US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4965

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ACTION REQUEST: TURKEY CONCERNED THAT NEW CONSTITUTION WILL GIVE KURDS A GREEN LIGHT ON KIRKUK

Identifier: 05ANKARA4965
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA4965 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-08-24 16:42:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV TU IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241642Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004965 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: TURKEY CONCERNED THAT NEW 
CONSTITUTION WILL GIVE KURDS A GREEN LIGHT ON KIRKUK 
 
REF: ANKARA 4873 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Timothy A. Betts for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request--please see para. 7. 
 
2. (C) Summary: Turkey believes the language on Kirkuk in the 
Iraqi draft constitution will remove safeguards currently in 
place in the TAL and give the Iraqi Kurds a "green light" to 
press forward with making the province part of the KRA. 
Turkey sees such a development (if true) as "explosive," and 
asks that the U.S. use its influence to "restore balance" on 
Kirkuk in the constitution.  Post seeks clarification on the 
current state of play on Kirkuk in the constitutional process 
to pass to the Turks.  End summary. 
 
3. (C) On instructions from FonMin Gul, MFA Director General 
for the Middle East Oguz Celikkol called in A/DCM Aug. 24 to 
express Turkey's concerns about articles in the new Iraqi 
constitution which reportedly remove "safeguards" which had 
been present in the TAL which would prohibit Kirkuk from 
becoming part of the KRA.  Specifically, Celikkol referred to 
Articles 149 and 152 of what he said was the current draft 
constitution, and pointed out that they refer only to TAL 
Article 58 and to para. a of TAL Article 53.  The Turks are 
particularly alarmed that para. c of Article 53 has been 
removed; this para. specifically bars Kirkuk (and Baghdad) 
provinces from becoming part of any regional grouping. 
Additionally, according to Celikkol, the draft constitution 
sets a low bar for demanding a provincial referendum on 
joining a regional grouping: one-third of the members of a 
provincial council or a petition signed by ten percent of a 
province's population would be sufficient. 
 
4. (C) Celikkol asserted that the draft constitution upsets 
the previous balance hammered out within the TAL to protect 
Kirkuk's special status.  The Iraqi Kurdish groups will see 
this outcome as a "green light" for their demand to take over 
Kirkuk and make it part of the KRA.  Many thousands of Kurds 
have already moved into the province since 2003.  This, 
combined with the constitutional language, make it a fait 
accompli that Kirkuk will come under Kurdish control, he 
argued.  Celikkol added that he understood that Sistani had 
issued a statement opposing Kirkuk's incorporation into the 
KRA.  If this is the case, and if the Sunnis were also to 
oppose this, "the situation is explosive," he said. 
 
5. (C) A/DCM asked if Turkey was also discussing its concerns 
with the Iraqis.  Celikkol responded that he understands that 
the constitution is being hammered out by a very small circle 
in Baghdad: SCIRI leader Hakim, KDP leader Barzani, and 
Ambassador Khalilzad.  Celikkol complained that there is no 
easy ITG address in Baghdad with whom to speak about such 
issues.  He said Turkey does talk to Hakim in general terms 
about Kirkuk, but has not discussed specific constitutional 
language with him or the Shia.  Discussing the issue with the 
Kurds is "difficult."  As for the Sunni Arabs, the Turks want 
to concentrate their dialogue on encouraging them to 
participate in the political process, not on specific Turkish 
complaints.  Turkey is asking the U.S. to use our influence 
to keep safeguards in place on Kirkuk in the constitution. 
If these safeguards are removed, Celikkol argued, it may 
"unleash additional tensions and divisions in Iraq." 
 
6. (C) A/DCM pointed out that we were being careful to ensure 
that the constitutional process was an Iraqi process.  Amb. 
Khalilzad and our Embassy were working hard to promote 
dialogue and bring the parties together, but if the language 
the Turks are concerned about is agreed to by all sides, we 
cannot change it.  Noting that post has not seen a draft with 
the kind of language the Turks have found, and that several 
of Acting U/S Sensoy's earlier claims about the text to the 
Charge had proven to be erroneous (reftel), A/DCM asked if 
the text the Turks had obtained was authoritative.  We 
understood that there are many different draft texts in 
circulation in Baghdad.  Celikkol responded that it had come 
from the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad, which was translating 
the text it had received from Arabic to Turkish.  He added 
that the Turkish ambassador in Baghdad was talking to a 
number of contacts, including members of the constitutional 
drafting committee, so he felt confident that the text was 
genuine.  He added that if we can clarify whether the text is 
authoritative, he would be grateful. 
 
7. (C) Action request and comment: Request Washington or 
Embassy Baghdad confirm our latest understanding of the state 
of play on Kirkuk in the draft constitution so that we may 
convey this to the Turks.  We have encouraged the Turks to 
discuss this issue with the Iraqis.  While we cannot comment 
on the impact the language on Kirkuk will have in Iraq, 
Turkey will react negatively and harshly if the 
constitutional language on Kirkuk is as the Turks claim. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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