US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI6595

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NEW DELHI NEPAL EXPERTS CALL FOR LONG-TERM STRATEGY

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI6595
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI6595 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-08-26 13:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MASS KDEM PGOV MOPS PBTS IN NP India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
KATHMANDU PASS RICHELSOPH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, KDEM, PGOV, MOPS, PBTS, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: NEW DELHI NEPAL EXPERTS CALL FOR LONG-TERM STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 4131 
     B. NEW DELHI 6149 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: New Delhi-based Nepal experts representing 
a wide spectrum of viewpoints agreed that the international 
community must take a longer-term view of the crisis in 
Nepal, and argued the US must lead in any recasting of 
strategy, as New Delhi is handcuffed by conflicting domestic 
interests and strategic perspectives.  In an evolution from 
previous views, most seem ready to see the King depart the 
scene in Kathmandu.  End Summary. 
 
Washington Must Lead, Because New Delhi Can't 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Although participants at a New Delhi-based 
Nepal-watchers lunch hosted by A/DCM in honor of Nepal Desk 
Officer David Richelsoph recognized Washington's consistent 
signals that New Delhi had the lead on forging a common 
policy on Nepal, they insisted that, ultimately, the USG will 
have to initiate any re-engineering of the currently 
stagnating policy.  The lack of consensus on Nepal among 
India's strategic, intellectual and political communities 
prevents the emergence of fresh GOI policies, they explained, 
but New Delhi would support a productive new tack in Nepal if 
one were put forth by Washington.  Researcher Anil Kamboj of 
the government-supported Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analysis stated that the Indian military is not backing a 
position of its own in the internal GOI debate on Nepal 
policy, but would fully support any political decision of the 
government.  Several journalists and a retired Ambassador 
indicated that MEA and others responsible for Nepal might 
view a more activist Washington role with relief. 
 
India Might Accept a UN Role 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) While recognizing New Delhi's historic allergy to UN 
involvement in South Asian conflicts, the lunch participants 
were surprisingly optimistic that the GOI would acquiesce to 
a productive UN role in mediating a solution to the 
Palace-parties-Maoists struggle.  Even former Ambassador to 
Nepal KV Rajan, who maintains close contacts to the MEA, 
agreed that India might accept UN involvement if it appeared 
that an international community or UN-sponsored solution 
would encourage the King to climb down from his current 
position and provide a way out of the political stalemate. 
However, when pressed by A/DCM, none of the lunch guests were 
able to define exactly what a UN-brokered solution might look 
like or what role the UN might play. 
 
Maoists: Ready to Compromise, Or Just Tactics? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4.  (C) JNU Professor of South Asian Studies SD Muni 
reiterated his appeal for governments to give credence to 
Maoist assurances that they are willing to join a democratic 
government, and even accept a titular monarchy.  Alluding to 
his close connections to senior Maoist leaders (he responded 
to a challenge by asserting that he had met CPN(M) chief 
Prachanda "within the past 10 months"), Muni asked us to 
trust the Maoists' willingness to participate in a peaceful 
political process. 
 
5.  (C) In response, MG (ret) Ashok Mehta argued forcefully 
that the Maoist statements of willingness to cooperate were 
only a tactic aimed at persuading the political parties to 
join forces against the King.  Once the King was gone, Mehta 
implied, the Maoists would then hold all the cards and 
dispense with the parties.  Moreover, Mehta asserted, Maoist 
treatment of the people in areas under their control belied 
Muni's assurance that they were true democrats at heart. 
Muni responded that the Maoist leadership has come to the 
conclusion that it cannot win militarily and is therefore 
ready to join a democratic government.  Embassy officers 
underlined that the Maoists' past practice placed the burden 
on them to change behaviors, not just language. 
 
Maoists Are Out-thinking the Rest of Us 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Terrorism and insurgency expert Ajai Sahni of the 
Institute for Conflict Management complained that India, the 
US, and other international actors were unable to assess 
accurately both Maoist actions and the proper course to end 
the conflict because of short-term thinking.  While the 
Maoists are content to play out strategies that will advance 
their goals over the course of a decade or more, the 
international community is so determined to seek a solution 
within a timeline of months that it is unable to respond 
effectively.  Muni disagreed with Sahni's assessment of 
Maoist intentions, but he, Rajan and Kamboj concurred that 
the international community's emphasis on short-term fixes 
was precluding an accurate assessment of how to end the 
conflict. 
 
7.  (C) Sahni, generally seen as hawkish against Maoist and 
naxalite insurgents, argued that India and the US must stop 
focusing on the military dimension of the conflict, and 
instead adopt a longer-term perspective of how to address 
political concerns of all parties to the crisis for a lasting 
solution.  Rajan, who had earlier advocated increased 
military assistance to the RNA (Ref A) as a means to break 
the Maoist insurgency, agreed that a military solution is 
impossible.  All participants agreed that the international 
community must seek some path that will bring the Palace, the 
parties and the Maoists into a political process, whether it 
upholds the traditional "twin pillars" format or not.  None 
of them, however, gave any detailed proposals for such an 
approach. 
 
Comment: Down with the King 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) We were struck by the widespread acceptance among New 
Delhi's Nepal watchers of the idea that King Gyanendra has 
made himself dispensable.  We have convoked this group 
repeatedly since February 1, and on this occasion found a 
stark souring of views on the King, which contrasts with the 
GOI's continued commitment to the "twin pillars" of 
constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy.  While 
several of these interlocutors had earlier focused on pushing 
the King into an alliance with the parties, they have all but 
given up hope that he will do so.  Disparaging the "twin 
pillars" formula as obsolete, they are now open to finding a 
solution without, or in spite of, the Palace.  The widespread 
agreement among our interlocutors that Washington, instead of 
New Delhi, must take the initiative in new steps on Nepal, 
combined with MEA's admission that it is searching for more 
effective policies (Ref B), underlines the urgency of finding 
a way forward and sharing those ideas with India. 
 
9.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi) 
MULFORD 

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