US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1493

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001493 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WANTS TALKS WITH TIGERS AT 
HOME; ASKS FOR TOUGHER U.S. STANCE AGAINST LTTE 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1460 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. OSLO 1263 (NOTAL) 
     C. COLOMBO 1453 (NOTAL) 
     D. 04 COLOMBO 1999 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B, 
D). 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see Para 12. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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2.  (C) Nearly a week after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) agreed to talks with the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) to strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement, details 
regarding the timing, venue and level of participation remain 
unresolved.  The GSL rejected an initial proposal that the 
talks take place in Oslo, fearing that the European venue 
might be perceived as a "reward" for the Tigers' August 12 
assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. 
Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar told Charge' August 25 
that he expects the talks will take place within the next two 
weeks, possibly at a location in "no-man's land" between GSL- 
and LTTE-controlled territories in northern Sri Lanka.  The 
Norwegian envoy denied Sri Lankan press reports that Norway 
had urged the EU not to list the LTTE as a terrorist 
organization.  The GSL looks to the U.S. to send the LTTE "a 
very, very strong message" that Kadirgamar's assassination 
makes "business as usual" impossible, Sri Lankan Foreign 
Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara told Charge' on August 24.  In 
 
SIPDIS 
particular, Palihakkara sought U.S. assistance in persuading 
other countries, including the EU, to ban the LTTE and to 
investigate the flow of money from the Tamil diaspora to the 
Tigers.  Embassy recommends that the Department raise with 
Brussels the possibility of listing the LTTE as a terrorist 
organization; encourage the Governments of Thailand and 
Indonesia to investigate reported LTTE weapons procurements 
in those countries; and review possible sources of LTTE 
funding in the U.S.   End summary. 
 
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FROM NORWAY TO "NO-MAN'S LAND": 
TALKS VENUE SHIFTS AFTER GSL GRUMBLING 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Nearly a week after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) agreed to talks with the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) to strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement, details 
regarding the timing, venue and level of participation remain 
unresolved.  Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar told Charge' 
on August 25 that he remains in the middle of GSL and LTTE 
jockeying over these specifics.  He said it is increasingly 
likely, however, that the talks will be held in Sri Lanka 
instead of Oslo, which had been originally suggested as a 
venue (Ref B).  Where in Sri Lanka, however, remains up in 
the air.  The GSL refuses to meet at LTTE headquarters in 
Kilinochchi, while the LTTE, citing purported security 
concerns, has rejected Colombo.  Brattskar said the 
Norwegians are thus working for agreement on a neutral site 
like the "no-man's land" between GSL- and LTTE-held 
territories in the north.  To assuage LTTE concerns about 
security, Brattskar said he has suggested that the Norwegians 
accompany the Tigers from Kilinochchi on the drive down to an 
agreed-upon location in "no-man's land"--most likely Omanthai 
in the northern district of Vavuniya.  Brattskar said that 
the meeting could take place as early as next week, but the 
following week is likelier, assuming the remaining details 
can be worked out.  Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar 
Helgesen would come for the meeting, Brattskar predicted, 
while London-based LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham almost 
certainly would not. 
 
4.  (C)  The GSL had strongly opposed the selection of Oslo 
as a venue for several reasons.  In an August 22 meeting, 
Acting GSL Peace Secretariat head John Gooneratne told 
Charge' that if the purpose of the proposed talks truly was 
to address ways to strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), 
working-level, technical discussions between the military 
commanders of both sides familiar with "the ground realities" 
would be the most practical vehicle to achieve that. 
Military-to-military meetings used to occur regularly at the 
district level, Gooneratne observed, and proved very helpful 
in preserving the CFA, but the LTTE has stopped participating 
in them except in Jaffna.  If the venue were Oslo, the LTTE 
would send a high-level political delegation (most likely led 
by Tiger ideologue Thamilchelvan), which "will talk in 
generalities with no reference to what is going on on the 
ground."  The LTTE mouthpieces would use Oslo as a backdrop 
for posturing and evasiveness, instead of making firm 
commitments to end violations of the CFA, Gooneratne 
predicted.  The GSL had been looking for some time for ways 
to strengthen the CFA--not to rewrite it--but the "LTTE has a 
different idea of what the talks should be.  They see talks 
as a delaying tactic," Gooneratne said, and "as a way of 
avoiding (the) international opprobrium" the LTTE deserves 
for Kadirgamar's assassination. 
 
5.  (C)  In an August 24 discussion, Foreign Secretary 
H.M.G.S. Palihakkara emphasized to the Charge' that the 
perception of an Oslo venue as a reward for the Kadirgamar 
killing could cause President Kumaratunga's embattled 
government significant political damage.  "Our commitment to 
the peace process is unchanged," the Foreign Secretary 
explained, but "we're faced with a credibility problem." 
Kumaratunga has already come under fire from her right-wing 
rivals for proposing talks so soon after the assassination; 
an all-expense paid Tiger boondoggle to a European capital 
would only "give the extremists a chunky bone to chew on." 
To dispel that perception, the GSL was prepared to accept 
working-level CFA talks at any venue in Sri Lanka except LTTE 
headquarters in Kilinochchi, Palihakkara said. 
 
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POSSIBLE EU DESIGNATION: 
BEARS FURTHER SCRUTINY 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Both Gooneratne and Palihakkara complained to Charge' 
about reports in the Sri Lankan media that Norwegian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Helgesen had told an Oslo press conference 
that Norway does not support an EU designation of the LTTE as 
a terrorist organization.  The GSL had been looking for "more 
muscular facilitation" from Norway, Gooneratne lamented; 
"continually humoring the Tigers" is not productive.  While 
the GSL is pursuing talks with the Tigers, it is also looking 
to its friends in the international community, including the 
U.S., to send "a very, very strong message" to the LTTE that 
its "culture of impunity" for Kadirgamar's assassination and 
other violence is completely unacceptable, Palihakkara said. 
Although the GSL "got positive feedback from several European 
countries," the Foreign Secretary asserted, Norway is 
militating against the EU listing the Tigers as a terrorist 
organization. 
 
7.  (C)  In his August 25 meeting with Brattskar, Charge' 
passed on GSL discomfiture at Helgesen's alleged remarks to 
the press in Oslo advising against EU listing of the LTTE. 
Brattskar said the GSL had made its frustration clear to him 
as well, adding that the Sri Lankan Embassy in Oslo had also 
raised it there.  Brattskar maintained, however, that 
Helgesen's comments had been miscast by "journalists who 
don't know anything about Sri Lanka." 
 
8.  (C)  As facilitator, Norway takes no position on what 
individual countries or regional groupings choose to do 
regarding the LTTE, Brattskar clarified, and Helgesen's 
comments had not been an effort to tell the EU what to do. 
Rather, Brattskar said, Helgesen had been suggesting that all 
the possible ramifications of an EU listing be carefully 
thought through.  (Note:  This tracks with Ref B report of 
Helgesen's August 19 briefing to the diplomatic corps in 
Oslo.  End note.) For example, if the EU listed the LTTE, 
could its citizens still continue to serve with the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), in which Danes, Swedes and Finns 
make up the majority?  Would listing the LTTE affect the 
ability of EU member states to participate in the 
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)? 
Brattskar said he had also pointed out to the GSL that an EU 
listing of the LTTE could cut off all other European channels 
of communication with the Tigers except Norway at a time when 
the GSL periodically stipulates that the Norwegians should 
not be the only channel.  In sum, Brattskar said, the GSL 
sees EU listing as a key element of a "crackdown" against the 
LTTE in the wake of Kadirgamar's assassination but has not 
analyzed all of the possible ramifications.  Brattskar 
confided to the Charge' that he had suggested to Oslo that it 
seek guidance from Foreign Ministry lawyers on what the legal 
implications of an EU listing would be for Norway's 
facilitation role. 
 
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PASSING THE WORD TO THE LTTE: 
NOT "BUSINESS AS USUAL" 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) While the GSL has made clear that Kadirgamar's 
assassination has not altered its commitment to the 
ceasefire, it "badly needs help" from friendly nations like 
the U.S. to send a strong, "public indication" to the Tigers 
that it is contemplating "certain actions" to tighten 
restrictions on the LTTE, Palihakkara said.  Acknowledging 
that the U.S. listing of the Tigers as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization already imposes more stringent sanctions than 
most other governments have in place, the Foreign Secretary 
said that his government is seeking "U.S. leadership in 
sending a strong message that the LTTE culture of impunity 
cannot prevail" and the LTTE cannot go back to "business as 
usual" after the brutal assassination.  He and the Charge' 
discussed several potential measures, including looking at 
money flows from the U.S., possibly via the Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), to LTTE coffers.  Listing 
key LTTE leaders as individuals, in addition to the LTTE as 
an organization, could also have an important symbolic 
effect, Palihakkara said.  He asked that the U.S. also urge 
the EU to explore the possibility of listing the LTTE, adding 
that the Indian government had agreed to undertake a similar 
demarche. 
 
10.  (C)  Palihakkara said that the GSL had approached the 
Governments of Indonesia and Thailand about reported LTTE 
weapons procurements in their countries, adding that the 
"Thais are more serious (about terrorism) now," especially 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, while "Indonesia is much 
more difficult."  In general, he reported, "We've made some 
headway, but haven't touched the core of the (LTTE arms 
procurement) network" in Southeast Asia. 
 
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NEXT CO-CHAIR MEETING? 
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11.  (C) Brattskar told Charge' that he understood from Oslo 
that a co-chairs meeting on the margins of the UNGA on either 
September 15, 16 or 19 was under discussion.  He added that 
any of those three dates would work for Oslo. 
 
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ACTION REQUEST 
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12.  (C)  The GSL has laudably renewed its public commitment 
to upholding the ceasefire and pursuing the peace process in 
the wake of Kadirgamar's murder.  By doing so, President 
Kumaratunga faces substantial domestic political risks, 
especially as her government may face elections in the next 
few months.  We recommend the Department consider the 
following U.S. measures to help support the GSL in this 
difficult period and to increase international pressure on 
the LTTE: 
 
--Demarches to the governments of Indonesia and Thailand 
urging them to crack down on reported LTTE weapons 
procurement operations in their countries; 
--A demarche in Brussels to sound out EU thinking on listing 
the LTTE as a terrorist organization.  Emphasize that we 
believe listing would be a powerful message but that we 
understand there are various ramifications, e.g., 
restrictions on EU contacts with LTTE in Sri Lanka, that must 
be fully explored; 
 
--Investigate possible LTTE fundraising in the U.S., as 
recommended in Ref D; 
 
--Explore the possibility of designating key LTTE leaders as 
individuals. 
 
 
 
ENTWISTLE