US embassy cable - 05CAIRO6582

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

ADDITIONAL DETAIL ON GOE GTMO DETAINEE ASSURANCES

Identifier: 05CAIRO6582
Wikileaks: View 05CAIRO6582 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Cairo
Created: 2005-08-25 15:12:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER PREL PHUM PINR EG GTMO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
S E C R E T CAIRO 006582 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FO, ELA 
S/WCI FOR AMB. PROSPER, R. MILLER AND D. HODGKINSON 
L FOR J DOLAN 
DRL FOR C. CAMPONOVO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PHUM, PINR, EG, GTMO 
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL DETAIL ON GOE GTMO DETAINEE ASSURANCES 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 6487 
     B. STATE 147191 
 
Classified By: CDA Stuart E. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1. (S) This message adds additional detail to the GOE 
response regarding GTMO detainees as outlined in Ref A.  Post 
received this information through established liaison 
channels and through face-to-face meetings with Egyptian 
General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director Soliman. 
Soliman's thorough discussion of this issue coupled with 
separate discussions in liaison channels represents full 
Egyptian concurrence with the requested assurances for the 
transfer of Egyptian detainees.  End summary and comment. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Points Delivered and Acknowledged 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (S) Due to General Soliman's travel outside of Cairo, ORA 
liaison delivered ref B demarche both orally and via 
non-paper on August 14 to the Chief of the National Security 
Bureau at EGIS.  The Chief is responsible for all 
counterterrorism and detainee issues.  He acknowledged 
receipt of the points and said that he would pass them to 
General Soliman for his review.  General Soliman does not 
devolve decision-making authority on issues of such import. 
 
---------------- 
The GOE Response 
---------------- 
 
3. (S) General Soliman returned to Cairo in order to meet 
with Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence Peter Hoekstra and his delegation on August 20. 
Embassy Charge d'Affaires also attended the meeting.  Post 
had briefed the delegation on the assurances issue and we 
used this opportunity to press General Soliman for a detailed 
response the latest request for assurances. 
 
4. (S) The Egyptian response to the ref B demarche and to our 
presentation to General Soliman on August 20 was as follows: 
 
 -- Soliman acknowledged receipt and understanding of the ref 
B talking points, which were passed verbatim. 
 
-- Soliman affirmed Egypt's commitment to treat the subjects 
humanely, according to Egypt's law and its commitments and 
international obligations under the U.N. Convention Against 
Torture.  Soliman re-asserted that Egypt respects its 
obligations, and the returned detainees would not be 
subjected to torture. 
 
-- The detainees would not be held unless the Egyptian 
justice system had a case pending against them.  Were they to 
be detained, the American Embassy would be granted access to 
them as has been done in the past. 
 
-- Egypt is willing to accept the repatriation of the 
Egyptian Guantanamo detainees and take full custody and 
control of them upon their return. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
5. (S) As mentioned in ref A, the GOE would "rather (the 
detainees) stay in Guantanamo Bay," but have agreed to accept 
them in the spirit of counterterrorism cooperation.  As 
Soliman noted, accepting the detainees imposes a security 
risk on Egypt and will require the mobilization of resources 
to monitor the individuals to ensure they do not pose a risk 
to Egyptian or U.S. national security. 
 
6. (S) Soliman's Aug 20 presentation on this subject 
represents the definitive Egyptian response to our request 
for assurances. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
JONES 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04