US embassy cable - 05CAIRO6583

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006583 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, EG, IS, IZ, GZ, Visits 
SUBJECT: CODEL THORNBERRY MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR SOLIMAN 
 
REF: CAIRO 6447 
 
Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) In an August 23 meeting at the Egyptian General 
Intelligence Service (EGIS), Congressmen Thornberry and 
Cramer and Charge Jones discussed Gaza withdrawal, a 
post-withdrawal plan to preserve peace, and Iraq with EGIS 
Director Soliman.  Soliman stressed that the GOE would treat 
withdrawal from Gaza as a first step in a broader plan to 
implement the Road Map.  On Iraq, he urged the USG to 
reevaluate its focus on elections and work more effectively 
to end the violence, secure the border, and support 
humanitarian development.  End summary. 
 
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CODEL Thornberry meets EGIS Director Soliman 
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2.  (C)  Congressman Mac Thornberry (R/TX), Congressman 
Robert Cramer (D/AL) and HPSCI staff members Riley Purdue and 
Christine York met with EGIS Director Soliman for 
approximately one hour at EGIS headquarters on August 23. 
The delegation was accompanied by CDA Jones, ORA Chief Martin 
and poloff as Embassy notetaker. 
 
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Gaza withdrawal 
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3.  (C)  General Soliman praised PM Sharon as a brave leader 
who made the difficult decision to withdraw from Gaza a 
reality and thereby opened the door for implementation of the 
Road Map.  He added that by giving hope of a better life to 
the Palestinians, withdrawal will weaken the appeal of the 
Jihadi resistance.  In particular, development of 
electricity, water, education, and cultural centers, with the 
support of international donors, will inspire Palestinians to 
fight those who threaten the dawn of a new era of peace and 
prosperity. 
 
4.  (C)  GOE support for the withdrawal, Soliman explained, 
has focused on bolstering the GOI's sense of security and 
diffusing tension among Palestinian factions.  Soliman 
explained that shortly after the GOI announced the planned 
withdrawal, Sharon told Soliman to work with the Palestinians 
to make the process smooth or he would "destroy Gaza." 
Soliman said the factions commited to non-violence towards 
Israel for 2005, and he is optimistic that this commitment 
will be extended for 2006.  As for allaying the GOI's fear 
that post-withdrawal Gaza will be a ticking bomb, Soliman 
said that substituting professional border guards on the 
Egyptian border will address this concern and stop arms 
smuggling through the border tunnels.  Soliman speculated 
that the GOI may submit the border guard agreement between 
Israel and Egypt to the Knesset for approval as soon as the 
week of August 28.  If approved, Soliman predicted that 
deployment of the guards would take less than three weeks. 
Although the GOI and GOE have yet to agree on third party 
monitoring of border crossings such as Rafah, Soliman said 
that the parties do not want to use the United Nations in 
this role. 
 
5.  (C)  Congressman Thornberry thanked Soliman for the 
critical role Egypt has played to ensure a peaceful 
withdrawal and asked Soliman to comment on the strength of 
Abu Mazen's internal support.  Soliman stressed that Abu 
Mazen, along with the rest of the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
is committed to achieving peaceful coexistence through 
dialogue and realizes that Arafat was wrong to launch the 
intifada.  Nonetheless, Soliman said, Abu Mazen needs 
physical, political, and economic support, from the GOI in 
particular, to maintain the confidence of his people.  On 
this note, Soliman expressed his frustration at Israel's 
ongoing rejection of donor efforts to support the PA.  He 
offered, as an example, that the GOI has continued to deny 
import clearance for 50 cars (intended as a donation to the 
PA) that have been sitting at the Rafah border since 2000. 
In addition, the GOI refuses to allow the PA to receive 
rifles or ammunition.  Without this, Soliman said, the 
Palestinian Security Services have no hope of fighting Hamas 
or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Although many countries 
have offered to help the PA, they have grown tired of 
Israel's refusal to allow them to "deliver," and some have 
even stopped trying. 
 
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Next Steps 
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6.  (C)  In response to Congressman Cramer's question as what 
factors could impact further progress and Abu Mazen's 
influence after withdrawal, Soliman outlined his vision for 
advancing peace in 2006.  Touching first on the impact of 
Israeli internal politics, Soliman predicted that the Labor 
Party will withdraw from the coalition after withdrawal, 
leaving Sharon without adequate support for the budget.  If 
there is no budget by March 2006, Soliman said, the 
government will have to resign, and Sharon will call for an 
early election, perhaps in May.  All of these developments, 
Soliman explained, would likely create a "holding period" 
that could frustrate the Palestinians.  But Soliman said that 
to sustain Palestinian optimism, he will propose that Israel 
return to the line held on 28 September 2000 and redeploy IDF 
forces from the remaining five cities. 
 
7.  (C)  Soliman expressed doubt that any Palestinian faction 
would act against Israel in the near term because so doing 
would give Israel an excuse to retaliate.  In addition, 
Soliman noted that in the Cairo Declaration, Hamas and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad said they want to join the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).  This would be a 
positive step, Soliman emphasized, because it would mean the 
factions would become party to the Oslo Agreement and, in 
theory, their militias would need to surrender their arms to 
the PA when asked. 
 
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Iraq 
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8.  (C)  Revisiting a message delivered in a recent meeting 
with USG officials (see reftel), Soliman criticized the USG 
for focusing on building its version of democracy in Iraq and 
not taking the steps necessary to establish security and 
support economic development.  Soliman explained that the GOE 
is not belittling the democratic process, but believes it 
cannot function until security is established and economic 
development is proceeding.  Soliman accused the USG of "not 
caring" that the new Iraqi constitution may give privileges 
to Kurds that could lead to a civil war.  "You just stick to 
your track" by pushing for elections, he continued, even 
though Iraqis will not participate, and the elections results 
will remain unchanged. "Democracy under fire without full 
participation is not democracy," Soliman underscored. 
 
9.  (C)  Focusing on security, Soliman urged, is the only way 
forward because Iraq cannot build a democracy without the 
confidence of the people.  Soliman encouraged the USG to open 
a back channel with the Sunni insurgents, who, he said, are 
responsible for 70 percent of the violence.  The Coalition 
must not underestimate the power of the Sunnis, Soliman 
warned.  In addition, the Coalition must secure the borders 
because corruption is enabling foreigner fighters to enter 
Iraq freely.  This should be done through dialogue with Syria 
and Iran.  Soliman noted that it is in Iran's interest that 
Iraq remain poor and unstable, and added that thousands of 
Iranians, intelligence agents and insurgents, are going to 
Najaf and Karbala.  The USG must engage to counter this, he 
warned.  Likewise, Soliman suggested that the USG must engage 
with Syria so it does not "turn its eyes" when insurgents try 
to cross into Iraq.  Finally, Soliman said, that the 
Coalition should immediately press forward with economic 
development projects in peaceful areas in order to garner the 
support of the Iraqi people. 
 
10  (C)  Congressman Thornberry expressed appreciation for 
Soliman's advice and signaled that there may be an 
opportunity to reexamine the USG's approach in Iraq.  Both 
Congressmen thanked Soliman for GOE cooperation on terrorism, 
in particular, and the range of issues the GOE and USG face 
together. 
 
11. (U) The Codel did not have an opportunity to clear this 
cable. 
 
 
 
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JONES