conference.  MP Hassan Al-Jowhar's 
NIV application is still pending (ref H).  He noted the 
complexity in having a name removed from the look-out system 
and advised the group that Shaykha Hessa Al-Sabah, daughter 
of the Crown Prince, had to be fingerprinted because of the 
presence of derogatory information.  Nonetheless, the 
look-out system is an extremely useful tool and recently 
helped to identify a Kuwaiti applicant who, although she 
faces several charges for supporting terror activities, was 
approved by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Health for medical travel 
to the U.S. (refs B and F).  Her medical history referred to 
vague traumatic experiences, omitting that her husband died 
after being captured by the police for being part of a terror 
cell that planned attacks on U.S. and Kuwaiti interests. 
Based on the contradictory information provided in her 
application, CONS has asked SIMO to brief interviewing 
officers on how to spot information that may link a visa 
applicant to a terrorist organization. 
 
********************************************* 
Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website 
********************************************* 
LEBARON