US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK5503

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, INR 
NSC FOR MORROW 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, TH, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAKSIN MISTAKES AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 5455 
 
     B. 5393 
     C. 4946 
     D. 4697 
     E. 4653 
     F. 4696 
     G. 3203 
     H. 2219 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY/COMMENT:  Prime Minister Thaksin's missteps 
and often heavy-handed responses to the unrest in far 
southern Thailand have clearly exacerbated a long-simmering 
conflict.  However, while he has made mistakes, the Prime 
Minister has not paid a serious political price for his 
southern policy, as most Thais remain indifferent or even 
support a hard-line position.  While the Prime Minister has 
undoubtedly made a bad situation worse, there are indications 
-- such as the creation of the National Reconciliation 
Commission (NRC) -- that Thaksin appreciates the situation in 
the South is complex and defies easy and quick resolution. 
He now appears to be genuinely looking for viable approaches 
to the South.  His upcoming meeting with the President is an 
excellent opportunity to raise our concerns about the 
situation in the South while encouraging Thaksin to continue 
with his reconciliation efforts -- the best current option 
for dealing with the decades-old insurgency.  END 
SUMMARY/COMMENT. 
 
A SERIES OF MISTAKES MAKES A BAD SITUATION WORSE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (C)  During the last year and a half we have witnessed  a 
troubling increase in violence by anti-government Muslims in 
the far South - often followed by a heavy handed government 
response (refs).  Violence in the South has been occurring in 
varying degrees since the Thais incorporated the Muslim Malay 
provinces into the Kingdom over 100 years ago.  This is not a 
new issue for the Thais.  But since the resurgence of 
violence in early 2004, Prime Minister Thaksin has made a 
series of decision which, in hindsight, have served to 
exacerbate the situation.  Most notable among these was the 
decision early into his first term to dissolve the combined 
civilian-police-military task force which since the 1980s had 
successfully managed to contain the separatist-related 
violence.  The Prime Minister was convinced that the southern 
insurgency had all but died out and thought that the task 
force was no longer necessary, an assessment that turned out 
to be drastically wrong. 
 
3.  (C)  The loss of the coordinating body has increased the 
natural propensity of Thai bureaucracy to stovepipe 
information and not cooperate operationally.  The problems 
caused by this lack of coordination have been compounded by 
the constant shifting of both the civilian leadership and 
uniformed commanders who have responsibility for the South. 
In addition, Thaksin has often set unrealistic deadlines for 
his deputies to "solve" the southern problem and has been 
inconsistent in his policy statements, creating a situation 
where the operational leadership has a weak mandate and lack 
of strategic focus.  He has wavered back and forth between 
carrot and stick.  On the one hand, he has reached out for 
hearts and minds, for example, through quick-fix economic 
incentives (subsidized food sales and funding to encourage 
sports).  On the other hand, he enacted the controversial 
emergency decree (refs A,C,D,E).  Despite the government's 
repeated public assurances that the decree will not lead to 
human rights abuses, the reaction from some of the Muslim 
community in the South was extremely negative, and the decree 
has provoked increased fear and suspicion of the government's 
intentions.  A senior Thai MFA official (ref A) has also 
expressed serious concern about the decree, indicating that 
some Thai officials are also concerned that the edict was 
poorly conceived. 
 
POLICY MISSTEPS DO NOT HURT THAKSIN POLITICALLY 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (C)  Thaksin inherited a long-standing problem and made 
it worse.  He faces serious criticism internationally and 
from some Thai NGOs and political opponents.  However -- and 
while it may be counterintuitive -- Thaksin is not paying a 
serious political price domestically for his failing southern 
policy.  Thaksin simply has not had the domestic political 
incentive to amend his policies, as many Thais, including 
Buddhist Thais in the South, actually want the government to 
take a harder line toward militants.  The overall effect of 
these attacks on Thai institutions and civilians has often 
been to bring out strong nationalistic feelings among the 
Buddhist majority and strengthen the Prime Minister's 
political position as a tough leader willing to make hard 
decisions. 
 
THAKSIN BEGINS TO UNDERSTAND 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Against this background, we sense a growing 
realization within the government and from Thaksin himself 
that they are not making sufficient progress, and that policy 
changes are necessary.  An advisor to the National Security 
Council (NSC) recently told us that the Prime Minister had 
developed a better understanding of the southern situation 
following a meeting with southern businessmen who were able 
to explain to the Prime Minister in economic terms -- the 
language Thaksin understands best -- the effect the 
insurgency is having on commercial interests in the South. 
His establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC) in March 2005 led by Anand Panyarchun, one of the most 
highly respected figures in Thailand, was a serious and 
positive development.  The NRC is working on proposals to 
address the underlying causes of the unrest.  The Commission 
is composed of highly credible and representative members, 
and Anand will not let himself be manipulated by Thaksin. 
 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENGAGEMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  When considering how we approach the Prime Minister 
on the South we should remember that Thaksin dominates the 
Thai political scene as no other civilian prime minister has 
before him.  Although his popularity has waned somewhat, 
according to recent opinion polls, he is still the confident, 
dominant leader of an overwhelming parliamentary majority. 
Additionally, Thaksin believes that he has established a 
personal relationship with the President, and often reminds 
visitors of their "common Texas roots."  To the media, 
Thaksin has likened his upcoming meeting with the President 
to a conversation between personal friends.  The meeting with 
the President therefore represents an excellent opportunity 
to raise our concerns about his sometimes erratic approach to 
dealing with the South while encouraging him to stay the 
present course as represented by the NRC, rather that the 
hardline approach embodied by the emergency decree.  Coming 
from the President -- a leader the Prime Minister clearly 
admires -- rather than through impersonal public statements, 
which often provoke a negative and contrary reaction, this 
message should resonate. 
 
7.  (C) The Prime Minister told Ambassador he is eager to 
explain his southern policy and to rebut concerns that his 
measures are dictatorial and counterproductive.  We suggest 
the following points in response: 
 
-- We recognize this is an internal Thai affair, but we are 
ready to cooperate to the extent we can, e.g., sharing 
intelligence, human rights training, and educational reform 
if the Thai side so desires. 
 
-- We appreciate the RTG's assurances that the emergency 
decree will not be used to justify human rights abuses in the 
South.  If there are human rights violations by security 
forces in the region, it will only exacerbate the problem, 
and could have a negative impact on our overall bilateral 
security cooperation programs.  We do not want that to 
happen. 
 
-- We are encouraged by the work of the National 
Reconciliation Commission; we are optimistic that this 
distinguished group will come up with good recommendations, 
and hope that the government will be able to work with them 
on implementation. 
BOYCE