US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1243

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECHS QUESTIONING TURKISH ACCESSION, BUT LIKELY 
TO SUPPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 150087 
 
     B. 2004 PRAGUE 1666 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Czech public and official position on 
Turkey's EU accession has softened noticeable from late last 
year, when the GOCR came out clearly in favor.  A petition 
opposing Turkish accession received 12,000 signatures last 
month; the Foreign Minister this week published an editorial 
saying the EU needs to chose integration over enlargement. 
MFA officials state that the GOCR position in the upcoming 
Gymnich and in future debate will depend in part on the EC's 
assessment of the legality of the recent Turkish government 
statement against recognition of Cyprus.  However, despite 
the public and private misgivings from the MFA, staff there 
admit that the numbers do not add up for an EU vote to modify 
last December's decision.  The UK Embassy is confident the 
Czechs will maintain formal, albeit lukewarm, support for the 
talks.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Last year, former PM Stanislav Gross took a clear 
position in favor of Turkish accession, overcoming the 
natural reluctance of Christian Democratic FM Cyril Svoboda 
(ref B).  In speeches and in a published editorial, Gross 
pledged Czech support for accession on terms similar to those 
applied to the Czech Republic.  However, Gross was careful to 
remain within the EU mainstream and the Czechs never took an 
active role in the internal EU debate. 
 
3. (C) With the EU mainstream having shifted following the 
constitutional referenda defeats, the Czech position has also 
shifted.  PM Paroubek has not yet spoken out on the question 
of Turkish accession talks.  This has offered the MFA free 
rein in shaping the internal debate.  Thus it was Svoboda who 
first published an editorial, in the August 23 edition of 
Pravo entitled "Integration of the Union, not enlargement." 
He frames the debate over enlargement solely in the context 
of the twin referenda defeats and the imperative of the EU to 
immediately address the complaints that led the French and 
Dutch voters to say no.  He warns against a "helter-skelter 
enlargement," that enlargement "beyond those countries that 
belong to Europe" is not on the agenda, and that "empty and 
cheap promises" will end up reducing the EU's ability to 
absorb new entries.  His comments are not explicitly directly 
against Turkey, but the context is clear. 
 
4. (C) Svoboda's published comments tracked with those of MFA 
Director for EU Coordination Tomas Ulicny, who told Pol-Econ 
Counselor on August 19 that the GOCR position on launching 
negotiations October 3 had to reflect the "new reality" in 
Europe and the Czech Republic following the referenda 
defeats.  As evidence of the latter, he lifted a three-inch 
thick binder that allegedly contained 12,000 signatures from 
Czechs opposed to Turkish accession (the petition was open 
over a two-week period following a July 29 demonstration on 
Wenceslas Square against EU accession, organized by Czech MEP 
Josef Zieleniec as part of the "Voice for Europe" campaign). 
 
5. (C) Discussing the landscape of EU members on Turkish 
accession, Ulicny termed the UK, Spain and Italy the only 
firm supporters, with Germany, France, the Netherlands and 
"the Nordics" firm opponents.  He said the Czechs are now in 
the "ambiguous" category.  In the end he admitted that a 
qualified majority in favor of changing the December decision 
was probably impossible, but he continued with a strong 
argument against accession.  While Ulicny readily accepted 
the strategic importance of opening the Turkish negotiations 
as agreed last December, he immediately dismissed the USG 
position by stating this ignores the "cost" of Turkish 
accession, "which the Czechs and other Europeans will be 
paying, not the U.S." 
 
6. (C) Ulicny said that in the end the GOCR position would be 
determined by the question of whether the recent Turkish 
declaration refusing to recognize Cyprus was found to be 
against the acquis.  Ulicny said MFA lawyers had determined 
it is not, but that the MFA prefers to wait for a ruling by 
Commission lawyers, which he expects will come in the days 
prior to the September 1-2 Gymnich. 
 
7. (C) Ulicny reported that Turkish MFA U/S Sensoy would 
visit Prague on August 25 for a single meeting with Czech MFA 
Deputy Minister Muller.  (Note:  Embassy will follow-up with 
Ulicny and the Turkish embassy after this visit). 
 
8. (C) Ulicny's boss, Europe Director General Hana Mottlova, 
told Charge August 24 that a change in the Czechs' formal 
position on accession talks was unlikely given the UK 
Presidency's firm position.  She added that she was surprised 
by the FM's editorial the previous day. 
 
9. (C) UK Embassy DCM reports HMG is confident the discussion 
at the Gymnich will not alter the status quo, and further 
that they see little likelihood that the Czechs will end up 
opposing the start of accession talks on schedule. 
10. (C) Comment:  The FM's published comments and the 
passions of one of his senior staff against Turkish accession 
were both a significant departure from past debate on the 
topic.  It is not clear how much this reflects a true shift 
in public opinion post-referenda, as opposed to absence of a 
firm position in favor of accession from the Prime Minister. 
While our bottom-line assessment is that, in the end, the 
GOCR is not likely to actively oppose launching talks in 
October, the level of support is notably softer here than it 
was last year.  We will need to continue to engage the 
Czechs, and focus on the Prime Minister himself. 
MUNTER